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When the first publication of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s magnum opus Wahrheit imd 
Meihode (Truth and Method) came to life in 1960, the work was initially received with a 
slight sense of puzzlement and yet concurrently acknowledged as monumental. The title, 
in English, Truth and Method, was regarded by the philosophical community both in 
Germany and abroad as being somewhat obscure, as Gadamer himself would later admit/ 
but the ingeniousness of the book’s content could hardly be debated. Since its initial 
publication. Truth and Method hZiS, respectively helped to expand and light up the horizon 
of modern hermeneutics by provoking, at once, a reconsideration of the phenomenon of 
understanding while, at the same time, enlivening the debate over scientific methodology 
and its exclusive claim to truth.
The central aim of the present thesis has been to focus on Part I of Truth and 
Method, concentrating primarily on the 'guiding humanistic concepts’ and the experience 
of truth in art, to clarify Gadamer’s understanding of truth and to shed new light as to how 
the experience of tmth is to be grasped in relation to the human sciences, i.e. the 
humanities. The humanistic concepts, I believe, are vital to understanding the experience 
of truth. One reason, which leads me to this conclusion, is that in Truth and Method 
Gadamer begins his philosophical undertaking with the elucidation of the humanistic 
concepts rather than with a direct exposition of truth. By opening with the humanistic 
concepts, Gadamer seems to demonstrate subtly the phenomenological and ontological 
nature of knowledge and understanding. The outcome of this manoeuvre is that one comes 
to realise that truth does not simply belong to method and that it is not something which 
can be defined solely as ‘absolute certainty’. Moreover, in my interview with Professor 
Gadamer, the humanistic concepts, he explained to me, are the most ‘natural’ and 
‘original’ concepts. By natural and original, he means that these concepts are intrinsic. 
They evolve from life as well as being a part o f life, i.e. a way o f living. Thus these 
concepts, he affirmed, represent ‘a way of life’ and a way to truth. Consequently, insofar 
as comprehending the phenomenon of truth, I believe any and every investigation of the 
concept of truth must begin with the understanding of the humanistic tradition.
The following thesis however does not end simply with the humanistic concepts. It 
also devotes to examining the truth-claim or the ‘truth-experience’ of art. This part of the
' See 'Refleclions on My Philosophical Journey’ in The Ptnlosophy o f  Hans-Geot% Gadamer. (Eci. Lewis E. Halm. 
Chicago; Open Court Publishing Co., 1997.), p. 17.
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inquiry centres on two important questions; (1.) How are we to understand art? (2.) What 
does it mean to experience art? The challenge here has been to show how Gadamer 
overcomes Kant’s subjectivation of the aesthetic experience and to demonstrate how and 
why Gadamer considers the experience of art as the ‘self-presentation’ of being.
In surveying the various works of criticism I have tried to draw attention to what 
seem to me to be the most insightful comments and analyses. If I have failed in any way to 
supply proper acknowledgement to ideas, which might seem close to other critical works, I 
offer my apologies. As I am sure those in the research business know well, in reflection 
ideas often interfuse with one’s own, making it difficult sometimes to discriminate 
between one’s own ideas from another’s. However, I have tried my best to keep from that 
error.
Introduction
What is ‘truth’? How do we in our time understand the concept of truth? Is truth 
what is exclusively opened to the ‘exact sciences’, i.e. the natural sciences, and accessible 
only through rigorous scientific method? If so, how are we to think about and understand 
the variety of knowledge-claims that exist beyond scientific exactitude and methodological 
procedure? Are we simply to deem these knowledge-claims as irrelevant and abandon them 
since they possess no ‘truth’, or do we accept them as lesser knowledge-claims with 
minimal significance? Or better yet, can we nevertheless understand them simply as equals 
to scientific knowledge? And what if we consider that the phenomenon of truth is neither 
confined nor restricted to the so-called ‘objective sciences’, what happens then? Do we not 
undermine all accepted standards of truth and objectivity (as determined by the modern 
sciences) if we stretch the possibility of ‘truth happening’ into the domain of the ‘lifeworld’ 
{Lebensweltyi If not, how are we to access those truth-claims in the interpretive disciplines, 
such as art, history, literature and philosophy, which transcend the realm of the natural 
sciences? Do we continue to employ the reputable ‘scientific method’ to secure and 
guarantee their truth-claims, or are there other possible avenues, independent of method, to 
realise an experience of tmth? And finally, what does it mean, if anytliing at all, to have an 
experience of truth? In his magnum opus Wahrheit und Methode: Grimdziige einer 
Philosophischen Hermemiitik Hans-Georg Gadamer offers a fascinating attempt to unravel 
these profound and challenging questions which have perplexed Western thought since its 
very beginning. With rich pliilosophical thoroughness, he presents a heterogeneous 
exposition of truth which consists of an intriguing critique of culture that offers a unique re­
thinking of concepts, such as ‘prejudice’, ‘authority’, ‘tradition’ and ‘language’ as well as a 
sophisticated review of modern aesthetic theoiy -  Immanuel Kant’s Critique o f Judgement 
(1790) in particular -  and of historical understanding, which have developed gradually since 
the age of Enlightenment. But also central to Gadamer’s treatise is Martin Heidegger’s 
‘hermeneutics of facticity’, sometimes referred to as ‘hermeneutic phenomenology’. In fact, 
it can be said without exaggeration that Gadamer discovers in Heideggerian thought the 
necessary stmctural foundation and the conceptual tools for formulating his own 
‘philosophical hermeneutics’.
The Claim for Hermeneutic Truth beyond the Parameters of Method
In Truth and Method Gadamer begins from the standpoint that there is truth beyond 
the ‘sciences’ and argues explicitly that experiences of truth can neither be left to the
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modern sciences to be discovered nor synthetically limited to the sphere of scientific study, 
since such events are intertwined and difihised into the very fabric of ‘Being’, In his view 
the understanding of truth, with which our modern time has become acquainted, has been 
artificially narrowed, especially since the age of Cartesian rationalism, to denote something 
that is wholly ‘absolute’, i.e. possessing ‘atemporal certainty’, and that which can solely be 
discovered through scientific method. This perception of truth, Gadamer explains, was 
dramatically fostered in the eighteenth century by the analytic tradition of German Idealism, 
which found its point of departure in the Kantian critiques. Since then, the phenomenon of 
truth as ‘absolute knowing’, to use Hegel’s phrase, became strictly monopolised by the 
modern sciences and thought to be acquired only tlirough the spirit of methodical research 
and progress. However this view of truth as certainty, Gadamer contends, denies the 
possibility of truth-claims, for instance, in art or literature, where knowledge is not based on 
fixed empirical data that can be studied, verified and reproduced through method, but is 
conditioned by uncontrollable and inexhaustible variables, such as the imagination, intuition 
and artistic sensibility of the artist or writer. Although the study of Geisleswissemchaften^ 
neither demands or proffers proof nor begins with a clear, general mle, Gadamer maintains 
that it nevertheless possesses indispensable truth-claims that must be sought after and 
understood. But how can we realise those experiences of truth that lie outside the dominion 
of the modern ‘natural sciences’? Do we require and rely on the ideal of verification by 
method? The answer, for Gadamer, is a clear and definitive no! The human sciences, he 
declares:
. . are joined with modes of experience which lie outside science: with the 
experiences of philosophy, of art, and of histoiy itself. These are all modes of 
experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the 
methodological means proper to science {Truth and M ethod  xii / Wahrheit und M ethode 
xiii-xiv)^
 ^ The tenn Geisteswissenschaften translates into English as the ‘human sciences’. From hereafter, both tenus will be 
used interchangeably.
■ Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method. (2"‘* ed. London; Sheed and Ward, 1979); Wahrheit und Methode. 
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Molir (Paul Siebeck), 1960). All citations for Truth and Method will be cited hereafter as TM. Tlie 
original Gentian edition Wahrheit mid Methode will also be cited along side tlie English ftanslation as WM. 
Unfortimately, due to limited resources I have been forced to compromise myself to use tlie edition of Wahrheit und 
Methode instead of tlie 2“^^ or tlie 3^  edition. However, it should be noted that tliere is, according to Gadamer, 
essentially very little change between the first and the other two editions. The minor alteration to tlie second edition
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In contrast to his predecessors, such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Johann Droysen and 
Wilhelm Dilthey whose hermeneutical preoccupation was with developing a strict 
methodological system, comparable to that of the modern natural sciences, to legitimise the 
scientificity of the human sciences epistemologically, Gadamer rejects entirely the premise 
that method is the sole provider of truth and guarantor of validity of all sciences, and posits 
instead that the revelation of truth-claims in the human sciences occurs within the 
phenomenon of understanding (Verstandigtmg) that comes from dialectic and dialogue. In 
providing a critical analysis of modern hermeneutics, Gadamer, in Truth and Method, 
reveals how all attempts in the last hundred and fifty years to justify the 
Geisteswissenschaften as sciences did not succeed, on the account that every undertaking 
persisted in defending the human sciences by following Kant -  modelling the idea of science 
and knowledge on the natural sciences and seeking the distinctive features of human 
sciences in the artistic element (artistic feeling, artistic induction). His explication shows 
most clearly how Schleiermacher, Droysen and Dilthey all failed to escape fi'om the negative 
notion of ‘inaccurate sciences’ -  with which human sciences are still identified -  due to their 
insistence on viewing the human sciences through the eyes of a modern natural scientist. 
Their conception of themselves as scientists, in other words, was based on the standard of 
the natural sciences. What is more, Gadamer’s critique and criticism against the method- 
guided consciousness of the modern hermeneutic theorists likewise pertain to the positivists 
of the mid-twentieth century, whose aim was to equate the Geisteswissenschaften on the 
same plane as the natural sciences. However the positivists, Gadamer explains, did not 
aclmowledge the fundamental differences that Dilthey had made between the natural 
sciences and the Geisteswissenschaften, but they rather assumed that the methodology 
supplied by the natural sciences could in fact provide the human sciences with an accurate, 
objective method of inquiry, unaffected by changes in historical and scientific norms and 
premises. Put simply, they claimed that establishing a strict scientific method for the 
Geisteswissenschaften could abolish all subjective intrusions. From Gadamer’s point of 
view, however, such a methodological approach to the human sciences is inapplicable since 
it dismisses all cognitive value for disciplines which are influenced by the imagination and 
talent.
can be found in the new Foreword. It should also be noted tliat the English translation used here is based on the second 
edition of Wahrheit mid Methode ratlier than the first. In fact, there are no English translations of the first edition.
Inù'oduction
According to Gadamer, the Geisteswissenschaften as science ‘cannot be fitted into 
the modern concept of science’ (TM 9 / WM 5). Consequently, he argues that the search for 
a methodological approach to discover and justify truth-claims in human sciences is 
inappropriate, for it presupposes that the essence of truth discovered in the humanities is 
analogous to that found in the natural sciences. Indeed, to articulate about knowledge or 
truth-claims in the human sciences, is not the same as speaking about the certainty of 
algorithmic theorems. Whereas in the ‘objective sciences’ the ideal of truth is equated with 
self-certainty, i.e. with indubitable principles wliich can serve as starting points for 
discovering new general principles, obviously in the Geisteswissenschaften there are no 
irreformable, clear and distinct, absolutely certain principles, no indisputable general law or 
first rule that can lead to new maxims. The human sciences’ claims to truth, in comparison 
to the natural sciences, are of a different kind and order. They do not concern themselves 
with entities that exist ‘out there’ in the world or how those entities came into existence; 
they are rather in the business of exploring the phenomenon of ‘Being’ of human beings. 
Their truth-claims are rather discovered and defined in respect to the human condition, to 
the historicity of mankind; consequently, their clarity and certainty are only acquired within 
the continuum of Being. ‘The historical sense, which the human sciences cultivate in 
themselves’, Gadamer explains, ‘brings with it a habituation to changing standards that lead 
to an uncertainty about the use of our own standards’.^  What is more, the language of the 
human sciences is very different from the language of the natural sciences. The use of 
dissimilar languages indicates most clearly in advance that the human sciences’ claim to 
truth is not identical to that o f the natural sciences. Modern sciences speak in terms of 
monological ‘sign’ language. Words are principally used as an instrument for exact 
designation. They function as signs or designators which point to things. The symbolic 
language of mathematics, for instance, is static, self-contained and limited in its scope. 
Although new concepts may be added to mathematical language, existing concepts seldom 
evolve or expand their meaningfulness. Concepts, for the most part, are mainly univocal, 
fixed and precise in their indication. For example, if we take the simple formula for speed: v 
= d/t (velocity = distance/time) or the chemical equation for water: H2O = 2H + O (H2O or 
water 2 hydrogen + 1 oxygen), what is understood here is a specific and precise
 ^Hans-Georg Gadamer. ‘Tmtli in tlie Hmnan Sciences’ in Hermeneutics and Truth. (Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 1994), p. 27.
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designation of concepts. There is no ambiguity regarding the meaning of the equation or 
formula since there is one and only one understanding for each concept. This inert 
character of scientific ‘sign’ language is what enables that which is designated to be tested, 
confirmed and reproduced through method. Scientific terms, in other words, do not speak 
but indicate: ‘It can be stated as a fundamental principle that wherever words assume a mere 
sign function, the original connection between speaking and thinking, with which we are 
concerned, is changed into an instrumental relationship’ (TM 392 / WM 410). In complete 
contrast, the language of the human sciences is ‘natural’ and ‘living’. It is dynamic, ever 
growing and changing. The terms we use in the human sciences possess a horizon of 
meaningfulness, and consequently (metaphorical) ambiguity is inescapable. But precisely 
because words often possess multiple meanings, this character of plurality also supplies the 
concepts with a saying-power. Gadamer affirms:
Slowly I became aware that the language customarily used in German philosophy 
was not just full of preconceptions and prejudices, but also full of depth and 
significance. Gradually I came to heed the speaking power of words, a power which 
still goes on speaking in every linguistic usage and in its antecedents. In sum, the 
language of philosophy itself began to speak again.
Hence, the concepts of the Geisteswissenschaften do not indicate and explain; they disclose 
and ‘express’! Their significance lies not in exactitude but in expression. Words articulate 
and disclose themselves in such a way that we learn them. We acquire an understanding of 
a word, i.e. its meaningfulness, over time, as the word discloses itself to us as it is in its 
selfsameness. If one makes the assertion that ‘Juliet is beautiful’, for instance, this assertion 
does not so much indicate precisely what Juliet ‘is’, instead it expresses a multifarious and 
inexhaustible range of qualities that ‘could’ characterise Juliet. The word beautiful is not a 
closed concept, and thus it cannot be determined ‘absolutely’. Within this one concept, 
there are many other concepts, which are full of their own meaningfulness, that have 
become embedded over its living history. Consequently, this makes the assertion, ‘Juliet is 
beautiful’, equivocal; but at the same time, the term beautiful spealcs of Juliet in certain a  ^
light so that we can learn something of her from the inherent richness of the concept, and in 
turn Juliet also discloses a particular character of the word ‘beautiful’. Obviously, there is
Hans-Georg Gadamer. ‘Reflections on My Philosophical Jonniey’, op. cit., 21.
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no precision or pinpoint accuracy in such an assertion. But does this mean that such 
assertions, which do not use an univocal system of signs, are false or less true than 
mathematical propositions? Certainly, this is not the case, in that we are not comparing two 
identical twins but two very individual and dissimilar sciences, each with their own 
particular set of vocabulary and ‘method’ of disclosure. Since the language of the human 
sciences is not an instrument of designation, their truth-claims cannot be discovered through 
scientific method. Method, in order to be effective, requires a ‘sign’ language.
An other objection, which Gadamer holds against the search for method validation 
for the Geisteswissenschaften, is in the fact that such a quest indicates a misconception of 
what the human sciences really are. To demand method, according to Gadamer, is to 
presuppose that there is a fixed subject-object dichotomy inherent in the 
Geisteswissenschaften -  meaning, for instance, that the truth of a work of art is ‘out there’, 
disconnected and independent of the perceiver, to be rationally analysed.^ Certainly when 
knowledge is acquired through method, there is an independent object of investigation and 
an impartial observer who examines that particular object from a neutral position by means 
of logical induction to universal laws; however, in regards to the human sciences such a 
subject-object schema cannot be established sinee the subject pemsing, i.e. the interpreter, is 
also the very object of investigation, i.e. the interpretandiim. Tins means that the object of 
the human sciences, i.e. the content of literary and historical studies, is the moral and 
liistorical existence of mankind, and insofar as the study of the Geistes\vissenschqften is 
concerned, the investigative cogniser (man) is always a part of the object of inquiry. 
Consequently, he cannot stand over against his subject of pemsal as a contemplative subject 
against an independent object. In historical studies, for instance, the historian can never 
adopt an attitude of detached contemplation, in that he can neither deny nor stand 
disconnected, extricated from his own historicity when examining or interpreting historical 
events. Of course, there is the ‘temporal distance’ between a given event and the historian, 
and one could indeed argue for a ‘distanced objectivity’; but nevertheless, this does not 
overcome the fact that the investigator is always fixed within the continuum of (historical) 
effects, which arise from all given events.^ To be sure, insofar as his historical perception is
V
 ^111 § 4. 1 it will be shown furtlicr, tlirough Gadaiiier’s notion of ‘play’, tliat in ail and the hmnan sciences in general a 
subject-object schema is absent.
 ^hi § 2. 4 which focuses on the Heideggerian notion of facticity, I will make clear this point concerning tlie inescapable 
and hieluctable ‘situatediiess’ of man in liis liisloiy.
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concerned, he does not view history as a tabula rasa or an empty consciousness but always 
seeks to understand it from his historically tainted position, i.e. a ‘prejudiced’ perception, 
for he himself, as an historical being, is immersed and surrounded by history. Consequently 
he possesses, what Gadamer calls, an ‘effective historical consciousness’ 
{Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewufitsein). It seems, according to Gadamer, every event or 
‘manifestness’ of history touches our lives, directly or indirectly, actively or passively. As a 
matter of fact, we cannot begin to construe properly any ‘happening’ of history without first 
taking into account our own set of inherited prejudgements, which in effect derives from 
every historical event. ‘True historical thinking’, Gadamer tells us, ‘must take account of its 
own historicality’ (TM 267 / WM 283). To be sure, a subject-object dichotomy camiot exist in 
historical studies since there is an indivisible unity between historian and history, an 
indispensable fusion, in a manner of speaking, out of which truth and understanding are 
uncovered. ‘The true historical object’, Gadamer writes, ‘is not an object at all, but the 
unity of the one and the other, a relationship in which exist both the reality of history and 
the reality of historical understanding’ (ibid.).
It should be noted from the outset that Gadamer does not suggest that we ought to 
dispense with method. What he does instead is to call into question the status of method by 
asking if method is the only path to tmth. There is no question that we owe much to 
scientific method, for it has rendered and verified knowledge-claims that have changed 
substantially the way we tliink about and perceive our world. Through methodical research 
and progress, we have disabused many illusions and liberated ourselves from much of our 
ignorance in regards to our knowledge of the physical world and of our being. In some 
sense, we could say, that we owe our cultural being to science and its method of 
verification. When we consider our eveiy day lives, almost nothing goes untouched by 
science. ‘Science is -  even as one reproaches it -  the alpha and omega of our civilization.’  ^
But does this mean that we have complete access to all truths tlirough method? Certainly 
there are areas of human existence in which scientific methodology cannot pervade nor 
prevail. In fact, the use of method is always limited in scope, in that it is always confined to 
a particular language, i.e. scientific language, and to a specific set of facts, which it tries to 
prove in abstraction from other facts that may be related with them. The human scientific
Truth in the Human Sciences’, op. cit., 38.
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research does not so much focus univocally on the achievement of comprehensible and 
useful results, but rather concentrates on questioning. Method represents at best a good 
way to find answers but one cannot expect to discover new questions through method.^ 
Consequently, method only renders a partial view of ‘Being’. Hence, rather than 
constituting an unrealisable methodical program of practical guidelines for discovering and 
justifying truth-claims in the Geisteswissenschaften, Gadamer, in Truth and Method, 
directly and indirectly raises two fundamental questions: 1). What is truth? and 2). What 
are the necessary conditions for the possibility of cognising truth? In his view, 
understanding the ‘whatness’ of tmth does not begin with inductive logic, but rather with 
the ‘hermeneutic of facticity’, the interpretation of Dasein (Being-there), which Heidegger 
brought to light in his well-known achievement Being and Time. Heidegger, we can say, 
fundamentally breaks from the method-minded position of the nineteenth-century 
hermeneuticists by abandoning the traditional perception of truth as agreement and by 
rejecting the idea of the search for a ‘methodological’ hermeneutics to concentrate on 
explicating the ‘givenness’ of human existence. In explicating the meaning of ‘Being’ and 
‘Being-there {Dasein) in-the-world’, Heidegger explains in Being and Time that tmth is 
neither absolute correspondence or coherence of something to something, but rather the 
‘sudden moment’ when a phenomenological uncovering or unfolding of the being of Being- 
there as it is in its selfsameness occurs. In simpler terms, tmth, as he puts it, is aktheia, 
unconcealment {Unverborgenheit) or disclosure {Erschlossenheit).^ This formulation of 
tmth in essences separates the notion of tmth from the notion of certainty and appropriates 
it to the finitude of Dasein. But given that tmth is aktheia, how shall we disclose and grasp 
unconcealment (truth) itself. In Heidegger’s view the possibility for grasping tmth lies in 
the phenomenon of understanding. The stmcture of understanding, he contends, is what 
allows truth to be ‘authenticated’. Understanding in this sense is itself a mode of disclosure 
and as such, it is itself tmth.
In Truth and Method Gadamer fundamentally rejects the notion: veritas est 
adaequatio rei et intellectus and instead takes over Heidegger’s ‘phenomenal’ rediscovery
® See Jean Grondin. Hemieneiitische Wahrheif? (2”*^ ed. Weinheim: Beltz Atlienauni, 1994), p. 106.
 ^Tmth in Greek translates as alëtheia, wliich is made up of the prefix ct- (‘not’) and the verbal stem -A«&(‘to escape 
notice’, ‘to be concealed’) Truth thus may be understood as ‘not covered’ or ‘un-concealed’.
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of Wahrheit a Is Unverborgenheit (truth as unconcealm ent).B y  accepting the notion of 
unconcealment and the primordial relationship between truth and understanding, Gadamer, 
as it were, discovers a direct access through the impasse of modern hermeneutics, which is 
oriented to method and methodology for legitimising and justifying the so-called ‘truth 
experience’ in the Geisteswissenschaften. In fact his treatise radically moves away from the 
‘methodical rationality’ that characterised much of traditional hermeneutics to offer a 
different kind of hermeneutical theory, one which considers the phenomenon of 
understanding and the ontology of language as the opening gates to truth. Gadamer calls 
his theory ^Philosophische Hermeneutik’ (philosophical hermeneutics). Philosophical 
hermeneutics, he contends, is not concerned with formulating general principles for 
interpretation or with discovering unassailable certainties of agreement or correspondence, 
rather it seeks to grasp how understanding is possible and through understanding, how 
truth, i.e. unconcealment, is cognisable in the human sciences. In Gadamer’s view, these 
questions are fundamental in challenging the unquestioned domination of Kantian thought, 
which placed and delimited all concepts of knowledge and truth exclusively under the 
umbrella of theoretical and practical employment of reason.
Philosophical Hermeneutics vis à vis Kantian Aesthetics
Central to Gadamer’s endeavour in Truth and Method is the overcoming of Kant’s 
radical subjectivisation of aesthetics. In his Critique o f Judgment Immanuel Kant (1724- 
1804), one of the most highly influential Western philosophers of modern time, provides, 
with his transcendental foundation of aesthetic judgment, a new basis for aesthetics. Kant, 
in general, subjectivises and aestheticises the judgment of taste. That is to say, he abandons 
the moral and social implications of taste and limits its significance exclusively to the 
aesthetic realm. By virtually categorising and labelling ‘subjective’ and ‘aesthetic’ to 
whatever does not measure up to the standards of the objective and methodical natural 
sciences, Kant restricts and confines the notion of truth to the realm of pure natural 
scientific cognition, departing from the ‘humanist tradition’ in which judgments of taste still
111 all, Gadamer concurs with tlie essence of Heidegger’s ontological accomit of truth (and miderstanding), but this 
does not mean tliat he simply takes Heidegger word for word. Gadamer’s treatment of tmtli, or rather his 
understanding of how truth is experienced, i.e. the imderstanding of tlie conditions necessary to cognise truth, in some 
sense diverges significantly from Heidegger’s notion of truth experience. For Gadamer the imconcealment is ultimately 
tied to dialogue and dialectics, as we shall come to discover.
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possessed a cognitive value. Strictly speaking, his subjectivisation of taste discredited all 
conceptual knowledge except that o f the natural sciences. But moreover, it compelled the 
‘human-sciences-to-be’ to be subjugated to a methodology of the natural sciences in self- 
analysis in order to justify their own truth-claim and avoid relativism -  in simpler terms, to 
adapt the practices and standards of the natural sciences in order to legitimise themselves as 
‘sciences’. Following Kant, the humanistic tradition -  which prior to Kant was the 
governing norm of human sciences -  was thus displaced by the increasingly dominant 
method of the natural sciences. As such, the human sciences’ claim to tmth came to be 
measured by a standard alien to them. The study of the Geisteswissenschqften-to-hQ arrived 
at a critical turning point. The consequence of Kant’s Third Critique in short meant that 
there was now the need to justify the autonomy of the Geisteswissenschaften independently 
from the natural sciences. In the nineteenth century, hermeneutic theorists, such as 
Schleiermacher, Droysen and Dilthey pursued this aim extensively. However, as we have 
indicated earlier, their attempts to legitimise the autonomy of the Geisteswissenschaften and 
its epistemological independence ultimately failed due to their inability to escape their 
methodological consciousness."
In his attempt to counteract the consequences of Kant’s radical subjectivisation of 
aesthetic reflective judgement and the methodical mode of knowledge represented by the 
natural sciences, Gadamer uses Heidegger’s interpretation of Dasein and his formulation of 
tmth as ‘unconcealment’ to legitimise knowledge and tmth-claims in the human sciences. 
However, this is not to say that Gadamer wishes to refute or circumvent Kant, for he 
neither abandons nor rejects Kant’s insights concerning reflective judgement. On the one 
hand, Gadamer certainly concurs with and advocates Kant’s establishment of aesthetic 
autonomy -  that is to say, he agrees with Kant that aesthetic judgement is independent from 
conceptual knowledge. However, on the other hand, he disagrees with Kant’s assertion 
that the concept of tmth is to be understood wholly in relation to conceptual knowledge. 
Thus what Gadamer attempts is to reassert the ontological foundations of the 
Geisteswissenschaften, which Kant dismissed when he established the autonomy of 
aesthetics, through the ‘practical discipline’ of philosophical hermeneutics.
In the first chapter, I will offer a brief overview of the work of Schieiennacher, Droysen and Dilthey.
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To rediscover the ontological foundations of the Geisteswissenschaften, the first 
major segment of Truth and Method concerns ‘The Freeing Up [or Uncovering] of the 
Truth Question in the Experience of Art’ (‘Freilegung der Wahrheitsfrage an der Erfahrung 
der Kunst’). Here, it pays to give some special attention to the German word Freilegung 
(freeing or uncovering), for we can already see that Gadamer implies that the question of 
tmth in art is somehow ‘eclipsed’ and obscured -  thus in need of unconcealment -  insofar 
as it has become lost and therefore in need of recovery. In his view the truth question 
regarding art has become clouded and confined not as one might assume by the natural 
sciences but by the aesthetic theory -  namely that of Kant’s Third Critique -  ‘that lets itself 
be restricted to a scientific concept of tm th’ (TM xiii / WM xv). Accordingly, part one of his 
investigation includes a critique of ‘aesthetic consciousness’ inherited from Kant and his 
successors. But before turning to his exposition concerning the question of tmth in relation 
to aesthetic experience, Gadamer first explores ‘The Significance of the Humanist Tradition 
for the Human Sciences’, examining four guiding humanistic concepts {Bildung, Sensus 
Communis, Judgement and Taste) which exemplify ‘amethodical’ means of acquiring 
knowledge and tmth. Here, Gadamer reveals forms of moral and social Icnowledge, which 
do not derive fiom reasoned proof, a universal mle but from humanistic concepts, which 
constitute a mode of knowing and of being. Although Gadamer is hardly explicit in 
revealing the stmctures of understanding in the first segment of Truth and Method, it seems 
clear that he does illuminate some of the basic ideas that constitute understanding by way of 
the humanistic concepts. These, we shall learn, are ideas such as ‘tradition’ and ‘openness’.
In section 2 of Part I, Gadamer elucidates the ontological significance of the work of 
art. This segment includes the notion of ‘play’ {Spiel) which demonstrates the 
phenomenological process of tmth/disclosure in the work of art and how that unfolding is 
to be understood. The experience of tmth in works of art serves as important paradigm to 
extend the concept of knowledge and tmth to historical understanding and the 
Geisteswissenschaften in general. For Gadamer historical understanding, similar to the 
‘beautiful’ in works of art, is not to be defined according to pre-existing mles. That is to 
say, understanding of a particular historical event cannot be grasped by subsuming it under 
general mles since it is always occupied with the particular historical event. Every historical 
event, in other words, must be scmtinised individually. In Truth and Method Gadamer 
constitutes a new conception of historical understanding. What his insights aim to offer is a
12
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pliilosophical statement that emphasises the ‘hermeneutical’ task, which suggests a need to 
overcome the primacy of self-consciousness, i.e. the necessity to transcend the self­
alienation, or rather the critical-distancing of the ‘self in the experience of art and history. 
Generally speaking, Gadamer stresses our need to become aware of how much of ourselves 
is involved in the experience of art and history, while at the same time opposing the notion 
of disinterested, spectatorial stand -  adopting an impartial attitude -  as represented in 
‘aesthetic’ or ‘historical’ consciousness when encountering works of art or studies in 
histoiy. This point of view is ftirther emphasised by Gadamer thiough the analogy of the 
‘play’ or ‘game’ {Spiel). Since the inherited forms of consciousness, i.e. the ‘aesthetic 
consciousness’ and ‘historical consciousness’ handed down from German Idealism, 
‘represent only alienated forms of our true history’,"  Gadamer’s primaiy interest is to bring 
to light the recognition of an ‘effective liistorical consciousness’ {Wirkungsgeschichtliches 
Bewufitsein). Briefly, Gadamer discounts the myth of ‘aesthetic consciousness’ and 
‘historical consciousness’ which promote the idea that we can possess an unbiased and 
prejudiceless or presuppositionless position for judgements concerning art and history, and 
for that matter our understanding in general. His position claims that since we exist within 
the continuum of history, we cannot therefore be unaffected by our history. As such, our 
consciousness is an effect or the result of history, i.e., it is one which is ‘effected by and 
effecting history’."
The significance which Gadamer places on his notion of ‘effective historical 
consciousness’ cannot be overestimated. By bringing to recognition an ‘effective historical 
consciousness’ in the experience of art, of history and philosophy, Gadamer expands 
Heidegger’s ontological account of understanding and offers groundbreaking insights into 
the phenomenon of understanding, adding a critical dimension to hermeneutics. What he 
proposes with the notion of ‘effective historical consciousness’ is that understanding is 
conditioned by history and tradition, arguing in effect that we exist within an inescapable 
historical continuum, that is, we are standing immersed within an event of inheritance 
{Überlieferungsgeschehen), which itself preserves prejudices {Vorurteile), that determine
"  ‘Reflections on My Pliilosopliical Journey’, op. cit., 27.
See Lawrence Kennedy Sclmiidt. The Epistemology o f Hans-Georg Gadamer. (2“‘^ unchanged ed. Frankfurt/ Main; 
Peter Lang, 1987), p. 114.
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and condition our understanding." However, this does not imply that we are always frilly 
aware of the total influence that history and tradition, i.e. the inherited prejudices, have on 
our understanding. Of course there are presuppositions which forever remain hidden 
throughout our lives. Our quest is simply to discover and recognise as many as possible 
those prejudices which influence our understanding.
With the notion of ‘effective historical consciousness’, Gadamer not only 
reconceptualises the notion of understanding in the human sciences but he also stretches and 
expands what he calls ‘the hermeneutical problem’ to the natural sciences. According to 
Gadamer, the natural sciences are not immune to the hermeneutical problem, and he 
explains that modern sciences ignore the fact that they too are effected by their historicity. 
The claim for scientific objectiveness by natural sciences, Gadamer argues, is false, 
maintaining that the methodology observed by the natural sciences distracts from the fact 
that the natural sciences too participate within the historical continuum and are thus 
conditioned by presuppositions, presumptions and prejudices.
The Objectives of the Present Thesis
The central concern of the present thesis focuses on the task of exploring and 
illuminating Gadamer’s attempt to re-establish the ontological foundations of the 
Geisteswissenschaften and therein legitimise the human sciences’ claim to truth. However, 
in order to keep the present work within a controllable scope, I shall limit myself primarily 
to the study of Gadamer’s treatment of the humanistic concepts: Bildung (culture), Sensus 
communis (common sense), Urteil (judgement) and Geschmack (taste), and his 
understanding of the ontological nature of art. Within this frame, my study will trace the 
unfolding of Gadamer’s conception of knowledge and understanding, examining in the 
process specific concepts, such as ‘tradition’ and ‘authority’ which affect one’s way of 
understanding, not only of human sciences but of every human experience. What is more, 
the current study also seeks to comprehend the significance of ‘play’ and dialogue, which 
Gadamer exemplifies explicitly in the experience o f art, in respect to illuminating how 
understanding and the experience of truth take place altogether.
The understanding of Vomrteile (prejudice) is a theory which Gadamer discovered tlirough Heidegger, and as we 
mentioned above, Heidegger play a significant role in helping Gadamer to develop his own diesis concerning 
understanding and ‘effective historical consciousness’.
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But first, to comprehend the full problematic scope of modern hermeneutics, I 
initially turn to Kant’s Third Critique in an effort to distill some of the far-reaching 
consequences of Kant’s subjectivisation of aesthetic judgment. In my view, the complex 
nature of the Third Critique and its dramatic affects on modern hermeneutics seems to 
demand and warrant a comprehensive examination, one which I aim to offer presently. 
Hence, in the first chapter the focus will be to show precisely how Kant constitutes the 
autonomy of aesthetics and in doing so, how he deprives aesthetic judgment of its cognitive 
import, which it still possessed in the humanistic tradition. As we shall discover, by 
reducing aesthetics to the realm of subjective universal and therefore denying it of any 
cognitive significance, Kant essentially marks the end of the humanistic tradition -  to which 
Gadamer returns -  in which aesthetics still possessed an epistemological value. The 
consequential effects of Kant’s aesthetics proper on modern hermeneutics cannot be 
overestimated, for in the nineteenth century hermeneutic theorists from Schleiermacher to 
Dilthey found themselves desperately searching for an epistemological foundation for the 
Geisteswissenschaften by adopting the apt model of methodical procedure of the natural 
sciences. Chapter one, thus, also includes a brief overview of modern hermeneutics and 
looks at the development of traditional hermeneutics, and hermeneutics of facticity belong 
to Martin Heidegger, and how these traditions came down to Gadamer.
In chapter two the focus of my examination will be on the guiding humanistic 
concepts. Although Gadamer’s elucidation of these concepts seems relatively modest 
compared to some of the other major sections of his work, the importance of these 
concepts, however, seems no less great, for they are imperative to understanding the 
essential task of Gadamer’s philosophical project. As we shall learn, it was through the 
guiding humanistic concepts that the ‘human-sciences-to-be’, prior to Kant, found its 
justification and legitimacy. Prior to any application of method for attaining knowledge, the 
humanistic concepts, Gadamer shows, represent not only a o f knowing but also a way 
o f being through which man discovers knowledge and understanding. And therefore, he 
finds in these concepts the key starting point for exploring the ontological condition which 
makes understanding and the acquisition of knowledge possible.
Finally, the tliird chapter is devoted to the question of tmth in the work of art. For 
Gadamer the experience o f art is the all important, exemplary paradigm which demonstrates 
the legitimacy of the human sciences’ claim to tmth. Hence, the purpose of the concluding
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chapter will be to investigate how Gadamer formulates the ontological significance of art, 
examining in the process the notion of ‘play’ and ‘mimesis’. Understanding play, in my 
view, is fundamental to understanding the core of ‘philosophical hermeneutics’, in that 
through the notion of play, Gadamer reveals the phenomenological and dialogical structure 
of understanding. Play exemplifies in a unique way how understanding and truth- 
experiences of the human sciences occur and how they are to be understood.
With respect to the concept of mimesis, Gadamer does not simply employ the literal 
meaning of ‘imitation’. For him, the mimetic represents a primordial phenomenon which 
expresses not so much an event of imitation as transformation." Gadamer explains that the 
mimetic experience conveys the identification of sometliing in its selfsameness and not a 
reference to an original. According to him, it was the classicist aesthetic of imitation that 
confined the original understanding of mimesis as the imitation of the original. And so, to 
uncover the hidden implication of the term, he follows the phenomenological approach of 
‘letting things appear in themselves’ and in effect deconstructs ‘the static conceptualities, 
the scholasticism and scientific objectifying, in our present way of thinking and to go behind 
the received interpretations of Plato and Aristotle’."
In conjunction with ‘play’ and ‘mimesis’ the final chapter will also examine the 
problems concerning the notion of ‘aesthetic consciousness’ and ‘aesthetic differentiation’. 
According to Gadamer, both of these concepts serve to divorce art from the sphere of 
reality. Aesthetic consciousness, he contends, demands the abstraction of art from its taie 
existence. It places art in its own autonomous world to be looked at as an object that can 
be analysed, but examined only insofar as we look at the form of the art and never its 
content -  for there is no content after the separation from reality, Gadamer conjectures. 
This abstraction of art from the lifeworld, which aesthetic consciousness requires, Gadamer 
terms as ‘aesthetic differentiation’. Aesthetic differentiation allows art to be viewed solely 
as ‘pure work of art’ but at the same time ignores the purpose, function and the meaning a 
work of art holds. But if we look at art and enjoy it merely for its forms, can we claim that 
there is knowledge in the artwork? Apparently the disconnection of art from the lifeworld 
erases all significance that the work of art possesses. Thus one of the primary objects of
"  Haiis-Georg Gadaraer. 'Poetry and Mimesis’ in The Relevance o f  the Beautiful and Other Essays. (Trans. Nicholas 
Walker Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 121.
Richard Pahner. ‘Ritual, Rightness, and Truth’ in Philosophy o f  Hans-Georg Gadamer. op. cit., 530.
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Truth and Method is the overcoming of the myth of aesthetic consciousness and aesthetic 
differentiation.
Chapter I 17
Kantian Aesthetics and Modern Hermeneutics: An Overview
§ 1. Kant’s Formulation of Aesthetic Judgment
The present chapter examines Kant’s Third Critique^ the Critique o f Judgment^ 
which is essentially divided into two major parts: a.) ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’ and 
b.) ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment’. Here, Kant is primarily concerned with the 
transcendental possibility of judgments; that is, he attempts to establish an a priori 
principle for judgments. Moreover, he questions the essential quality and structure of 
aesthetic judgments, the mental actions that constitute them, their distinctness from moral 
or cognitive claims, and the conditions which must be complied with a defence of 
particular aesthetic claims to be legitimate. In the Critique o f Pure Reason Kant defined 
judgment as essentially ‘determinative’, that is, the capacity to subordinate empirically 
given particulars under a universal law or concept provided by the faculty of 
understanding. To this extent, Kant’s definition of judgments of beauty excluded the 
possibility to ascribe to judgments of beauty any a priori principle of their own.
However after his Second Critique^ Kant realised that there was a need to formulate 
a philosophical system to bridge the division between the faculty of pure cognition, 
understanding -  the phenomenal world o f cause and effect {Critique o f Pure Reason) -  and 
the faculty o f desire, reason -  the noumenal world of freedom {Critique o f Practical 
Reason). The mediating link between understanding and reason, Kant called judgment 
{Urteilh'aft) ‘of which we may reasonably presume by analogy that it may likewise 
contain, if not a special authority to prescribe laws, still a principle peculiar to itself upon 
which laws are sought, although one merely subjective a priori’.' In keeping with his 
predecessors, such as G. Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754) 
who divided cognitive knowledge into a ‘superior upper part’, i.e. perfect knowledge 
founded in the realm of intellect that deals with clear and distinct ideas, and an ‘inferior 
lower part’, i.e. imperfect knowledge deriving from imagination and sense that yields 
arbitrary and confused ideas, Kant assumed in his First Critique that judgment was simply
' Kanl. Criticfie o f  Judgment. Introduction III. 15. Hereafter cited as CJ. In a letter to K. L. Reinliold (December 31, 
1787) Kant states: ‘I am now at work on die critique of taste, and I have discovered a land of a priori principle different 
irom those heretofore observed. For tliere are tlrree faculties of tlie mind: tire faculty of desire, hi tire Critique of Pure 
(tlieoreticai) Reason, I have fomid a priori principles for tire fii st of these, and in die Critique of Practical Reason, a priori 
prmciples for tire tltird. I tried to find them for tire second as well, and ftiough I thought it impossible to find such 
principles, die systematic nature of die analysis of die previously mentioned faculties of die human nihid allowed me to 
discover them, givhig me ample material for the rest of my life, material at which to marvel and possibly explore. So 
now I recognise tliree parts of philosophy, each of which has its a priori prmciples, which can be enumerated and for 
which one can delimit precisely the knowledge ftiat may be based on tliem: theoretical pliilosophy, teleology, and 
practical pliilosophy, of wliich die second is, to be sure, the least rich in a priori grounds of detennmation. I hope to have 
a manuscript completed diougli not in print by Easter; it will be eiitided “Critique of Taste’” . Philosophical 
Correspondence 1759-99, (ed. aiidtrans. Arnulf Zweig. Cliicago: University Press, 1967), pp. 127-8.
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a lower cognitive faculty, for he thought it possessed no general principles under which a 
particular can be subsumed. Judgment was considered common in the sense that everyone 
possesses the capacity to judge.
However, in the Third Critique Kant claims a distinct fonction for judgment, 
namely ‘reflection’. He postulates that the reflective capacity of judgment, in effect, 
suggests that there must be an independent a priori principle for judgment: specifically, the 
‘purposiveness’ (finality) of nature. This principle o f  finality proposes that nature is 
organised in such a way that it is made intelligible through our cognitive faculties, and 
therefore provides the possibility to discover concepts and laws in terms of which nature 
can be cognised. Thus, Kant states:
Now this transcendental concept of a finality of nature is neither a concept of nature 
nor of freedom, since it attributes nothing at all to the Object, i.e. to nature, but only 
represents the unique mode in which we must proceed in our reflection upon the 
objects of nature with a view to getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of 
experience, and so is a subjective principle, i.e. maxim, of judgment.^
Thus, aesthetic judgment is ‘the faculty of estimating formal finality (otherwise called 
subjective) by the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. . . . ’^  Since we have recapitulated 
Kant’s account of the general idea of finality (purposiveness), let us now turn to my 
primaiy interest which lies within Part 1 of the Critique, involving the ‘Analytic of the 
Beautiful’, the transcendental exposition of beauty. Here, Kant discusses the judgment of 
taste and its four necessary conditions: quality, quantity, relation and modality.
§ 1.1 The First Moment
Kant initiates his discussion of the ‘First Moment’ with the exploration of the 
specific quality concerning the judgment of taste. He begins, first, by confirming that the 
judgment of taste ‘is not a cognitive judgment, and so not logical, but is aesthetic -  which 
means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective, 
According to Kant, judgment of taste is independent of all interest and is qualitatively 
founded on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure:
■ Ibid., bitrodiiction V. 23.
 ^Ibid., Introduction VIII. 35. 
H bid.,§ I. 41-42.
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Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of 
a delight or aversion apart from  any interest. The object of such a delight is called 
beautiful.^
It is Kant’s primary enterprise to elucidate the particular character of pleasure since 
pleasure indeed plays a fundamental role for the judgment of taste. He explains ‘All 
delight (as is said or thought) is itself sensation (of pleasure)’.^  However, in order to 
explore and supply a sharper notion of the specific quality of the judgment of taste, Kant 
explicitly differentiates three different lands of delight: delight in the beautiful {das 
Schone), delight in the agreeable {das Angenehme) and delight in the good {das Gute). In 
the first instance, Kant speaks of ‘the beautiful’, or rather the experience of the beautiful 
(aesthetic experience), in relation to the feeling of pleasure but pleasure in the beautiful 
potentially is common to everyone, that is, universally communicable, to use his 
terminology; consequently, in doing so, he rules out the possibility o f any individual 
satisfaction. Kant further maintains:
Now, where the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to 
know, whether we, or any one else, or even could be, concerned in the real 
existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on mere 
contemplation (intuition or reflection). . . . All one wants to know is whether the 
mere representation of the object is to my liking, no matter how indifferent I may 
be to the real existence of the object of this representation. It is quite plain that in 
order to say that the object is beautiful, and to show that I have taste, everything 
turns on the meaning which I can give to this representation, and not on any factor 
which makes me dependent on the real existence of the object. Everyone must 
allow that a judgment on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is 
very partial and not a pure judgment of taste.^
We may conclude that ‘[i]t is not the nature of the beautiful object as such which interests 
him [Kant] in the first place. What he is concerned with is to analyse the judgments in 
which we call things beautiful’, as H. W. Cassirer perceptively notes.® Kant’s interest does 
not lie in qualifying or canonising the beautiful by means o f an universal formula as his 
Scottish predecessor, Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), for instance, sought to accomplish
N bid , §5. 50.
 ^Ibid., §3. 44.
 ^Ibid., § 2. 42,43
 ^H.W. Cassirer. A Commentary on Kant’s Critique o f Judgment. (London: Metliuen & Co. LTD, 1938),
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with his definition of the beautiful that beauty is ‘unity amidst variety’ ;^ instead, his 
inquiry focuses on the nature of the pleasurable reaction, which articulates itself in the 
judgment of ta s te 'm o re o v e r , he examines the anthropological conditions of any 
aesthetical communication. Kant primarily attributes the kind of pleasure determined for 
aesthetic judgment as ‘disinterested’ and sets it therefore apart from the pleasure we take in 
the agreeable and in the good. He explains:
One must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence of the 
thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the 
part of judge in matters of taste."
To put it in transparent terms, the beautiful is that which pleases in disinterested 
contemplation, i.e. intuition or reflection. What Kant claims is that the judgment of taste 
must be free of all interest, i.e., it must be determined by the feeling of pleasure in the state 
of ‘disinterestedness’. But what is he precisely implying by the notion of 
disinterestedness? Before he can give a positive definition o f the ‘negative’ 
(r/isinterestedness) account of this notion, Kant first tries to explain what is meant by 
‘interest’, and consequently introduces his notion of the delight in the agreeable and the 
good. The agreeable is, according to Kant, that which the senses find pleasing in sensation 
and involves, as does the delight in the good, a reference to the faculty of desire 
C'Begehrungsvermogeif). Interest (in relation to the agreeable and the good), Kant adds, 
describes the ‘delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an 
object’.'  ^ The agreeable coupled with interest pertains specifically to ‘a delight 
pathologically conditioned (by stimuli) . . . ."^ In other words, Kant, here, determines that 
the objects which provoke the subjective sensation, i.e. the agreeable feelings are desirable 
for the simple reason that they please and gratify the senses. As for the good coupled with 
interest, this delight differs from the agreeable in that it involves a ‘pure practical 
delight’.'  ^ As Salim Kemal explains, ‘[fjor Kant, “good” includes moral worth, 
instiumental worth -  as when it satisfies some ideal and so is a “good” object of its kind.’"'
p. 178.
Philosophical Writing: Francis Hutcheson. Treatise! p. 16. (London; Everyman, 1994).
Although here it may soxmd as if  what distinguishes aesthetic pleasure is merely how it feel, but of course it is much 
more tlian that, as it will be shown.
" C J § 2 .  43.
"Ib id ., §2. 42.
Ibid., § 5. 48.
"  Ibid.
"  Keuial, Salim. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction. (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), 
p. 35.
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This, in effect, implies that the delight in the good must be founded on a concept, that is, 
we must have an idea of what the object that pleases is intended to be. A further 
implication is that there is the relation of reason, to (at least possible) willing, and thus a 
delight in the existence of an Object or action, . . since the concept of an end is 
suggested. Here, let us observe a simple analogy that illustrates Kant’s notion of desire for 
the good which is different from his notion of ‘disinterested’ pure aesthetic judgment, e.g. 
if we say that ‘good health’ is something good, i.e. good fo r  something and good in itself, 
for the reasons that good health secures the probability for a longer life and for its intrinsic 
value -  that no one wishes to be ill -  then we could say that everything which serves as a 
means to the end for good health is to be desired and therefore to be called good, e.g. good 
nutrition, mental activity and physical exercise. This judgment is not related to the 
judgment of taste, but rather is a judgment based on desire and it’s usefulness, i.e., it is a 
delight in the good. Moreover, it involves a concept -  a rule.
In retrospect, the delight in the agreeable and in the good in both cases are linked 
with the notion of interest and therefore involve the faculty of desire. As Kemal confirms, 
‘in the case of desire, we value the object for the purpose -  moral or sensual -  it serves, 
and the fact that it exists is itself an occasion for delight because it can satisfy our 
purposes.'^ The judgment of taste, by contrast, is made independent of all interest. If 
asked whether something is beautiful or not, one could answer independent of the real 
existence of the object. One does not have to approve or to wish the existence of an object 
when one calls that object beautifld. Kant explicitly maintains;
Delight in the beautiful must depend upon the reflection on an object precursoiy to 
some (not entirely determined) concept. It is thus also differentiated from the 
agreeable, which rests entirely upon sensation.'®
Moreover, since the delight in the good also infers ‘delight in the existence of an Object or 
action’, it too is differentiated by Kant from the judgment of taste. In Kant’s view, the 
judgment of taste is a paradigm of reflective judgment since the object is judged without 
regard to any definite concept, but exclusively with respect to whether the contemplation 
of its form incites a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Aesthetic responses provide 
pleasure, i.e., the beautiful simply pleases, without taking interest in the existence of an 
object. Cassirer similarly notes, ‘[w]hether we desire the existence o f an object or do not
CJ § 4. 46,
"  Kemal. op. cit., 35.
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desire it, is a question which does not enter into our judgments about its beauty. . . . An 
aesthetic judgment about beauty is entirely indifferent to the existence or non-existence of 
its object."® Nonetheless, the object -  or at least an imagination o f it -  must exist in order 
to arouse the particular aesthetic reaction; however, in essence, one is indifferent in one’s 
aesthetic attitude towards the real existence of the object. Kant emphasises that the object 
is to be judged in its pure contemplation {Betfachtimg -  Anschauimg oder Reflexion). 
‘Beautiful’ is not an attribute which belongs to the object, but strictly speaking, it is an 
expression of pleasure in perceiving or merely imagining the object. The phrase ‘x is 
beautiful’ (The flower is beautiful.) suggests that ‘beautiful’ is a predicate (property) of the 
object. But this is, according to Kant, a linguistical confusion, based on the old ontological 
theory of the beautiful. However, it is important to emphasise here that although our 
judgment of taste may be subjective and the activity o f judging may involve grasping order 
without applying a determinate concept, they are still judgments and will have the same 
forms. Further, it should be emphasised that judgments of taste do not differ from 
cognitive claims in that their judging character is diminished. However, a question 
remains: what happens if the flower does not possess the quality of beauty, and the phrase 
expresses exclusively a particular subjective reaction, a feeling of pleasure? In such a case, 
it is much more plausible when Kant claims that the aesthetic attitude is free from any 
interest in the existence of the flower. In the aesthetic attitude, the emphasis is not on the 
object but exclusively pertains to the specific quality of the reaction, which is caused or 
triggered by the object or a representation of it. Here, we must ponder and question 
whether Kant’s formulation of the quality of the aesthetic attitude is entirely (in every 
respect) satisfying because we need to have an interest in the existence o f the phenomena 
which arouse pleasure, otherwise an aesthetic reaction would not come about at all. But 
the aesthetic reaction has no longer an interest in the existence of the object, which 
motivated this reaction. When we say: this flower is beautiful, we do not ascribe any 
properties to the flower. We merely express that we take pleasure in it. However, when 
we say: this flower is red, it is obvious that in this kind of judgment, we indeed say 
something about a property which belongs to the flower, to the object. And this cannot be 
tiue unless the object exists. While the judgment in the former case is an aesthetic 
judgment of taste, the latter indicates a cognitive judgment since one can ascribe the
CJ § 4. 46.
Cassirer, op. cit., 180.
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particular sensation of the red colour here, for example, to an object, namely the flower, 
that is outside ourselves. Accordingly, the judgment of taste is essentially different from 
logical/cognitive judgment since this kind of judgment rather expresses something about 
our feelings and us rather than about the object and its properties. Essentially, Kant makes 
the notion of ‘aesthetic’ in this particular context of judgment of taste synonymous with 
‘subjective’ and by doing so, he bases the determination of the judgment of taste not on the 
object being judged, but instead on the judging subject itself, who is self-conscious of 
his/her responding feelings against the particular ‘aesthetic’ obj ec t . Cl ear l y in cognitive 
judgments, under standing {Verstand) makes the necessary connection between the 
representation and the object and leads us, therefore, to a certain kind of knowledge, 
whereas in aesthetic judgment imagination (Einbildungsïcraft) plays the decisive role. 
What is meant by this is that ‘[hjere the representation is referred wholly to the subject, . . . 
and this forms the basis of a quite separate faculty of discriminating and estimating, that 
contributes nothing to Jmowledgefi^
By determining the aesthetic attitude as ‘disinterested’ Kant discovers a criterion 
which enables him to discriminate aesthetic judgment flom both moral judgment, i.e. the 
distinction of good and bad, and the judgment of sensation, i.e. the distinction of agreeable 
and disagreeable or pleasant and unpleasant. While the aesthetic attitude reflects the state 
of the subject in the face of the phenomenon, which we call beautiful, both moral judgment 
and sensual judgment are essentially related to the object. This conclusion reveals that 
Kant is exclusively concerned with the differentiation of judgments. Thus, it is possible -  
and this enlarges the social leeway o f communication a lot -  that one can disapprove 
something morally but appreciate it at the same time aesthetically. In § 48 Kant makes this 
explicitly clear by stating:
Where fine art evidences its superiority is in the beautiful descriptions it gives of 
things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The Furies, diseases, devastation 
of war, and the like, can (as evils) be very beautifully described, nay even 
represented in pictures.^"
See CJ §1. 41-42. Kant uses the term aestlietic in the sense owed to classical Greek usage that refers to anytliing that 
deals with sensibility whether in cognition or in feelings. Compare with Kemal. op. cit., 24.
C J § 1. 42. I have italicised a portion of the quote here to underline tire significance of Kant’s proposition. In Chapter 
n, 1 will return to this specific point to show the value and relevance of Gadamer’s critical reading of Kant, for iliis is one 
of tlie central issues concerning Gadamer’s philosophical henneneutics. See also CJ § 15. 71.
Ibid., 173.
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Everything depends on the perspective, i.e. whether one approaches the object from an 
aesthetic or ethic-moral point of view. In the aesthetic attitude, one is completely 
disinterested in the possible moral dimension of a thing and vice versa, meaning that the 
moral attitude should, likewise, respect the ‘autonomy’ of the aesthetic judgment. These 
ideas were revolutionary in the eighteenth century since they liberated the communication 
of art from all moral and religious standardisation and provided the possibility to make 
even evil and moral reprehensibleness to a fascinating sujet of the aesthetic 
communication.
To summarise the ‘First Moment’ or declaration of the judgment of taste, Kant 
postulates that in order to comprehend the beautiful, we must view it in light of the subject 
and its disinterested feeling of pleasure. In order to define and emphasise this specific 
quality of pleasure, Kant differentiates it from the agreeable and the good, which also 
involve pleasure, but -  in contrast to the beautiful -  with reference to the faculty of desire. 
Kant stresses that the judgment of taste must be divorced from all interest; otherwise it is 
partisan, and therefore not a pure judgment of taste. The experience o f the beautiful, 
simply stated, warrants satisfaction without reference to the faculty of desire; i.e. our 
natural side, nor by mles, i.e. our cognitive capacity. Hence, it h  free delight, meaning that 
it ‘is disinterestedly based on the formal subjective purposivesness in the object. (In 
Kantian terminology, this becomes: the formal subjective purposiveness in the 
representation tlirough which an object is given and in the contemplation of which our 
cognitive powers, the imagination and the understanding, are in harmony and free play.)’-^  
Yet nevertheless the beautiful is characterised as a feeling of pleasure similar to the delight 
in the agreeable and the good. In contrast to the aesthetic response, the delight in the 
agreeable and the good are both coupled with interest. They are not indifferent to the 
existence of an object but rather are dependent on its existence. Whereas the agreeable 
‘gratifies man’, the good possesses an ‘objective worth’. We can see, therefore, that Kant 
is well aware that pleasure occurs not only in the aesthetic moment but also in other 
occasions. His analysis points to the various ways we regard pleasure in these occasions, 
in view of our behaviour -  the rules we observe -  rather than with respect to merely 
introspective intuition. Melvin Rader writes:
Crawford, Donald. Kant’s Aesthetic Theory. (Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 
pp. 38-39.
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No one before or since Kant has more clearly distinguished [a]esthetic 
contemplation from practical, moral, cognitive, and appetitive interest. All o f these 
interest, in one rvay or another, are concerned for the real existence of their objects. 
Kant defined ‘disinterestedness’ as fascinated attention in the absence of such 
concern. The [a]esthetic object may be imaginary or real, but what is 
[ajesthetically relevant is its manifest forms and qualities as disinterestedly felt and 
envisaged.
§ 1,2 The Second Moment
In the ‘Second Moment’ of the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, Kant investigates the 
quantity of judgment of taste. Here, he is concerned with the judgment of taste and its 
claim for universal validity. In other words, to what extent is our judgment of taste 
universally valid? Hitherto, we have emphasised Kant’s approach to the ‘Analytic of the 
Beautiful’ in reference to the subject. But now, we ai‘e confi'onted with a challenging 
problem: the conflict between subjectivity on one side and a judgment claiming 
universality on the other. The classical thinkers prior to Kant were not aware o f this 
conflict. Their approach to examining aesthetic judgment was rather characterised by 
‘passive mirroring’, the creation of word units which represent objects (or aspect of things) 
in the world on the foundation of primary visual encounter. Even Kant’s earlier writings 
show an influence of the empirical method of proving universal validity. For example, in 
his lecture concerning logic (Philippi notes) Kant explains: ‘Die Urteile des Schonen gehen 
aufs Objekt, daher haben sie eine Allgemeingültigkeit.’^^  or: ‘Ein Gegenstand an dem 
dieses allés in einem fasslichen Verhaltniss angebracht i s t , ist wesentlich schon und gefallt 
allgemein.’'^  ^ But despite his obvious empirical approach to the object, we can already see 
a differentiation compared to the rationalistic aestheticians. Kant asserted: ‘Was allgemein 
gefallt, gefallt auf zwiefache Ait: 1.) nach Gesetzen der Sinnlichkeit; das ist schon und 
gefallt in der Erscheinung. 2.) nach Gesetzen des Verstandes; das ist gut und gefallt in
Rader, Melvin, ‘Tlie Experiences of tlie Beholder’. in A Modem Book o f Esthetics: An Anthology. (New Y ork: Hold, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1979), p. 332.
Jens Kulenkanipff. Materialien zu Kants '’Kritik der Urteilskraft\ (Frankfurt am Main; Sulukainp Verlag, 1974), p. 
104. All tnmslations from die Pliihppi notes are my own.; ‘The judgments of tlie beautiful refer to die object and 
therefore tliey have an universal validity. ’
Ibid., p. 107. Trans. ‘An object in wliich all tiiis is represented in a comprehensible relation is essentially beautiful and 
pleases universally.’
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Begriffen. This re-evaluation of representation and the search for the underlying organic 
function is clearly demonstrated in Kant’s critical philosophy. The acquisition of 
knowledge, Kant was convinced, must involve more than simply re-presenting and 
classifying the orders of things. He sets out, consequently, to uncover the subjective (and 
universally valid) conditions for the possibility of representation. Kant’s justification of 
aesthetic judgment, constituted on a transcendental philosophical perspective, is, however, 
in conflict between setting the determining ground of the aesthetic judgment in the subject 
and its claim for universal validity.
Here, we see a differentiation between the cognitive capacity of sensibility 
(Sinnlichkeii) and understanding {Verstand) which prepares the framework for the 
autonomy of the judgment of taste. This was quite a revolutionary thought in Kant's time 
and possibly unthinkable from a rationalistic point of view. Although the concept of 
‘sensibility’ {Sinnlichkeii) was still characterised with an empirical-psychological interest, 
here, we can already see its transition into the notion of ^GefiihV, which Kant later termed 
and understood (Kantian notion of Gefiihiy. ‘Aber was kritisiert denn das was allgemein 
gefallt? 1st es der Verstand? Nein, sondern die durch Erfahimng geübte Sinnlichkeit.’ ®^ At 
the end of this earlier consideration, Kant summarises: ‘Es gibt also gewisse gemeine
Gesetze der Sinnlichkeit in Ansehung der Form. . . Here, the application of the notion 
of ‘form’ is very interesting; it will become typical in the later context of transcendental 
philosophical perspective, emphasising the communicability of the beautiful with regard to 
the subject, thus, no longer being exclusive in respect to the object (in the sense of 
empiricism). In ‘Reflektionen zur Asthetik’ no. 672 (which Kant must have written it 
between 1769 and 1770), the notion of form comes closer to the investigation of categories 
of time and space, which was significant for the Critique o f Pure Reason. ‘. . .was also der 
Regel der Koordination in Raum und Zeit gemab 1st, das gefallt notwendig jedermann und 
ist schon.’'''' In the Critique o f Judgment, Kant dedicates himself to the problem of
------------------------------------------------------------ iX
Ibid., p. 105. Trans. ‘Wliat pleases universally pleases in twofold; 1.) according to tlie laws of sensibibty; tliat is 
beautifiil and pleases in its appearance. 2.) according to die laws of understanding; that is good and pleases in concepts.’ 
Ibid., p. 106. Trans. ‘ But what, then, criticises tliat wliich pleases universally? Is it understanding? No, but it is 
sensibility which is trained (developed) by experience.’ In Hie Critique o f Judgment § 3. 45., Kant distinguishes 
sensation from feeling (Gefiihl), explaining . .tlie word sensation is used to denote an objective representation of sense; 
and, to avoid continually miming Üie risk of misinterpretation, we shall call tliat wliich must always remain purely 
subjective, and is absolutely incapable of fomiing a representation of an object, by tlie familiar name of feeling. ’ We can 
conclude tliat feeling is tlierefore a subjective sensation by which no object is represented whereas objective sensation is a 
perception of an object tluough our senses.
Ibid., p. 107. Trans. ‘There are tlien particular universal laws of sensibibty in regard to the fomi.’
Ibid., p. 97. Trans. ‘ That winch corresponds to tlie rule of co-ordination in space and time pleases necessarily every 
one and is beautiful.’
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universal validity of judgment of taste with a pure transcendental-philosophical interest. 
He proposes that it ought to be fundamentally possible to combine the judgment of taste 
with the claim to universality, and he indeed claims to have discovered a solution to this 
problem in order to justify his thesis of ‘subjective universality’ in the ‘Deduction of Pure 
Aesthetic Judgments’. So how does Kant arrive at a subjective universal validity as the 
distinct quality of pure aesthetic judgment? First, his initial point of departure was from 
the attitude of disinterestedness towards the object (what is to be called beautiful), and the 
ability of the subject to experience that disinterestedness within a feeling of freedom 
{Gefiihl der Freiheit). Since Kant presumes that the feeling of being free {sich-frei-fiihlen) 
-  what we experience when we judge (or criticise) -  can not be only a private condition, he 
conceived that there ought to be then a corresponding objective side to the mere subjective. 
The subject that experiences this freedom while making an aesthetic judgment must 
consequently ‘. . believe that he has reason for demanding a similar delight from every 
one. Accordingly he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object 
and the judgment logical’.^ ' Universal validity is deduced from the primary premise of 
aesthetic freedom which is experienced by everyone who is in the state of 
disinterestedness. ‘For where any one is conscious that his delight in an object is with him 
independent of interest, it is inevitable that he should look on the object as one containing a 
ground of delight for all men.’'*^ The /ogfca/judgment, which is based on concepts, has an 
incontestable claim of universal validity. In contrast, the aesthetic judgment does not have 
any evidence for its claim, and therefore its claim can only be subjective; ‘i.e. there must 
be coupled with it a claim to subjective universality.’^^  The form of the judgment of taste 
suggests that we are dealing with logical judgment; however, since aesthetic judgment 
does not constitute itself on the basis of a concept, it can justify its claim for universal 
validity merely provisionally by its similarity (in form) to logical judgment. Thus, Kant 
writes, ‘The beautiful is that which , apart from concepts is represented as the object of a 
universal delight’. I t  is already evident that logical judgment is not identical with 
aesthetic experience; ‘Now clearly in our experience of the beautiful, in nature and in art, 
we neither verify our expectations, nor record what we encounter as a particular case of the
^ 'C J§ 6 . 51. 
"'Ibid., §6. 50. 
""Ibid,, §6. 51. 
Ibid., § 6. 50.
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universaT."^ Compared to the cognitive judgment, what is formed through understanding 
with the aid of a concept, the mechanism of subordination under the universal, does not 
take place in aesthetic judgment. Gadamer ’writes: ‘The point. . . is precisely that the 
dynamic of aesthetic delight comes into play without a process of conceptualisation, that 
is, without our seeing or understanding something “as something '’ Although Gadamer 
emphasises the subjective ability of experiencing the beautiful, we have to point out that 
this is not an exhaustive description of the aesthetic judgment according to Kant, It is 
absolutely necessary to say that Kant is also concerned -  although it is in a restricted way -  
with the reference to the object of our aesthetic experience. According to his thesis, there 
are two very important aspects: on the one side, he puts the feeling {Gefiihl) o f the pure 
subjective experience opposite to cognition {Erkenntnis), and on the other, he says that 
each aesthetic affection must assign to an object. Although aesthetic judgments have a 
formal similarity to logical judgments and participate in understanding {Verstand), they are 
not provable; yet despite this fact, they claim to be valid for every one. Consequently, 
aesthetic judgments cannot be ‘true’ or ‘false’ according to Kant’s logic. This connects 
them with the ideas of reason which also lack objective application. This ambiguity of the 
judgment upon the beautiful, between its form (singular, categorical judgment: ‘x is 
beautiful. ’) and its function (in terms of universal validity) distinguishes it from the 
judgments upon the agreeable and the good. A comparison of the beautiful with the 
agreeable and the good, based on the criterion of quantity, shows that the agreeable is 
rooted in private feelings, and the judgment upon it is restricted to the person who is 
judging upon it: Something is agreeable to me, we should say more accurately. ‘With the 
agreeable, therefore, the axiom holds good: Everyone has his own taste (that of senses)’.^ ' 
However, the beautiful is diametrically opposed to this. It would be ‘ridiculous’ to say that 
something is beautiful to me. Whoever is judging upon the beautiful ‘ . . . judges not 
merely for himself, but for all men, and speaks of the beauty as if it were a property of 
things.’ ®^ The judgment upon the beautiful demands the agreement o f every one. If every 
one would have their own taste, we could not speak about taste at all. ‘This would be 
equivalent to saying that there is no such thing at all as taste, i.e. no aesthetic judgment
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capable of making a rightful [justified] claim upon the assent of all men.’"® An agreement 
within the judgment of the agreeable is possible, however, that agreement has to be 
recognised as contingent; hence the beautiful is the object of necessary delight. Kant 
emphasises that this kind of universality is understood in a comparative sense. The mles 
we apply are, like all empirical rules, just general and not universal as in the judgment of 
the beautiful.
Finally, the universal delight of the good derives from a concept: ‘. . . good is only 
represented as an object of universal delight by means o f a concept, which is the case 
neither with the agreeable nor the beautiful.’'*'' Tn a judgment of taste the universality of 
delight is only represented as subjective.’'*' Here, Kant refers in particular to the 
transcendental-philosophical aspect of his critique. He examines: 1.) Is it right to demand 
that the judgment of taste upon the beautiful should be valid for every one without being 
founded on concepts? A positive answer to this question consequently results in the 
separation of the judgment of the beautiful from both the ‘taste of senses’ (Sinnen- 
Geschmack) in respect to the agreeable and the ‘taste of reflection’ {Reflexions- 
Geschmack) in respect to the good. 2.) Kant examines the reference of these aesthetic 
judgments (taste o f sense, taste of reflection) to the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. 
As he mentioned before, universality is also possible in the case of the agreeable, i.e. the 
taste of sense and universality of the taste of reflection, which, as experience teaches, does 
not always meet general approval -  that is, the often experienced phenomenon of the 
diversity of sensual taste. Apart from such remarks based on an empirical 
ground/foundation, Kant concludes 3.) that universality of the judgment of taste does not 
rest upon concepts of the object, and therefore it is in no way logical but aesthetic. This 
kind of universality does not involve any objective quantity of the judgment but one which 
is only subjective. In contrast to objective universal validity, subjective universal validity 
is based on the reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. To round up, his 
transcendental philosophical examination Kant refers to the delight mediated without 
concepts as expression of an ‘universal voice’'*'' It remains still unclear what Kant exactly 
means by this notion, yet nevertheless it should show an idea, which guarantees the 
possibility of an aesthetic judgment, that is respected universally. Thus ‘universal voice’
Ibid.
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denotes a transcendental philosophical dimension which is independent from empirical 
facts. It describes taste as someone’s own certain taste contrary to fashion that is 
subjugated to an empirical universality. ‘Against the tyranny exercised by fashion, sure 
taste preserves a specific freedom and superiority.’'*" Thus certainty in taste has a 
subjective effect and refers to the universal voice in which taste is confirmed. The 
universal voice does not necessarily correspond to fashion, but makes it possible to find a 
judgment free and independent from it. This freedom is rooted in the practice of 
disinterestedness, what characterises the quality of the judgment of taste. Within the 
framework of the ‘investigation of the question of the relative priority in a judgment of 
taste of the feeling of pleasure and the estimating of the object’,"" Kant speaks for the first 
time in terms of the constellation o f cognitive powers, which have in common all subjects 
who are about to make an aesthetic judgment, as being engaged in a free play. The 
stimulation of cognitive powers in a (state of) free play is the source of the subjective 
universal communicability and causes sensations of pleasure and delight which find their 
expression in the judgment of taste. ‘The quickening of both faculties (imagination and 
understanding) to an indefinite. . harmonious activity, such as belongs to cognition 
generally, is the sensation whose universal communicability is postulated by the judgment 
of taste.’"" Thus pleasure is originated in the initial representation. But it is very important 
to emphasise that the mental state of pleasure, as a free play of cognitive powers, does not 
refer to the object by means of a concept when we are making an aesthetic judgment. 
However, it refers to the subject and is in correspondence with the universal voice. 
‘Definition of the beautifril drawn from the Second Moment. The beautiful is that which, 
apart from a concept, pleases universally.’"^  In asserting an aesthetic judgment of taste, the 
subject, in order to authenticate the universality of his judgment, must assess and confirm 
in reflection through judgment that the pleasure which the object has occasioned is 
‘disinterested’ pleasure rather than moral or agreeable pleasure. Hence, judgments of taste 
are reflective.
"" TM 36 / WM 35 
""C J§9. 57. 
""Ibid., §9. 60. 
Ibid.
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§ 1.3 The Third Moment
The ‘Third Moment’ of the Analytic of the Beautiful is concerned with the 
relation of the ends brought under review in judgments of taste. We have already seen 
that, according to Kant, judgments of taste have a subjective foundation and are, 
therefore, different from cognitive judgments. The accessibility of the object in 
relation to the subject can merely be described as representation of the object. Thus, 
the problem of finality or purposiveness {Zwechnafiigkeil) which is a central one for 
the Critique o f Judgment can be explained as followed:
But that subjective side of a representation which is incapable o f becoming an 
element o f  cognition, is the pleasure or displeasure connected with it; for through it 
I cognise nothing in the object of the representation, although it may easily be the 
result of the operation of some cognition. . . in the finality, therefore, which is prior 
to the cognition of an Object,. . . we have the subjective quality belonging to it that 
is incapable of becoming a constituent of knowledge."^
As it is explored in the previous chapter, the aesthetic judgment is intrinsically different 
from a cognitive one. While a cognitive judgment refers to the Object as 
representation and ascribes with the aid of its cognitive capacities a concept to it, the 
aesthetic judgment, too, refers to an Object, but this Object only communicates itself as 
subjective sensation, that is, as the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in the subject, and 
therefore we have no concept of it. The representation of the Object complies with 
cognitive judgment if the laws of understanding {Gesetzmafiigkeiten des Verstandes) 
are applicable, whereas the representation of an object complies with an aesthetic 
judgment if the object affects the subject through the idea of formal finality {f 'ormale 
Zweckmafiigkeit). Thus, Kant can state:
The consciousness of mere formal finality in the play of the cognitive faculties of 
the Subject attending a representation whereby an object is given, is the pleasure 
itself, because it involves a determining ground of the Subject’s activity in respect 
of the quickening of its cognitive powers, and thus an internal causality (which is 
final) in respect of cognition generally, but without being limited to definite 
cognition, and consequently a mere form of the subjective finality o f a 
representation in an aesthetic judgment."®
"'Ibid., §vn. 29.
Ibid., § 12. 64.
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What does it, then, imply to speak of the finality of the beautiful? How does finality 
determine the aesthetic response to the object more precisely? These questions refer to 
‘beautifLiT as a relative predicate in the aesthetic judgment. In the framework of this 
examination, terms like ‘representation’ and ‘feeling of pleasure or displeasure’ will be 
central, which already indicates the subjective implications of the answer. Finality, 
according to Kant, is not the characteristic or quality of the beautiful Object but rather 
describes the attitude we have towards to the beautiful Object (as well as toward the whole 
world), or, more precisely, finality is to be described as a typical pre-figuration of the 
subjects cognitive capacities judging aesthetically in view of a particular Object. With 
respect to the critical systematic enterprise by Kant, finality fulfils the transcendental- 
philosophical demand, which he put forward for an a priori principle which constitutes the 
fundament of judgment {Urteilsh'aft). As a point of departure, Kant is preoccupied with 
the notion of feeling {Gefiihlsbegriff). In the Preface of the Critique o f Judgment, Kant 
describes the difficulties about a principle a priori ijVerlegenheit wegen eines Prinzips") 
which has to be in immediate connection to the feelings of pleasure and displeasure."® That 
judgment has to have its own principles ‘upon which laws are sought, although one merely 
subjective a priori’,"® was only an assumption for Kant. The immediate delight of the 
beautiful which Kant explored in his critique of aesthetic judgment, out of the direct 
connection to the feeling of pleasure, is already documented by him as a central issue in 
the above mentioned logic lecture: ‘Das Schone gefallt unmittelbar. Es gefallt mittelbar 
insofern es zu einem anderen Zweck der uns gefallt ein Mittel ist.’"' In his letter to Carl 
Leonhard Reinhold (December 28, 1787), Kant assumes already the different quality of the 
a priori principle in the judgment of taste and explicates it later in his Critique o f Judgment 
as subjectively founded. The principle o f ‘formal’ finality corresponds with the ‘as i f  o f 
aesthetic judgment, which was introduced for the first time in the ‘Second Moment’ 
concerning the quantity of judgment o f t a s t e . I n  the focused mediation between the 
concept of nature and the concept of freedom {Vermitthmg zwischen Natur -  und 
Freiheitsbegriff) the concept of finality (for judgment) is distinguished from both the 
former and the latter and claims as a subjective principle to have a middle position between
Ibid., Preface (to first ed.), 5.
Ibid., Introduction III. 15.
The quote is taken from .Tens KidenkampfTs Materialien zu Kants Kritik der Urteilskmft’. op. cit., 101. Here, I use 
my own translation: ‘The beautiful pleases us immediately. It pleases mediately in so far it is a mean to an end which 
pleases us’.
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them . this transcendental concept of finality of nature is neither a concept of nature nor 
of freedom, since it attributes notliing at all to the object, i.e. to nature, but only represents 
the unique mode in which we must proceed in our reflection upon the objects of nature 
with a view to getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of experience, and so is a 
subjective principle, i.e. maxim, of judgment."" In §10 ‘finality in general’, Kant 
differentiates the notion of finality {Zwecknidfiigkeit) from the notion of ends {Zweck). 
While an end is defined as the object of a concept so far as this concept is regarded as the 
cause of the object (the real ground of its possibility), the notion of finality describes in 
general the causality of a concept in respect of its object. The notion of end is, according 
to this definition, more restricted than the notion of finality. Kant states, ‘Finality, 
therefore, may exist apart from an end. . . insofar we. . . are able to render the explanation 
of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a will."" This important 
passage should be better elucidated. Under an end, we understand that that which man sets 
himself with the power of his will and for its realisation, he commits himself with the aid 
of appropriate means. Kant imagines in it the effect as the determining ground for its 
cause. Ends are determined according to a particular action whereby the result we 
anticipate determines that specific action. On the contrai*y, judgments of finality are those 
which judge certain activities or objects under the presupposition of precise ends whether 
they contribute to that end or not. Thus, both judgments have a relation to causality in 
common. In the finality o f aesthetic judgment, the precise end is not a concept, which is 
authenticated in the object perceived, but takes only into account its possibility. The 
causality of aesthetic finality merges in the attitude of the subject, i.e. in its feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure. This kind of delight or pleasure has to be understood in terms of 
permanence and not as a ephemeral state of consciousness. This permanence is coupled 
with the will being interested to preserve this present state. Kant states, therefore, that 
there are objects where we cannot speak of ends produced by the subject but which can 
only be explored by assuming or anticipating a will, which provides order according to a 
certain or specific end. While intended acts are expression of the good and realise, 
therefore, a finality coupled with an end, we find in natural objects, for instance a finalit)t 
without end or a purposiveness without purpose, that is, the characteristics of their
Compare also Introduction IV. 19. of Critique o f Judgment ‘. . . by tills concept nature is represented as i f  an 
understanding contained the groimd of tile unity of tlie manifold of its empirical laws.’
Ibid., Introduction V. 23.
""Ibid., §10. 62.
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organism is only explainable through a hypothesis of finality. Hence, the validity of this 
relation o f finality (fmality-relation) is, compared to the laws of reason, restricted. By 
comparing the forms of judgment in ethics and aesthetics, it seems that they are 
incompatible in view of the end -  finality distinction. Whereas in moral judgments the end 
of morality is decisive (determinant), aesthetic judgments are without interest and without 
ends. Despite their formal similarity, judgments of the beautiful and judgments of the 
good are to an extent different, as the latter refer precisely to a specific end and the former 
are only founded by assuming a finality, that is, an ‘as if end’. With an application of these 
observations regarding the finality of the agreeable, we can summarise that ‘the finality of 
the sensuous charming (of the agreeable) that contributes to the satisfaction of sensuous 
enjoyment -  which is to be wished as its end -  is similar to the morally commanded -  
which will appreciate an appropriate act or reality to it as useful i.e. final -  but is contrary 
to the finality in judgments of taste, which invariably has the form of an ‘as if . The 
assumption of ends in objects of nature, this includes works of art, too, as we shall see, 
derives from the feeling of freedom (for which we cannot give any reasons) by judging 
something aesthetically. The end with which we work hypothetically in the judgment of 
taste represents itself in that way as if freedom were to be wished or wanted. In this 
concern, the notion of finality is o f indispensable importance for Kant since it completes 
the system of his whole critical enterprise. It bridges the concept of nature and the concept 
of freedom, and in addition, concurrently, fulfils the task of satisfying a subjective a priori 
of the judgment of taste and justifies therein the possibility of the third Kantian critique in 
transcendental intention {tramzendentaler Absicht)^^ To speak of finality in terms of a 
form of principle concerning the beautiful implies that there is neither a real will involved 
nor a specific end thought, but that the finality only refers to the formal determinance of 
the beautiful object, which is given in a representation. In other words, ‘. . . beauty denotes 
a harmony of faculties (the form of finality) which we refer to an object (it is “in an 
object”), but only to the finality of form in the object -  by contrast with, and so “without 
the presentation” of an end and its appurtenant finality. The form of aesthetically given 
objects is, therefore, to be distinguished from its matter. The form stands under the mles 
of the co-ordination in space and time but is distinguished from the conceptual 
determinance of the object. The formal finality contains a formal causality, which
Maiifred Hoffe. Immanuel Kant. p. 262. 
Kemal. op. cit., 61.
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comprehends every single cause and effect relationship and has, therefore, the universal 
task to leave all possibilities open. Formal finality takes only the form of the object and 
treats them formally and concretises therein the absolute freedom of aesthetic judgment. 
Finality of judgment communicates, thus, a relationship between nature (art) and man. It is 
a transcendental principle that says something about the possibilities (a priori) i.e. about 
the conditions under which things can become objects of cognition. Moreover, finality 
evinces that which is left undetermined by understanding. Finality, therefore, transcends 
understanding {Verstand). The form of the beautiful results in the autonomous form of 
actualising something which goes beyond the sensuous, but this is not identified by Kant 
with some super-sensual, as something divine, but is formulated as something 
transcendental.
Hitherto we have traced Kanf s formulation of aesthetics and his claim for an a 
priori principle for aesthetic judgments by confining ourselves to the ‘Analytic of the 
Beautiful’. And to this point, what we have discovered is that Kant basically establishes an 
autonomy for the judgment of taste, which is analogous to theoretical and practical 
judgments, by ‘subjectivising’ the experience of the beautiful. We should be clear, 
however, that subjectivisation here does not simply imply the kind of subjective reaction 
associated with feelings of pleasure or displeasure deriving from mere sensations (of smell, 
taste, texture, sound or sight), which always vary from individual to individual. By 
subjective, Kant rather refers to the similar subjective conditions which must hold true for 
every individual in order to legitimate the universal validity of the judgment of taste. As 
we have shown, Kant’s investigation is clearly transcendental since he searches for the 
conditions which provide the possibility to judge something as beautiful, i.e. to give a pure 
aesthetic value. However, because the judgment of taste is aesthetic and is therefore not 
based on any definite concepts but on feelings {Gefiihl) alone, one has to assume that if the 
judgment of taste is to be universally communicable, ‘the accordance o f a representation 
with these conditions of the judgment must admit of being assumed valid a priori for 
everyone’ (C J § 38. p. 146-7). Kant, we explained, saw this condition in the formal 
‘subjective finality of the representation in the mind of the subject intuiting’"^  a particular 
object, and he understood beauty therefore as the ‘form of the finality o f an object’. 
Essentially, we demand from eveiy one ‘the pleasure or subjective finality of the 
representation in respect of the relation of the cognitive faculties [the free harmonious play
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b e t w e e n  i m a g i n a t i o n  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ]  e n g a g e d  i n  t h e  e s t i m a t e  o f  a  s e n s i b l e  o b j e c t  i n  
g e n e r a l ’ (§  38. p. 147).
What we must keep in mind is that the a priori principle, which Kant claimed, does 
not determine the interpretandum but rather guides one’s reflection upon the given 
particular. Whether or not the nature of the interpretandiim is itself concrete is of no 
concern in the aesthetic experience. For the pleasure that emerges during or through this 
reflective process does not reside within the quality of an object, but is rather the effect of a 
harmonious interaction between the cognitive faculties (imagination and understanding), 
which must be created by the judging individual within him or herself. As opposed to 
pleasure accompanied by sensations, the pleasure we feel in the beautifiil is the 
consequence of our mental activity, i.e. the free interplay between imagination and 
understanding when estimating an object {Beiirteilung des Gegenstandes). In other words, 
the beauty of an object we find in aesthetic contemplation, that is, in the mental activity of 
reflection, is never the beauty of the object as a thing-in-itself, i.e. as an absolute quality; 
instead, it is something that can only be thematised as an object of the subjective 
consciousness in a transcendental explanation. The beauty of an object is therefore not 
immediately perceivable but has to be created in contemplation/reflection. A certain sujet 
is puiposive not because it fulfils a particular wish or private purpose of the judging 
individual or because it sewes a certain aim or end; instead, it is purposive if the object is 
suitable to be contemplated upon or, as Kant puts it, if the object is ‘purposive for 
reflection’. In all, Kant characterises the aesthetic purposiveness as ‘purposiveness 
without purpose’, which should establish the necessary and pleasurable relation between an 
object and the judging individual. The interpretandum and its qualities are as a result 
always determined in relation to a subject that constitutes them, and are therefore not 
independently given apart from a subjective consciousness. Consequently they gain the 
status of phenomena in relation to a subject, i.e. their qualities are modification of 
subjective consciousness. To put it in simpler terms, the reality o f such phenomena is 
always constituted in relation to a cogniser and lies therefore, at all times, within this 
relation. And since such relation is constituted through an a priori principle, these 
phenomena are essentially distinguished from mere appearance {blofier Schein) and private 
imaginations. In other words, contrary to arbitrary and capricious imaginations, these 
phenomena emerge from universal, a priori conditions. Therefore, if one claims that
" 'C J §  15. 70.
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something is beautiful, it must hold true that everyone else should pass a similar judgment 
on the given object since the subjective conditions through which one perceives that very 
object are in principle the same for everyone. The capacity to judge something to be 
beautiful as universally valid judgment, i.e. taste, can therefore be assumed on the basis o f 
a sensus commimis aestheticus, which does not merely describe an empirical sense but a 
universal capacity of reflection. From this capacity o f reflection emerges the peculiar 
feeling of pleasure, which finds its expression in the aesthetic judgment. Since the judging 
individual is not conscious of a concept in this reflection but realises the formal subjective 
purposiveness only with the aid of a certain constellation of his/her cognitive capacities, 
i.e. in the awareness of the feeling of pleasure, aesthetic judgments can not be objectively 
proved (by a concept) but can only be verified through the very experience. Their claim 
for validity is therefore restricted to a subjective universality.
§ 1.4 Fourth Moment
In the fourth and final moment of the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ Kant’s primary 
interests lie in developing the modality or necessity of pure judgments of taste and so 
clarify further the subjective universality that such judgments claim. He writes in §18 
‘what we have in mind in the case of the beautiful is a necessary reference on its part to 
delight’."® The implication here is that the delight in the beautiful is necessarily shared by 
all subjects, i.e. it has a universal character. If we recall, in the First Moment Kant 
explains that delight in the agreeable is always coupled with interest. As such, the pleasure 
arising from the agreeable is contingent and therefore cannot claim universality. However, 
in contrast, Kant maintains that the delight in the beautifiil can claim universality since this 
type of pleasure is devoid of all interest, i.e., it is ‘disinterested pleasure’ which we can 
expect every subject to share since it derives fiom the ‘finality of form of finality’ which 
renders the same capacity to respond in a like manner to all. The universality of aesthetic 
judgments, moreover, is neither determined by moral compulsion, which, like the 
agreeable, depends on interest or by causal necessity, which contends that pleasure is 
caused by the object of perception. Judgment of taste, Kant postulates, is wholly 
independent of interest and is occasioned by the subjects, not the objects.
What is more, Kant asserts that the judgment of taste has an ‘exemplary validity’. 
He explains that ‘it [exemplary validity] is a necessity of the assent of all to a judgment
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regarded as exemplifying a universal rule incapable of formulation.’"® The reason for the 
incapability to formulate a universal rule of course lies in the fact that the rule is merely a 
subjective mle, since that which the predicate ‘beautifuT refers to is a subjective matter, 
i.e. the inner feeling or sensation belong to the subject. Therefore the status of a pure 
judgment of taste can be described as having exemplary validity for every one. In all o f its 
cases it represents an example which confirms a universal but unconceptualisible rule. 
Nevertheless one cannot count on that agreement definitively since the mle which 
determines the correct subsumption is not explicable in terms of objectivity. We already 
know from the Second Moment that the kind of universality involved in the pure judgment 
of taste is ‘subjective’ rather than ‘objective’. Whereas judgments with a claim to 
subjective universality are communicable and valid for every judging subject, judgments 
with the claim to objective universality hold good for every object of the same kind. Let us 
clarify this by illustrating an example. When we say ‘this rose is beautiful’, then this 
judgment is subjectively universal since it holds good for all judging subjects, but not for 
all roses. In contrast when we say ‘all roses have thorns’, then this judgment holds not 
only tme for all judging subjects but for all roses as well since thorns are an objective 
quality o f all roses. In the latter case we have an example of an objective cognitive 
judgment since the necessity of this judgment is derived fiom a definitive concept, i.e. the 
concept of a rose. But as we can see, in the former case, we do not have such a definitive 
concept, and thus it is not apodictic. Hence, we can conclude that judgments of taste 
concern individuals and are singular. And although they are devoid of any concept, there 
is still a necessity of the assent of all.
In §19 Kant emphatically makes clear that the necessity of aesthetic judgments, 
even if it is exemplary, is much more than an expectation or imputation. Although Kant 
never left any doubt about the binding or compulsory character of the judgment of taste, he 
now says ‘[A] person who describes something as beautiful insists that every one ought to 
give the object in question his approval and follow suit in describing it as beautiful.’ ®^ But 
Kant does not simply assign validity to a subject’s own pleasure, he requires ‘in the sense 
0 Î justifiably demands, an agreement from others’."' Nevertheless, he goes on to say that
"Hbid., §18. 81.
® Ibid.
Ibid., § 19, 82. 
Kemal. op. cit., 64.
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‘[t]he ought in aesthetic judgments . . .  is still only pronounced conditionally.’"" He states, 
‘[w]ere judgments of taste (like cognitive judgments) in possession of a definitive 
objective principle, then one who in his judgment followed such a principle would claim 
unconditioned necessity for it.’"" In the case of sensual judgment of taste one does not 
claim necessity at all since this kind of judgment (judgment of the agreeable for instance) 
is not represented as an object of a universal delight by means of a concept. As we have 
indicated above the same holds true in respect to the beautiful (incapability to formulate 
the rule!) but in contrast to the judgment of the agreeable, judgments of taste rightly assert 
a claim to universal validity. In contrast to the judgment of the agreeable the absence of an 
concept in the judgment of taste does not destroy the self-certainty of the judging subject 
and does not diminish or invalidate the claim for universality. Therefore Kant concludes 
‘they must have a subjective principle, and one which determines what pleases or 
displeases, by means of feeling only and not through concepts, but yet with universal 
validity’."" As we have seen in the Second Moment this subjective principle is determined 
as the free play o f the cognitive powers of imagination and understanding. Kant’s main 
interest here is to emphasise that the mental state, i.e. feeling of pleasure which constitutes 
the judgment of taste, is a feeling which different individuals can have in the same way. 
The universal validity of this feeling, i.e. the possibility that every one can have this feeling 
is expressed in the notion of a common sense. According to Kant the necessity of the 
universal assent to judgments of taste is only thinkable under the presupposition of a 
common sense. That is, he shows that a ‘universally valid but subjective experience is 
possible in the sense of transcendentally justified, in the way that cognitive judgments are 
transcendentally justified, by reference to common sense.’"" Here, Kant distinguishes 
common sense which underlies as a subjective principle any judgment of taste from 
common understanding (gemeinen Verstand) which is also referred to as common sense. 
While the presupposed common sense in judgments of taste is entirely based on feelings, 
the latter is based on concepts. The question whether one has reason for presupposing a 
common sense, which Kant himself poses in § 21, he answers by drawing an analogy to 
cognitions and judgments in general. Kant states:
CJ§ 19. 82.
Ibid., § 20. 82.
Ibid.
Kemal. op. cit., 65.
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[I]f cognitions are to admit of communication, then our mental state, i.e. the way 
the cognitive powers are attuned for cognition generally, and, in fact, the relative 
proportion suitable for a representation (by which an object is given to us) from 
which cognition is a result, must also admit of being universally communicated, as, 
without this, which is the subjective condition of the act of knowing, knowledge, as 
an effect, would not arise.""
One can say that Kant identifies common sense as the condition for the universal 
communicability of the mental state and hence also of feelings, so that the application of a 
common sense is from Kant’s perspective well founded. With the assumption of a 
common sense underlying the judgment of taste, Kant shows that the necessary condition 
is already provided, making it generally possible to solicit every one else’s assent. Put 
simply, Kant demonstrated that judgments of taste are transcendentally possible. But this 
does not automatically imply that our imputation is also accepted when we actually make 
an particular judgment. Kant was apparently aware of this difficulty, and so he explicitly 
points out:
Now, for this purpose, experience cannot be made the ground of this common 
sense, for the latter is invoked to justify judgments containing an ‘ought’. The 
assertion is not that every one will fall in with our judgment but rather that every 
one ought to agree with it."'
According to Kant, when one makes a particular actual judgment of taste, one puts forward 
one’s own judgment of taste as an example of the presupposed common sense, 
consequently, attributing to it exemplary validity. ‘Hence’, Kant emphasises, ‘common 
sense is a mere ideal norm. With this as presupposition, a judgment that accords with it, as 
well as the delight in an Object expressed in that judgment, is rightly converted into a rule 
for every one.’"® But what does this mean? Although judgments o f taste have only a 
subjective principle (principle of subjective necessity), it is nevertheless assumed to be 
universal in the sense that one, in the actual making of a judgment of taste, presupposes a 
common sense, i.e. the necessary idea to assumes that one’s feelings are universally 
communicable. The fact that one presupposes such a sensus communis justifies that one 
could demand universal assent concerning the different judging subjppts as if judgments of 
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definition: The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept, is cognised as object of a 
necessary delight.
§ 1.5 Summary of the Four Moments of the Third Critique
The significance of the Third Critique is obviously the transcendental philosophical 
basis which Kant gave to aesthetics. By placing the necessary conditions for the judgment 
of taste within the subject, so as to legitimise the universal validity for this kind of 
judgment, Kant also established the autonomy of the judgment of taste, but only at the 
expense of suspending the concept of knowledge and truth from the aesthetic province. 
Although Kant saw the uniqueness of aesthetic judgment and preserved it to a suprahuman 
dimension, which manifests itself in freedom, he nevertheless failed, according to 
Gadamer, to accord any cognitive value to such judgments. Since the judgment of taste is 
not based on any concepts, Kant maintains in his Third Critique that no knowledge is 
imparted in the aesthetic realm and asserts, '[i]t is only through a logical judgment that we 
get knowledge’''"^. As we can see, Kant thus relegated the concept of knowledge and truth 
only to the theoretical and practical use of reason.™
The effect of Kant’s new foundation for aesthetics cannot be underestimated. 
Kantian aesthetics made it impossible for those succeeding him to acknowledge a claim to 
truth in respect to the experiences of art, of philosophy and of history. As a consequence 
of his transcendental justification of aesthetic taste, all truth and theoretical knowledge 
were placed beyond the possible reach of the human sciences, subsequently, putting into 
question their legitimacy. The opening paragraph of Gadamer’s Truth and Method raises 
this specific fundamental issue concerning the legitimacy of the human sciences vis-à-vis 
the overriding dominance of methodical thinking on the model of the natural sciences in 
contemporary culture. Compared to the natural sciences, Gadamer points out, the human 
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) should not follow a methodological procedure 
appropriate to science. They neither employ the scientific method of induction nor appear 
to progress inductively in order to discover and increase our loiowledge of comprehensive 
‘historical laws’. This lack of a methodical procedure, as previously indicated, has caused
Ibid.
Ibid., § 15. 71.
™ Gadamer argues in Truth and Method tliat the Cartesian idea of truth is inappropriate for grasping taitli tliat is intrinsic 
to the human sciences; tlius, it seems appropriate and significant tliat in the present chapter I examine tlie concept of tintli 
and how Gadamer miderstands and applies tliis concept in relation to tlie Geisteswissenschaften.
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great alarm concerning scientific justifiability in the human sciences.’’ For many thinkers 
the absence of method puts into doubt how one can legitimise the truth claim in the 
Geisteswissenschaften, i.e. in the aesthetic or the historical experience. If method is not the 
vehicle through which we arrive at the presumed truth in the Geistes-wissenschaften, what 
does Gadamer purpose as the truth criterion that can be taken as the basis o f scientificity 
for the human sciences? This question subsequently seems to presuppose the controversial 
problem concerning the definition of truth and how one is to attain such a truth.
§ 2. A Brief Historical Overview of Nineteenth Centuiy Hermeneutics
In the sciences of the post-Kantian era, methodology discovered great vitality. The 
Age of Romanticism provided vast fertile grounds for the natural sciences to flourish. 
New discoveries and advancements in mathematical and physical sciences fuelled the 
optimistic belief that adherence to strict sciences could indeed disclose absolute truth. 
Against such a backdrop, the need to justify the human sciences as a science became 
evermore pressing, and out of this need for legitimisation, the Geisteswissenschaften 
witnessed the advent of modern hermeneutics, which for the most part adopted the 
methodical rationality of the natural sciences in search for a programmatic method to 
discover absolute truth. Here we shall examine three major hermeneutics of the nineteenth 
century and the turning point of modern hermeneutics, Martin Heidegger.
§ 2.1 Schleiermacher’s Grammatical Exegesis with Psychological 
Interpretation
Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834), credited as being the progenitor of 
modern hermeneutics, realised in textual interpretations (such as the Bible and the classics) 
an inherent problem of understanding. Because his theory of interpretation opens with the 
premise that ‘strict interpretation begins with misunderstanding’, Schleiermacher 
envisioned the development of a universal hermeneutic program which could parry
”  It must be admitted that Gadamer does not wish to omit metliod completely from tlie hmnan sciences. Tmie and time 
again, he acknowledges the need for metliodical work witliin tlie Geisteswissenschaften. hi his essay ‘Tnith in tlie 
Himian Sciences' (op. cit., 26), Gadamer states: ‘Certahily, tlie application of methods also belongs to the works of tlie 
hmnan sciences. They distinguish tliemselves from popularised belle lettre tlnougli a certain verifiability’. Another 
example is in a 1993 interview witli Carsten Dutt Wiere Gadamer freely admits tliat tliere are metliods -  metliods to be 
used as ‘tools’ {Werkzettge) -  in studymg tlie humanities. Tliese so-called ‘tools’, as he explains, must be learned and 
applied; however, tliey are by no means absolute in tlie sense of ‘scientific metliod’ nor do tliey alone make up tlie 
scientificity of the Geisteswissenschaften. Gadamer’s interest is not the negation of method in the Geiste.swissenschaften, 
but rather Ins concern lies in ‘qualifymg’ tlie concept of metliod in order to evoke a consciousness that reaches beyond 
the metliodological self-miderstaiidiiig of tlie Geisteswissenschaften. See Hermeneiitik, Âsthetik Praktische Philosophie: 
Hans-Georg Gadamer im Gesprach. (Heidelberg: Universitütsverlag C. Winter, 1993), pp. 15-16.
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misunderstandings in the act of interpretation. He called for a critical program, which 
exhausts the comprehension of language. By and large, he devised a theory for textual 
interpretation, which includes two main divisions, a ‘grammatical side’ on the one hand 
and a ‘psychological side’ of interpretation on the other. The grammatical aspect of 
interpretation, of course, concerns the usage of language in its totality, that is, in terms of 
its form, structure, dialect and the like, whereas the psychological involves the task of 
transposing oneself imaginatively back to the original situation (i.e. historical and 
psychological) in which the author conceived his/her work, thereby reconstructing not only 
the author’s intentions and purposes but also the impelling force which created his/her 
desire to say something. This then permits the interpreter to understand the text as well as 
and then even better than its author. These two forms of interpretation, as conceived by 
Schleiermacher, work to complement and check one another and function within the 
hermeneutic circle of whole and part. In grammatical interpretation, a text is dissected to 
its very essence until the meaning of each word is understood in context of the sentence to 
which it belongs. The meaning of the sentence is then determined in respect to the work as 
a whole, which then leaves the work to be comprehended in terms of its linguistic usage 
and literary genre. Conversely, the meaning of the whole is constituted by its part, i.e. its 
sentences and words. This dialectical relationship between the whole and part, hence, 
describes what Schleiermacher explains as the hermeneutic circle. For its part, the 
psychological aspect of interpretation also involves a similar dialectical relationship insofar 
as the work is placed in context of the author’s life and the history of the time while 
concurrently reconstructing an overall interpretation from the various individual 
experiences and aims of the author. Schleiermacher’s bipartite conception of hermeneutics 
thus functions in the way that ‘Grammatical interpretation complements psychological 
interpretation by fixing the exact meaning of the author’s words and eliciting a 
comprehension of the language as the author knew it, while psychological interpretation 
complements grammatical interpretation by exploring the life -  context in which the work 
was generated’.
Prior to Schleiermacher, ‘hermeneutics’ was simply an interpretative instrument 
employed by Scripture scholars who were preoccupied with the understanding of the Bible. 
After the Protestant Reformation, the dispute between Catholic and Lutheran scriptural 
interpretation became a controversial problem in relation to the proper understanding of the
Georgia Wanike’s Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. (Polity Press, 1987), p. 14.
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Bible. On the one hand, the Catholic view o f interpretation maintained that the correct 
understanding of the Bible is dependent on the testimony of tradition and authority of the 
old Church Fathers. However, on the other hand, Martin Luther’s reforming acts dissented 
from the Catholic reliance on tradition and authority by presupposing that the true criterion 
for proper interpretation of the Bible lies in the principle of sola scriptura. That is to say 
that Luther ‘rediscovered the until then forgotten self-evidence of Scripture.”  ^ Hence, 
Scripture is siii ipsiiis interpres, according to Luther.
Thus hermeneutics, which preceded Schleiermacher, simply dealt with the 
validation of scriptural text and situations where understanding was not self-evident. On 
the whole, it possessed only a limited scope and was hardly considered as a methodology 
appropriate for understanding in general. However, Schleiermacher’s contributions 
marked a significant change in the history o f hermeneutics. First of all, his presupposition 
that misunderstanding is the point of departure for every understanding, imiversalised 
misunderstanding ‘as the situation and occasion of interpretation’.’'’ He thus explains, ‘The 
business of hermeneutics cannot begin merely when the faculty of understanding becomes 
uncertain of itself; rather it is involved from the very beginning in the endeavour to 
understand something said.’™ For this reason, Schleiermacher conceptualises hermeneutics 
as the ‘infinite task’ of reconstructing from the ground up every foundation of grammar 
and expression o f inwardness. The art of interpretation, as he envisions it, is an ongoing 
process for ‘deeper interpretation’. However, since complete understanding is impossible 
(likewise the attempt to eliminate all misunderstandings is unrealisable), the goal of 
hermeneutics is not the attainment of absolute understanding, but rather of an improved 
and better understanding, i.e. interpretation which avoids misunderstandings. 
Schleiermacher’s reconstruction o f interpretative practices points toward a formal 
methodology. However, Schleiermacher himself refrains from offering specific guidelines 
or general ‘methods’ o f interpretation. He rather emphasises that hermeneutics, especially 
the psychological side of interpretation, involves interpretative divination {divinare), i.e. 
guesswork. Although the grammatical aspect of interpretation provides useful insight for 
the understanding of a text, it is nevertheless the psychological side which Schleiermacher
See Jean Grondin’s Introduction to Philosophical Hemienentics. (trans. Joel Weinslieiiner. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1994), p. 40. The primacy of Scripture was notliing new to Luther, for it was already emphasised by St. 
Augustine in Ins De doctrina Christiana. Wliat Luther accomplished is tlie re-employment of the sola scriptura principle 
as tlie proper criterion for scriptural interpretations.
Ibid., p. 70.
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stresses as the central focus of interpretation. The interest of Schleiermacher’s 
hermeneutics is in the thought behind the words. However, since the interpreter can never 
know the exact thought of the author, divination is inescapable. In other words, ‘At the 
point when the fundamentally comparative means of grammatical interpretation leave us at 
a loss -  that is, when it is not the commonness but the uniqueness of a particular style that 
is to be elucidated -  then often enough we simply have to guess what the author was trying 
to say’.™ The task of developing a methodological procedure, i.e. devising a methodical 
exposition of mles governing interpretation, was therefore left open for his successors.
§ 2.2 Droyseii and Understanding through Research
In the nineteenth century, historians, in their efforts to liberate themselves hom 
Hegelian teleology, i.e., from the assumption that ‘the history of the world is none other 
than the progress of consciousness of freedom’, viewed history as an empirical science 
based on facts. They therefore reasoned that history had to be interpreted according to it 
own merits, independent of a priori principles. This view of history essentially pushed 
historians to broaden and transpose the theory of hermeneutic circle of whole and part, 
which Schleiermacher specifically reserved for textual interpretations, to understand the 
hi stow of mankind as a whole.
In this basic schema of whole and part, every particular, historical phenomenon is 
conceptualised only in the context of the historical period to which it belongs. This in 
substance implies that every historical epoch is to be treated uniquely and understood as 
possessing its own internal meaning, that is, every historical event is to be judged 
immanently, as indicative of its time. However, for the historical sciences to justify their 
claim to truth, historians presupposed a need to employ a conceptual scheme, i.e. a 
methodology, not only to defend their discipline against the arguments of historical 
relativism but also to establish historical studies as ‘sciences’ equally standing with or 
comparable to the natural sciences.
Johann Gustave Droysen (1808-1884) was one of the earliest philosophical 
pioneers to attempt the task of developing a methodological system based on 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical principles for understanding history. Droysen was well 
aware of the scientific revolution that was taking place in his own time, and he perceived
The quote from Schleiermacher is taken from Jean Grondin’s translation found in Introduction to Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, p. 70.
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in the natural sciences a paradigm, that is, the utilisation of a method, for the historical 
sciences to emulate. Kant, for Droysen, was the model to follow: ‘We need a Kant to 
provide [not merely a model for gathering] historical materials but a critical paradigm for 
theory and practice toward and in history.’™ However, Droysen realises that the method 
needed for historical understanding must differ from that of the natural sciences, for in the 
historical sciences there is no self-givenness of experiment, that is, historical studies do not 
possess the opportunity to look at their interpretandiim directly but rather rely on tradition, 
i.e. how historical events are handed down to us. Thus, for Droysen, the method of 
historical sciences consists in imderstanding through research (forschend zii verstehen). 
This implies an intellectual reworking of the past, that is, a restless examining and re­
examining of the inherited remains o f the past. Historical sciences therefore endeavour in 
a ceaseless process of searching through the remains for new historical source materials 
and for ever new interpretations of them, which might offer new life to the past, 
broadening and deepening our understanding of the past and present. Droysen, therefore, 
points out that historical study ‘does not merely repeat what has been handed down as 
history; instead, it must penetrate more deeply; it tries as far as possible to find whatever of 
the past is still left to be discovered; in the spirit of letting things come to life again and 
understanding them, it tries to create new sources, as it were’.™
In his endeavour to justify historical studies as an empirical science, Droysen 
introduces a recognisable universal commonality uniting every individual historical 
phenomenon together. As Droysen sees it, the notion of ‘continuity of progressive 
historical work and production’ provides the necessary universality needed to legitimise 
historical studies as an empirical science.™ The continuity and coherence of history, he 
implies, lies in the movement towards moral and ethical progress. Thus Droysen explains 
that historical understanding is constituted by the understanding of the progressive 
development of moral powers throughout histoiy. These moral powers express themselves 
in language, in science and in forms of communal life, such as family, community, church 
and states. They represent the outward expressions by which historical understanding of 
things ‘inner’ can be achieved. Moral powers supply historians, as Droysen claims, with
™ Grondin, op. cit., 71.
™ Due to tlie unavailability of Droysen’s Histotik: Vorlesimgen ilber die Enzyklopiidie imd Méthodologie der Geschichte 
(published by R. Hübner. Mmiicli, 1937; Daniistadt 1977), Regretfully, I am forced to rely on Jean Grondin for the direct 
quotes found hi Introduction to Philosophical Henneneutics. p. 80.
Ibid., p. 81.
™ Ibid., p. 82.
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the essential questions necessary to search and re-search the moral significance of 
historical materials. They are to historian what laws are to the natural sciences.*® Moral 
powers are the foundation of the nature of history and of the possibility of knowing it.*' 
This suggests that the particular historical phenomenon or event has to be understood in 
relation to the entirety of its historical moral progress. For ‘humanity is only the integrated 
totality of all these moral powers and forms, and every individual [exists] only in the 
continuity and community of these moral powers’.*^  Hence, historical understanding is 
none other than the progressive self-awareness and self-knowledge on the part of mankind.
For Droysen, individual utterance is to be understood within the context of the 
whole, and the whole from the individual. Here, we clearly notice an echoing of 
Schleiermacher. Droysen in fact adopts Schleiermacher’s notion of understanding, insofar 
as he identifies historical understanding with the ‘infinite task’ of critically re-enacting or 
retracing history in an effort to become ever closer to understanding both the cause and 
genesis of the original historical utterances. The study of histoiy, according to Droysen, is 
therefore comparable to the Schleiermacherian study of texts. However, to all intents and 
purposes, Droysen at length fails to establish a methodological system of investigating 
histoiy that could equal the degree of methodological certainty belonging to the natural 
sciences. His notion of understanding through research seems hardly to justify itself to be 
called a methodology or to legitimate its claim to truth.
§ 2.3 Dilthey’s Understanding Life from out of Life itself
The search for a methodological approach to the human sciences reaches its climax 
in the works of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). Like Droysen, Dilthey set out to justify and 
secure history’s claim to be a science. He, too, attempted to render an epistemological 
legitimacy for history by developing a methodological system, which could produce 
objective knowledge but avoid the reductionist, mechanistic, ahistorical explanatory 
schema of the natural sciences. In conceptualising histoiy as an autonomous science, 
Dilthey’s critical intent aimed to emancipate the historical sciences from the subordination 
to the natural science by formulating an independent, systematic and methodical 
foundation for the understanding of history and the human sciences in general.
*®TM191/WM204 
Ibid., 188/201 
Grondiii. op. cit., 82.
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The challenge of formulating such a methodology, for Dilthey (as it was for 
Leopold von Ranke and Johann Droysen), evolved from his critical opposition to the 
Hegelian philosophy of history. To Hegel history is, roughly speaking, a steadfast 
progression towards a higher rational purpose, an end that is beyond human individuals, 
but nonetheless involves their multifarious aims and activities, inasmuch as they are 
instrumental in bringing about the ultimate end. Hegef s emphasis on the rational character 
of history led to his view that history exists as a manifestation of the rational mind. In 
Hegelian terms, world history is the history of thought. However for Dilthey, such an 
account of history denies the significance of historical experiences. He, in contrast to 
Hegel, perceives a connection between experience and history, and therefore reasserts the 
necessity of experience in understanding history. If history is to be a legitimate science, it 
must be empirical, explains Dilthey. ‘All science, all philosophy, is empirical science. All 
experience derives its coherence, and the validity conditioned by it from the coherence of 
human consciousness’.®^ But this opens the question, how is experience to offer historical 
understanding? To grasp how Dilthey closes the distance between experience and 
historical understanding, we first need to comprehend his concept of experience.
Dilthey was well aware of the fact that the empirical character of the 
Geisleswissenschqften is something quite dissimilar from that of the natural sciences, and 
he, therefore, distinguishes the lived experience (Etiebnis) grounding the 
Geisteswissenschaften from the scientific experience {Erfahnmg) realised in investigative 
sciences. Through experience, natural phenomena are explained in terms of mathematical 
laws and rules in the natural sciences. However, associated with the
Geisteswissenschaften, experience is acknowledged as the very mode of ‘understanding’: 
‘We explain nature, we understand mental life’ (Die Natiir erklaren wir, das Seelenleben 
verstehen wir), says Dilthey.®'’ In the field of modern critical sciences, experience is the 
result of discovering verifiable normative laws of obseived phenomena. It, therefore, 
focuses on the repeatability of experimental results and the collection of observed data. 
Further, scientific experience entails objectivity, that is, detachment between the 
interpretandiim and its investigator. In contrast, by Erlebnis or ‘lived experience’ Dilthey 
rather refers to something which ‘deals with living connections of reality experienced in
See Dioysen, Wilhelm.: Collected Works, vol. XIX ‘ The Foundation of the Sciences of Man, Society and Histoiy’ (ed. 
H. Johoach and R. Rodi. 1982), p. 389.
See Wilhelm Dilthey. Gesammelte Schriften. Band V: Die Geistige Welt. Einleitimg in die Philosophie des Lehen. 
(Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1924), p. 144.
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the mind’.*^  Erlebnis, in other words, is a living historical process, and since it evolves 
within the conscious mind of the subject, it, therefore, possesses a cognitive function. 
Erlebnis is undetachable from the individual consciousness, as consequence, producing 
only a ‘subjective response’. That is, every instance of experience is contained within the 
individual consciousness and possesses an intuitive immediacy.
Dilthey’s concept of experience in respect to the individual self reflects a 
‘happening’ or an event or fusion of events, which stands apart as a coherent whole from 
the temporal flux of daily life. Experience in this instance not only represents an 
interruption to the normal routines observed in everyday living but also equates as meaning 
and provides intrinsic continuity and coherence to the individual life. It is, moreover, 
immediate and direct self-understanding, and yet concurrently belongs to the unity o f the 
individual self-consciousness which experiences the particular experience and thus 
contains an inalienable and irreplaceable relation to the whole of this one life.*  ^ To be 
more precise, ‘What an experience means is immediate, in the sense of not mediated by a 
concept, but for that very reason its meaning is not (in another sense) immediately 
apparent. Rather it constitutes itself in memory and self-reflection.’*^
Life-histoiy, as it were, revolves and unfolds around Erlebnis. The particularly 
significant experiences of an individual are the events from which the life-conduct of that 
individual is determined and shaped. Applied to the hermeneutic circle of whole and part, 
Dilthey’s concept of Erlebnis can, therefore, be considered as an appropriate basis for 
comprehending the individual life, that is, one understands one’s particular experiences 
within the context of the whole o f one’s life, and conversely the whole of one’s life 
becomes understandable in respect to understanding one’s particular experiences made 
throughout one’s life. Hence, the concept of Erlebnis suggests an intrinsic connection to 
the individual self-understanding, which is to be understood as a process in constant 
motion, always open for revision and never complete. In order to provide a fixed basis by 
which he can legitimate the scientific character of history, Dilthey applies his concept of 
Erlebnis to historical understanding. But this leads to the all-important question: how is 
historical understanding possible under the premise of Dilthey’s concept of Erlehnisl How 
can individual self-understanding, emanating through personal lived experiences, provide
See Dilthey Today: A Critical Appraisal o f  the Contemporaiy Relevance o f  His Work. (London; Gi'eeiiwood Press, 
1988), p. 108.
TM 60 / WM 63
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the fundamental basis for historical understanding? Where does the connection lie 
between personal self-understanding and historical and social-scientific understanding?
What Dilthey proposes is that knowledge of history is acquired in similar fashion to 
self-knowledge. He suggests that the given coherency within an individual’s life is similar 
to the given coherency in history insofar as in both instances, experience is the supplier of 
unity. Just as in the individual life, where one’s particular experiences organises and 
governs the direction of one’s life, so it is likewise in history that the particular historical 
events constitute and construct the movement of history. However, in the case of historical 
understanding it is the historian who undertakes and consumes himself in the task of 
interpreting and understanding historical events or ‘happenings’. It is he who understands 
the wholes of our historicity. Since he observes and studies history and is himself a 
historical being, the historian, for Dilthey, possesses a superior historical sophistication, 
which enables him to think beyond what is already thought in life experience.*® What this 
implies is that the historian, given his privileged insight, is able to relive and investigate 
the particular historical experiences, which provide continuity and make history 
intelligible. However, this seems to fragment the continuity between the experience of the 
historian and that of the individual. Further, it raises the question: how is the historian to 
surmount the limitations of his own historical situation, that is, as a historical being 
himself, how can he escape his own prejudices, tradition and particularity? And is his 
historicity not a hindrance to objectivity? It seems clear that in studying history, the 
identity or immediacy between the experiencing subject and the understanding subject is 
abolished, in the sense that one (the historian) is confronted with another individual’s, 
community’s or culture’s experiences from which a coherence has to be formed, although 
one is not the subject who has made the experiences oneself. The historian, for instance, 
cannot experience ‘immediately’ what a particular individual is experiencing, nor for that 
matter the experience of every individual. Without the notion of immediacy, which 
Dilthey himself stresses, how can history be made coherent?
Dilthey recognises that experience and understanding differs from individual to 
individual, and so to bridge the gulf between individual experience and the experience 
which belongs to social and historical understanding, he appeals to Hegel’s notion of Geisi 
or spirit. Geist, for Dilthey, represents an over-arching or collective consciousness of
See Joel C. Weiiisheimer. Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A  Reading o f Truth and Method. (New Haven; Yale University 
Press, 1985), p. 88. (Cited hereafter as GH.)
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society, which functions analogously to the individual consciousness. The individual 
experience no longer pertains merely to the particular self; rather it is subsumed in the 
Geisi. Thus, Dilthey explains:
The individual experiences, thinks and acts constantly in a common sphere and 
only within such does he understand. In the same way, everything that is 
understood bears within itself the mark of being familiar in terms of this common 
sphere. We live in this atmosphere; it surrounds us constantly. We are immersed 
in it. We are everywhere at home in the historical and understood world, we 
understand the meaning and significance of everything. We are ourselves 
intertwined in these communalities.®^
Insofar as the particular individual conforms and participates in the common cultural 
practices and modes of self-understanding, the individual reflects the larger whole to which 
he belongs through those ‘communalities’, and thus the experience of the one reflects the 
experience of the whole. Understanding o f history, thus, derives from a dialogical 
interaction between the historical individual, i.e. the historian, and the historical world. 
The commonality of experience present in social and historical knowledge remains an 
ongoing process, ever révisable in reflection.
Although in his life-philosophy Dilthey endeavoured to abandon all notion of 
Hegel’s speculative metaphysics, he nevertheless had to return to Hegel’s notion of 
objective Geist in order to demonstrate the possibility of common experience and supply a 
connection between experience and understanding; that is, Dilthey had to find a way to 
explain how understanding o f a particular historical event is possible although the 
experience is not authentic for the historian. It appears that he ultimately could not accept 
the fact that experience is historically and temporally conditioned, and this seems to 
indicate that the subsequently implied finitude of consciousness and the fear o f the 
relativistic implications of his life-philosophy compelled Dilthey to return to the very 
speculative idealism for which he criticised Hegel.
However Geist, as Dilthey conceives it, differs somewhat in regards to Hegel’s 
conception of ‘absolute’ Geist, which treats art, religion, philosophy and the like as forms
TM 195-6 / WM 208
See W. Dilthey , Der Aufbau der gescliichtlicheii Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften (Sulirkamp. Frankfhrt, 1970), p. 
178. ‘der einzelne erlebt, denkt mid liandelt stets in einer Spliare von Gemeinsamkeit, iind nur in einer solchen versteht 
er. Allés Verstandene tragt gleichsam die Marke des Bekanntseins ans solcher Gemeinsamkeit an sicli. Wir leben in 
dieser Atmosphare, sie mngibt ims bestandig. Wir sind eingetaucht in sie. Wir sind in dieser geschichtlichen und
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of immediate truth, revealing suprahistorical knowledge. According to Dilthey, all 
knowledge is intrinsically historical, that is, all knowledge is rooted in ‘real life’, and as 
such, the disciplines of art, philosophy and religion exist simply as expressive forms of 
life. By divorcing truth from art, philosophy and religion, Dilthey implies that these 
‘expressions of life’ are to be understood only in terms of tracing them back to the mental 
consciousness from which they originated. Here, we see at once that Dilthey essentially 
recurs to the ‘psychological’ aspect of interpretation relevant to the Schleiermacherian 
concept of hermeneutics. And again, we see the empathetic need to return to the past in 
order to discover the meaning behind the forms of expression, the ‘inner word’. Moreover, 
Dilthey’s claim that history is the single source of unconditioned certainty raises several 
other critical implications. It suggests, first, that historical knowledge is de-relativised 
from all experience. This means that Dilthey essentially disconnects history from its own 
foundation -  namely experience -  and places history outside the sphere of his life- 
philosophy. However, this diametrically opposes his earlier position that historical 
knowledge is never quite complete but ever unfolding within the circle of experience and 
understanding. By implying the absoluteness of historical knowledge, Dilthey virtually 
imposes a Cartesian standard of certainty by which to measure history. This subsequently 
means that the objectivity, which constitutes history as a science, is to be found not within 
history but outside it. But why does Dilthey supersede his insights of experience with 
Cartesian idealism? Ultimately, Dilthey could not escape his own preoccupations 
concerning the relativistic implications of his life-philosophy. He in fact could not 
overcome the self-doubt, which emanated from his commitment to Cartesian idealism, to 
accept the historicity of historical experiences. As a result of Descartes influence, 
Dilthey’s understanding of history, at length, follows in the likeness of Hegel’s speculative 
metaphysics, and one can surmise that it is Cartesian understanding of truth which in the 
end undermines Dilthey’s entire project, that is, to legitimate the human sciences as a 
science.
In retrospect, Dilthey, on the one hand, bases his philosophy of life on Erlebnis, 
that is, lived experience, establishing the empirical character of the Geisteswissenschaften. 
This subsequently implies that he is committed to the methodology of hermeneutics. That 
is, he acknowledges that understanding takes place within the hermeneutic circle where
verstaiidenen Welt iiberall zu Hause, wir verstehen Sinn und Bedentung von dent alien, wir selbst sind verwebt in diese 
Gemeinsamkeiten. ’
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there are no fixed foundations on which to base our knowledge and understanding. It is 
clear that for Dilthey the present is the only point of departure for reflections on life since 
there can be no other starting points, as it were, for understanding than in life itself. To be 
sure, Dilthey recognises that there are uncertainties in life; however, this does not suggest 
that the absence of certain foundations implies that there is no truth. Life, as it were, gives 
rise to truth according to Dilthey. However, on the other hand, Dilthey is unable to 
emancipate himself from seeking an Archimedian point from which he can build an 
understanding of historical knowledge. The search for a fixed starting point, for the most 
part, is due to his fears of relativism. What appears obvious is the fact that Dilthey rejects 
the idea that historical understanding, similar to self-understanding, is temporally 
conditioned, thus, abandoning his own insights of experience in regards to history. He 
understands well that in his life-philosophy understanding is never absolute in the sense 
that it is finite, but rather that it is always open for amendment. However in respect to 
history, Dilthey insists on the Cartesian understanding of truth and asserts that historical 
knowledge is absolute. This is to say that historical knowledge is definite in the sense that 
it is free from any contextual, situational or temporal restrictions. But then the questions 
arise, how is history to be understood? From which direction or starting point are we to 
approach history? Where is the methodology? By divorcing history from experience, 
Dilthey seems to displace history from life. This is a contrary to his earlier position that 
history arises from life. It is obvious that Dilthey was in a life-long conflict between the 
traditional and the hermeneutical. Dilthey’s obsession with traditional epistemology did 
not allow him to give up the concept of objective certainty in regards to history and 
hindered him therefore from drawing out the logical conclusions for his life-philosophy. 
This task and the task of legitimising the Geisteswissenschaften were thus left open to his 
successors of the twentieth century, for such a philosopher as Hans-Georg Gadamer. We 
should note however that traditional hermeneutics did not simply leap to philosophical 
hermeneutics. There was an important transition between Dilthey’s methodological 
discipline and Gadamer’s practical discipline. This transition was Heidegger’s 
‘hermeneutics of facticity’.
§ 2.4 Heidegger’s Interpretation of Dasein
Following Dilthey’s insights into ‘life-history’, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) 
places his attention on the temporal horizons of Leben (life) and sets the ontology of
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factical life as the true basis for hermeneutics. In his magnum opus Being and Time {Sein 
und Zeit) Heidegger inquires into the nature of ‘Being’ and poses the age-old question 
‘what is Being?’ Understanding ‘Being’, Heidegger tells us, is self-understanding, which 
begins with the uncovering of the entity called ^Dasein ', there {Da) where Being {Sein) 
appears.^® In simplest terms, Dasein is human existence (there) in the world (in-der-Welt). 
But we should note here that this does not suggest simply locating Dasein in a fixed or 
isolated space as a boat on diy land, but rather as a boat which ‘is’ only in water, so ‘is’ 
Dasein -  that is, its being -  only ‘in der Welt’. Being-in-the-world {Dasein), Heidegger 
further adds, has the character of ‘thrownness’ and can only uncover its ‘being’ through 
hermeneutics -  through understanding,^' To illuminate this point, we evidently find 
ourselves ineluctably ‘thrown’ into the world, into a time and place we did not choose, yet 
nevertheless we must accept our being-there {Dasein) without knowing neither how or why 
‘being’ {Sein) came to be ‘there’ {da) nor where it will lead, other than ‘being-towards- 
death’. This is ‘the facticity’ of life. In this sense we could say that the happening o f life 
has a genuine ‘tragic’ character about it since all human beings are thrown, without their 
doing, into a pre-existent world^^ in which they cannot act other than simply to accept their 
givenness of being-there-in-the-world. But at the same time, precisely because Dasein is 
thrown into the world, Dasein is endowed with creativeness, thoughtfulness and 
interpretive capacities that are unique to itself. The peculiar condition of thrownness not 
only confers on Dasein special capabilities but also motivates it towards its own self- 
understanding, the truth of its own being and its possibilities of being. Without the 
thrownness o f Dasein would there be a need for interpreting or understanding? As it were, 
human beings are not placed in the world with a signed-sealed explanation, which offers 
definitive answers in respect to the meaning of their being-there and how they are ‘to be’ in 
the world. Dasein’s meaning, instead, can only be recognised in terms of its own 
projecting and projections {EntwUrfe), i.e. its own possibilities, its potentiality-for-being. 
To disclose its possibilities, Dasein has to understand itself in coming ‘to be’ what it can 
be. Understanding (Verstehen), Heidegger contends, is a fundamental existentiale, and as 
such it is a basic mode of Dasein's ‘being’ -  rather than a faculty o f apprehension, as Kant,
The word Dasein plays a decisive role in imderstanding Being. ‘Da-sein’ literally translated means Being-there. But 
tlie usage implies a kind of Being or existence. Although here tlie concept seems somewhat opaque, in tlie course of the 
present investigation, however, its meaning will emerge rather clearly.
Martm Heidegger, ^eing and Time, (trans. Jolm Macquarrie & Eward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell, 1962),
(H. 37-8), p. 62.
By ‘pre-existenf, I am merely suggestmg tliat world is prior to any subject-object separation between self and world.
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for example, had conjectured.®® Being, in short, is understanding, and therefore the being 
of Dasein already understands -  that is, it already has the power to grasp its own 
‘potentiality-for-being’. In understanding, Dasein's own possibilities are disclosed in a 
way that Dasein always knows understandingly what it could be. Understanding in this 
sense is always self-understanding through which Dasein cultivates itself:
Dasein is such that in every case it has understood (or alternatively, not understood) 
that it is to be thus or thus. As such understanding it ‘knows’ what it is capable o f -  
that is, what its potentiality-for-being is capable o f This ‘knowing’ does not first 
arise from an immanent self-perception, but belongs to the Being of the “there” 
which is essentially understanding.®''
Understanding is the ‘knowing’ of Dasein \s own ‘situatedness’ in-the-world and the 
‘disclosing’ of possibilities. Moreover, if we go a step frirther and acknowledge that 
Dasein's capacity to understand, in its movement towards coming ‘to be’ of what itself can 
be, represents its historicity, understanding, as a structure of being, then, must also be 
recognised as being oriented to the temporal continuum. Since the being of being-there is 
historical, so too is understanding historically conditioned. O f the three time dimensions: 
past, present and future, the futural always has primacy due to the projective character 
(Entwurfscharakter) of understanding. But knowing simply that understanding is a mode 
of being still seems to be an incomplete understanding of what understanding itself is. 
What is yet to be explained is the ‘howness’ of understanding. Given that understanding is 
projection and disclosure, how is projection and disclosedness themselves to be grasped? 
For this we turn to Heidegger’s reconceptualised theory of phenomenology.®^
In defining phenomenology, Heidegger goes back to its Greek origins, and explains 
that this concept is made up of the Greek words: phainomenon and logos. The first.
Gadamer concms: ‘Before any differentiation of understanding into tlie different directions of pragmatic or tlieoretical 
interest, imderstanding is There-being’s mode of being, in that it is potentiality-for-being and “possibility”’ (TM 230 / 
WM 245).
Heidegger. Being and Time. (H. 144), p. 184.
Wliat is meant by a Teconceptxialised theoiy of phenomenology’ pertains to Heidegger’s re-thhiking and redefining of 
tlie concept and Üieory of phenomenology, first elaborated by Edniimd Husserl. Husserl, die fomider of ‘transcendental’ 
phenomenology, argues in liis phenomenological accoiml of understanding that the conditions wliich supply the 
possibility ‘to understand’ emanate within tlie ‘hfeworld’ -  in tlie concreteness of living. Moreover, he adds tliat all 
objects in die hfeworld are given to die human consciousness. Consequendy, all knowledge and imderstanding are, as it 
were, situated in die horizon of subjective modes of givemiess, in die ‘transcendental ego’, to use Ins term -  diis is to say, 
die existence and meaning of hfe and the hfeworld are rooted in die history mid culture of mankind. Although Heidegger 
agrees witii Husserl’s msiglits in respect to his notion of die liistoricality of being, he, on die odier hand, brealcs away 
from Husserl’s idea of pure intellect, die transcendental subjectivity, to question the meanmg of Being and to dissolve the 
iniaginmy^ position of dominance die subject (himiaii behig) has over die object (the world). For an in-depth comparison 
with Heidegger’s accoimt of ‘henneneutic phenomenology’ in Sein und Zeit see Husserl’s Cartesian meditations: An 
Introdjiction to Phenomenology, (trans. Dorion Cairns. Hie Hague, 1960)
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phainomenon, he explains is a Greek expression which traces back to the verb (paiosoOai, 
which means ‘to show itself :
Thus (paivopevov [phenomenon] means that which shows itself, the manifest [das, 
was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbai*e], 0aivEo9ai itself is a middle­
voiced form which comes from (paivco -  to bring to the light of day, to put in the 
light. 0aivœ  comes from the stem (pa (pha) - ,  like <pmç (phôs) tlie light, diat which is 
bright — in odier words, that wherein tliat die expression “phenomenon” signifies diat 
which shows itself in itself®*’
Heidegger further clarifies that phenomenon has also a secondary meaning which signifies 
something that is ‘semblant’ or has ‘semblance’ to something, i.e., something that merely 
looks like so-and-so, but phenomenon as ‘semblance’, he states, is a mere privative 
modification which fails to gasp the thing itself. Heidegger likewise expressly 
differentiates phenomenon from the notion of ‘appearance’, which also fails to indicate 
something as manifest. Something can appear as something else only when there is 
something that is, in effect, showing-itself. Thus, he explicitly argues that we should 
understand the primordial signification (pawdqevov as ‘that which shows itself, disclosing 
itself as it is and not something which is ‘seeming’ (Scheinen) or ‘appearing’ like 
something.™
As for the -ology in phenomen(ology), Heidegger points out that this suffix has its 
roots in the concept of logos which signifies ‘discourse’, and discourse, he states, is ‘letting 
something be seen’, i.e., ‘it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse 
is about.’®® Through the exchange of vocal proclamations, i.e. speaking, we let discourse 
itself be seen as well as what discourse itself reveals. Together, the concepts phainomenon 
and logos create a definition which means ‘to let that which shows itself be seen from itself 
in the very way in which it shows itself from itself®®. By determining phenomenology as 
such, Heidegger, ingeniously undermines and reverses the ‘traditional’ relationship 
between man and the objective world. The idea that objects in the ‘lifeworld’ are 
constituted by human consciousness and categorisation is replaced with the understanding
Being and Time. (H. 28), p. 51.
Heidegger is clearly confronting Kant’s assertion tliat we can only laiow the world as it ‘appears’ to us tlii'ough Üie 
constitutive categories of human subjectivity. The world as an object of tratli, in Kant’s view, is located in tlie stnuctiue 
of tlie consciousness we have of it. Consequently, we caimot get ‘to the things tliemselves’. Heidegger we shall see 
works tlioroughly against the Kantian notion of appeai ance in favoin of phenomenology to understand tlie world in itself 
and as itself.
Being and Time. (H. 32), p. 56.
™ Ibid.,(H. 34), p. 58.
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that the universal or essential qualities of things we encounter in the lifeworld disclose 
themselves to us as they are in themselves. In this sense, the world in which man lives is 
no longer his ‘private’ world. The human consciousness is no longer the centre and origin 
of all meaning -  that is, the prevailing power, which determines and projects a meaning to 
the external world, is not the human mind; rather it is the ontological self-showing of the 
thing itself {Sich-Zeigen der Sache selbst), i.e. the manifesting of the world as it ‘is’ in 
itself, which Dasein must interpret.
The consequence of Heidegger’s reformulation of phenomenology is a 
radicalisation of the ‘traditional’ concept o f understanding (Verstehen). Understanding is 
not conceived so much as a capacity that can grasp con ectly the relational value of things, 
which the human consciousness has predetermined, but as a mode of being which 
phenomenologically discloses and uncovers the being of Dasein's own potentiality-for- 
being -  that is, bringing to the light of day, the being of Dasein itself and what itself is 
capable of being, the ‘could be’. Understanding is projection, disclosed 
phenomenologically. The disclosure of possibilities requires ‘letting things be’ and in their 
being, brought to the light of day. This further implies understanding involves 
‘openedness’ (Offenbarkeil) to the unfolding of the thing itself. The being of Dasein must 
be open to interpretations and re-interpretations of its own possibilities for being. Life, in 
other words, can be understood as a process and outcome of continuous interpretation 
which occurs within the phenomenon of being-in-the-world -  a point which Gadamer 
himself makes clear in his work. By conceptualising and recognising understanding as 
projection and as disclosedness, Heidegger, likewise, radically reformulates the way the 
phenomenon of truth is to be perceived and treated.
With the uncovering of the Greek concept of phenomenology, Heidegger 
concurrently points out that the concept of truth, which the Greeks understood -  i.e. ‘the 
most original truth’, was misconstrued and transformed by later thinkers, such as St. 
Thomas Aquinas whose conception of tmth was primarily the notion of adaequatio. He 
explains that the traditional philosophical treatment of Truth as adaequatio -  the 
‘agreement’ of something to something -  comes from the interpretation of Aristotle’s 
assertion ‘that the soul’s “Experiences”, its voq/.iara (‘representations’), are likenings of 
things’.™® But this interpretation of truth as agreement, Heidegger says, ‘is very general
Ibid., (H. 214), p. 257.
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and empty’™' since it assumes that truth is solely the relation of one thing to another. Truth 
as adaequatio, he argues, does not take into account that not every relation is an 
agreement, although every agreement (as truth) must be a relation. What is more, the term 
‘agreement’, as a relational understanding of things, does not offer knowledge of 
s o m e t h i n g i t  is, but only ‘just as’ something is to another, e.g., 5 is ‘just as’ 3 plus 2 
is -  but what are 5, 3, and 2 as things in themselves? To realise the thing-in-itself, as it is, 
is the event of truth, and this process is prior to any agreement or correspondence. Truth, 
Heidegger claims, is not a relational totality, for it ‘has by no means the stmcture of an 
agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the 
subject) to another (the Object)’™^ So then, how is truth as the recognition of the thing-in- 
itself realisable? To clarify the structure of truth in its ‘most original sense’, Heidegger 
recovers the near forgotten Greek ‘pre-philosophicaT understanding of truth and provides 
an ontological account of truth which precedes all characterisations of truth as 
cotrespondentia (‘correspondence’), convenientia (‘coming together’) and adaequatio 
(‘likening’) intellectns et rei.
According to Heidegger, truth can be realised through assertion, for ‘Asserting is a 
way of Being towards the Thing itself that is’.™® With every assertion there is, of course, 
an idea of what something is, which must be confirmed either as true or false. The act of 
confirming (Bewahrung), then, demonstrates an ‘uncovering’ of what something is ‘just as 
it is’;
What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its agreement 
between “contents of consciousness” among themselves. What is to be 
demonstrated is solely the Being-uncovered [Entdeclct-sein] of the entity itself -  
that entity in the “how” of its uncoveredness. This uncoveredness is confirmed 
when that which is put forward in the assertion (namely the entity itself) shows 
itself as that very same thing. “Confirmation” signifies the entity showing itself in 
its selfsameness.'®''
If one puts forward the assertion, ‘this is a knife’, the object asserted as being a knife must 
be confirmed. In carrying out a demonstration, the object which one has in mind shows 
itself just as it is in itself, confirming itself as a knife or not, ‘that is to say, it shows that it.
Ibid., (H. 215), p. 258.
Ibid., (H. 218), p. 261.
Ibid., (H. 218), p. 260.
'“rtbid..(H .218),p.261.
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in its selfsameness, is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being -  just as it gets 
uncovered as being. . . .The Being-true [truthfulness] (truth) of the assertion must be 
understood as Being-uncovering [disclosedness]’.™® Assertion is, then, an uncovering 
{aletheuein) and pointing out (apophansis) of something ‘as it is in itself. It is a mode of 
disclosure through which one arrives at a ‘clearedness’. If an assertion is ‘true’, then it 
uncovers the entity in question. But what if the assertion is false? Is there still an 
uncovering? To be sure, there is nonetheless an uncovering, but that uncovering is the 
disclosure of falsehood. The entity does not reveal itself as it is in its selfsameness, but 
rather as what it is not. There is a kind of ‘negative disclosure.
As we can see, truth possesses a phenomenological character; it opens and reveals 
itself ‘as it is in itself -  something is brought to the light of day and is seen in its 
‘uncoveredness’. The understanding of truth as uncovering or unconcealment is the 
Greeks concept of aktheia, which was superseded by the notion of adaequatio and in turn 
by the Cartesian notion of certainty in the seventeenth century. However, simply
rediscovering akiheia as disclosure is not enough for Heidegger. To complete its
understanding, he also adds an important concept which he calls the phenomenon of 
‘hiddenness’, and emphasises the struggle that one has to face in penetrating the ‘what is’ 
behind the concealment. In Heidegger’s view, with every event of unconcealment, there is 
also an event of closure, a hiddenness. If we look at a sphere, for instance, we never see 
the whole of the sphere. We are always limited to the frontal view and the backside always 
eludes us. With an uncovering of one area, there is always a covering-up of some other 
part of the sphere. Similarly, we do not have a bird’s eye view o f what truth is in its 
fullness. We cannot look down and observe truth as if from a mountaintop; instead, we are 
limited to an ever-partial view -  certain perspectival profiles iperspektivischen 
Abschattungeiif^^ of that which is truth. The full scope of truth, as it were, is never 
entirely revealed, and our knowledge o f it therefore remains forever incomplete. What we 
acquire in our endeavour of finding truth is simply a collection of profiles o f truth, which 
we discover by being-in-the-world. The task of discovering it remains perpetually 
unfinished. The character of hiddenness and unhiddenness of truth and the imperceptible 
nature of truth as a whole is vital to Gadamer’s perception of truth:
Ibid
106 Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological accoimt of tmth maintains that tilings always present a profile of themselves. 
And tliis idea of perspektivischen Abschattimgen is one wliich botli Heidegger and Gadamer adopt into Üieir 
understanding of truth.
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This, then is his [Heidegger’s] point; “Truth” is not complete unconcealment whose 
ideal fulfillment is the self-presence of absolute spirit. He teaches us rather to think 
that truth is both revealing and concealing. . . .What is expressed is not everything.
The unsaid first brings the said to the word which can reach us. This seems to me 
compellingly correct. The concepts in which thinking is formulated stand against a 
wall of darkness.'™
As we mentioned earlier, understanding is the ongoing process of disclosing and 
uncovering of Dasein ’x potentiality-for-being, as it ‘is’, in its selfsameness. To this extent, 
‘Dasein is “in the truth’” .™* This assertion is possible since Heidegger also defines tmth as 
‘uncoveredness or disclosure of the thing itself. Heidegger fundamentally accords truth 
with understanding. In fact, every event of tmth is understanding, and as such truth is an 
element of being which solely appertains to and belongs to the being of Dasein. It is an 
issue only for Dasein, and can only be discovered by Dasein: ‘Being (not entities) is 
something which “there is” only in so far as tmth is. And truth is only in so far as and as 
long as Dasein is. Being and tmth “are” equiprimordially’.™® The basic state of being-in- 
the-world is thus the basis for the primordial phenomenon of truth. Consequently, truth is 
-  as is understanding -  conditioned by the historical and social powers of being. Tmth 
reveals to being in being. To be sure, the phenomenon of tmth is no longer conceived as 
something that is independent and ahistorical o f being, which can be discovered and 
understood through methodical research. In fact, it is no longer equated with methodical 
proof. For Heidegger, tmth as alstheia is a phenomenological event, which unfolds in the 
clearing (Lichtung) the various facets of itself, so that what we understand is its 
manifestness. However, the whole tmth or truth as a whole can never be grasp since it 
continuously and simultaneously reveals and hides itself. And because Dasein or 
understanding itself is both historical and finite, there is indeed no aniving at an absolute 
tmth as Hegel had presumed.
Hans-Georg Gadamer. ‘Selbstdarstelliiiig Hans-Georg Gadamer’ Gesammelte Werke. Band 2 Hermeneutik II. 504. 
The above translation is taken from Robert J. DostaTs essay ‘The Experience of Tmth for Gadamer and Heidegger: 
Taking Time in Sudden Lightning’ in Hermeneutics and Truth, op. cit., 50.
Being and Time. (H. 221), p. 263.
Ibid., (H. 230), p. 272.
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§ 3. The Humanistic Tradition
Unlike the nineteenth-century modem hermeneuticists or the twentieth-century 
positivists, the absence of a method specific to the human sciences does not prompt 
Gadamer to the search for a method proper to the Geisteswissenschaften. This is strictly 
due to the fact that he does not equate tmth with methodically reasoned proof Instead, as 
a counter-movement against the methodical model of knowledge represented by the ‘exact 
sciences’, Gadamer in Truth and Method turns immediately to four forsaken humanistic 
ideals to demonstrate the existence of knowledge and tmth, which lie outside the domain 
of the natural sciences, that can be acquired without the aid of a method.
In contesting the dominion of method -  which claims itself as the sole model of 
scientificity -  Gadamer contends that the validity of the Geisteswissenschaften is not 
situated per se in ‘method’ but rather in what he calls the guiding humanistic concepts or 
principles {humanistische Leitbegiiffey. Bildimg (culture), Sensiis communis (common 
sense). Judgment (Urteil) and Taste (Geschmack). He maintains that it is through these 
concepts that an access to tmth, intrinsic to the Geisteswissenschaften, is possible. In the 
following sections we will explore in detail each of the four guiding concepts, which 
Gadamer illuminates, examining how each is to be valued and applied to the studia 
humanitatis. But first, let us consider some critical questions, which have yet to be 
posited, that presently need to be addressed if we are to understand properly Gadamer’s 
employment of these concepts. To begin, we may ask, what is Gadamer implying when he 
states ‘as a child of modern Enlightenment, I have been led to my path via the great 
humanistic heritage^ or when he speaks of the human sciences as ‘the tme advocates or 
representatives of humanism’?' How are we to understand ‘humanistic heritage’? Is he 
regarding himself a humanist and suggesting a renewal o f the doctrines of humanism? 
And if so, to which humanistic doctrines or school(s) of thought is he referring? Is he 
concerned with reviving the humanism that flourished during the Renaissance or is he 
interested rather in the German humanism of Goethe and Schiller? Or does he go back 
much further, for example, to Greek metaphysics, to Plato and Aristotle. Jean Grondin, a 
prominent critic of Gadamer’s work, has emphatically declared that Gadamer is an 
emissary o f humanism. In his critical essay ‘Gadamer on Humanism’, Grondin contends
' Tlie first quote is taken from a letter of reply to P. Cliristophei' Sinitli found in tlie voliune of The Philosophy o f Hans- 
Georg Gadamer. op., cit., p. 526 (Tlie italic given is my own). Fiutlier, the given translation of the original quote ‘die 
waliren Sachwaller des Humanismus ’ is my own since this particular translation offered in tlie TM volimie (p. 10) 
seemed rallier short of reflecting acciuately what is miplied in tlie original.
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that Gadamer defends humanism by following Herder’s (humanistic) view ‘that humanity 
constantly has to subdue the animality out of which it stems by developing its rationality, 
which is actually nothing but the overcoming of animality and the barbaric forms in the 
history of mankind’.® This may well be the case, but oddly enough (or perhaps not so 
surprisingly) Gadamer never mentions any overcoming or mastering of the darker side of 
human ‘animality’ through humanism in either Truth and Method or in any o f his later 
writing. There is, to be sure, no tenable evidence to suggest that the fear of barbaric evil or 
animality is the cause or reason why Gadamer illuminates the concepts; Bildung, senstis 
communis, judgment and taste.
We need to be attentive to the fact that Gadamer never explicitly or implicitly 
indicates a return to or a ‘rehabilitation of humanism’; for one, he is too historical, so to 
speak; that is to say, he is well aware that a return to ‘what was’ is impossible. Any 
attempt to recapture or return to the past, in his part, would be none other than an obvious 
self-betrayal. Secondly, the section ‘Bedeutung der humanistischen Tradition fur die 
Geisteswissenschaften’ in Truth and Method does not in any manner express or espouse a 
rehabilitation of humanism', rather it translates as ‘The Significance of the Humanistic 
Tradition for the Human Sciences’. What is important, as we shall discover, is Gadamer’s 
use of four ‘specific’ concepts to show how, combined together, they form a ‘mode of 
being’ that establishes and unfolds a valid form of knowledge, which cannot be attained or 
demonstrated through strict methodological procedure. Yet nonetheless Grondin compares 
Heidegger’s famous Letter on Humanism, in which Heidegger replies to Jean Beaufret’s 
questioning of the concept of humanism, with Gadamer’s use of the humanistic concepts as 
the foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften in Truth and Method and argues, ‘[wjhat is 
striking in all this, is that Gadamer so candidly brings to life again the classical self- 
definitions of humanism that Heidegger rejected out of hand.’® But is Gadamer’s position 
as antithetical and confrontational to his mentor’s as Grondin contends? Does he truly re­
employ ‘again the classical self-definitions of humanism’, and consequently, is it 
appropriate to label Gadamer a humanist?
When Heidegger in his Letter speaks of humanism as the ‘forgetfLilness of being’ 
(Seinsvergessenheit), he is directly in line with his earlier critique of understanding the
® Jeau Grondin, ‘Gadamer on Humanism’ in The Philosophy o f Hans-Georg Gadamer. op. cit., 162.
 ^ Ibid., p. 163. Disappointingly, Grondin provides a less tlian modest smmnary of the 1946 debate over the concept of 
humanism between Jean Beaufret and Martin Heidegger. His historical account surrounding the debate and tlie content
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truth of ‘Being’ {Sein und Zeit), in that both works represent a critique on metaphysical 
thinking which gives priority to that which ‘is’ (Seiendes) over ‘Being’ (Sein). Thi'ough all 
the excess noise made on Heidegger’s rejection of the anthropocentrism of humanism, the 
core of his critique, contrary to what some critics have argued, does not focus on the evil or 
bmtality o f mankind or its self-centredness -  albeit, they may be side issues; rather it 
illustrates how Western thought and language since Plato’s metaphysics has forsaken the 
dignity of Being (Sein) in its thoughtless intellectualisation and pursuit of understanding 
the world (reality) in terms of the ‘idea’. Heidegger states:
Freilich beruht die Wesenshoheit des Menschen nicht darin, daB er die Substanz 
des Seienden als dessen »Subjekt« ist, um als der Machthaber des Seins das 
Seiendsein des Seienden in der allzulaut geriihmten »Objektivkat« zergehen zu 
lassen. . . .  So kommt es denn bei der Bestimmung der Menschlichkeit des 
Menschen als der Ek-sistenz darauf an, daB nicht der Mensch das Wesentliche ist, 
sondern das Sein als die Dimension des Ekstatischen der Ek-sisenz. Die 
Dimension jedoch ist nicht das bekannte Raumliche. Vielmehr west allés 
Raumliche und aller Zeit-Raum im Dimensionalen, als welches das Sein selbst ist.''
But how does metaphysic affect humanism? In Heidegger’s view humanism ‘thinks 
metaphysically’ and does not place high enough the humanitas of man, in that it side-steps 
and leaves unanswered the questions of Being (Sein) by subordinating everything ‘that 
which is’ (Seiendes) to the instance of the idea, the eidos. Or in simpler terms, it leaps 
over the questions of Sein for the questions of "Seiendes’t  He explains: ‘Solange jedoch 
die Wahrheit des Seins nicht gedacht ist, bleibt alle Ontologie ohne ihr Fundament. 
Deshalb bezeichnete sich das Denken, das mit »S.u.Z« [Sein und Zeit] in die Wahrheit des 
Seins vorzudenken versuchte, als Fundamentalontologie.’® Gadamer is not in 
disagreement. In fact, it is precisely this Heideggerian notion o f Being and the 
‘thrownness into Being’ over the Seiendes that inspired him towards the philosophy of 
lifeworld. Gadamer concurs that the ‘idea’ must not have an ontological precedence over 
‘Being’; for he, like Heidegger, recognises that metaphysics cannot sufficiently render
of dispute seems far too inadequate for one to be sympathetic to liis discontent towards Heidegger’s critique on 
humanism or to grasp and acknowledge tlie differences between Gadamer and Heidegger’s view on humanism. 
"Heidegger. Oberden Htimanisnms. (Frankflirt am Main; Vittorio Klosteiinami, 1947), pp. 19,22.
® Heidegger makes a clear ontological distinction between ‘Being’ (Seiti) and ‘tliat which is’ (Seiendes). In Sein und Zeit, 
he uses deliberately and cautiously the expression; il y a l’Être or ‘es gibt das Sein’ in order to avoid the expression ‘das 
Sem ist’ smce the ‘ist’ notion is normally used for tliat wliich ‘is’, i.e. das Seiende. hi the English translation it is difficult 
to express ‘es gibt das Sein’ (tliere is being) witliout using tlie ‘isf part.
 ^Heidegger. Über den Humanlwius. op. cit., 41.
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knowledge of the whole in that; (1) it conceals and subordinates the truth of Sein while 
placing the Seiendes to the foreground of being, and (2) it constitutes only a minor facet of 
the ‘whole of Being’. So then, how does Gadamer understand Being? What is it that 
constitutes the essence of Being? The sum of human thought and experience, he proposes, 
is language and tradition. He writes;
Rather, language is the universal medium in which understanding itself is realised.
The mode of realisation of understanding is interpretation . . . The relation between 
language and understanding is seen primarily in the fact that it is the nature of 
tradition to exist in the medium o f language, so that the preferred object of 
interpretation is a linguistic one. . . . Linguistic tradition is tradition in the literal 
sense of the word, i.e. something handed down. . . . What has come down to us by 
way of linguistic tradition is not left over, but given to us, told us -  whether in the 
form of direct repetition, of which myth, legend and custom are examples. Or in the 
form of written tradition . . . (TM 350-51 / WM 366-7).
When we consider his use o f the four humanistic concept {Bildimg, Sensus communis. 
Judgment and Taste), indeed, they reflect a mode of understanding, a way of Being and a 
way of ‘coming into being’, which has been preserved through tradition. Consequently, 
tradition is ‘not over against us but something in which we stand and through which we 
exist’.® The humanistic concepts, as presented in Truth and Method, are less metaphysical 
and more involved in bringing into the foreground the whole of Being. Indeed they 
attempt to go behind or beyond metaphysics. Yet there is a difficulty that arises here. 
How can Gadamer turn to the ‘humanistic’ tradition and not imply metaphysics?
As we have explicated thus far, Heidegger in his Letter associates humanism with 
metaphysical thinking, and for this reason, we said, he reproaches the concept since it 
forsakes the truth of Being. Grondin is perfectly conect when he states, ‘[f]or Heidegger, 
it is urgent to realise that man is not at the centre of the universe. He is perhaps a 
peripheral apparition in the whole of Being, out of which it should gain a new 
understanding of itself and its essential finitude, or “thrownness” into Being and by 
Being.’® Gadamer, I added, likewise turns away fi*om metaphysics, but does this imply that 
he also rejects humanism? Since Gadamer is not very explicit in his position concerning 
this concept, we can only speculate. Of course he uses the adjective ‘humanistic’, which,
® Ricliar E. Palmer. Hermeneutics. (Northwestern University Press, Evanston. 1969), p. 177.
* Grondin. ‘Gadamer on Plinnanism’, op. cit., 160.
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linguistically speaking, implies having to do with or concerning ‘humanism’, but in what 
manner does he apply this concept? In some sense he seems to keep with the traditional 
use of the term as that which attributes crucial importance to education, i.e. cultivation in 
the broadest sense. One has only to consider the first humanistic concept, Bildimg, which 
he illuminates comprehensively, to understand that Being is and demands openness, 
revision, and correction. What is more, the concepts: sensus communis, judgment and taste 
all constitute and support Gadamer’s notion of Bildimg. Yet there seems to be something 
more in his use of the term ‘humanistic’, a latent or perhaps even an outward significance, 
which has yet to be considered. Without being too presumptuous, I propose that there is a 
subtle re-determining or redefining of the concept by Gadamer, occasioned by a 
‘Heideggerian prejudice’, that is, the influence of Sein und Zeit and the Letter on 
Humanism. When Gadamer utilises the term ‘humanistic’, there seems to be a new 
interpretation; that is to say, he clears away some of the presuppositions which over time 
have hidden its original meaning. His accordance with Heidegger’s critique on 
metaphysics seems to suggest that he, in effect, has ‘polished’ the term ‘humanistic’ 
enough to overcome the priority of ‘methodical abstraction from nature or from the 
concrete whole’, i.e. the metaphysical subjectivism or the forgetfulness of being. What 
seems to have taken place is the redefining o f the term ‘humanistic’ by incorporating the 
traditional notion of education with the Heideggerian emphasis on Being to formulate a 
concept that focuses on the meaning of Being, which subsequently influences our 
understanding of the Seiendes. Again, if we look at the four particular concepts which he 
brings to light, they all centre on the Sein rather than on the Seiendes. In fact, with each 
concept, Gadamer filters through all o f its transformations to penetrate beneath the diluted 
and multi-coloured surface of the word, placing himself at the centre of what is thought 
and unthought, to rediscover or ‘uncover’ its original understanding. To be sure he tries to 
bring about a ‘new event of disclosure’, a new way of thinking and understanding each of 
the four guiding principles. And in this way, the rediscovery of humanistic concepts seems 
to follow the Heideggerian phenomenological notion of truth uncovering, unconcealment 
{Unverborgenheii). Hence, to say that Gadamer is antithetic to Heidegger’s position on 
humanism seems somewhat misconstrues.
In a way, it seems more appropriate and precise to say that Gadamer possesses 
something of a ‘new’ or ‘polished’ humanistic perspective, i.e. a general standpoint from 
which he views the tmth of Being (Sein) and that which is (Seiendes). This perspective.
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we may argue, is neither a self-inflating affirmation of human greatness nor the 
perfectibility of man; it reflects rather a cautionary vision which tries to understand the 
meaning of Being-in-the-world {In-der-Welt-Sein), to borrow Heidegger's expression, by 
recognising the enormous value that concepts, such as Bildimg, semus communis, 
judgment and taste, as a mode of being, add to the sphere of knowledge and to 
understanding the nature of Being. What is also important to note is that the ‘Gadamerian 
notion of humanism' arguably offers an alternative way of discovering truth and 
consequently a new way of looking at the Geisteswissenschqften.
§ 3.1 Bildung
After introducing a very brief account on the problematic nature of method, 
Gadamer's discourse turns immediately to the concept of Bildung and briefly outlines its 
origin and its transformation in meaning. The early idea of Bildung, i.e. natural shape 
which refers to the external appearance of the well-formed limbs and figures, according to 
Gadamer, underwent a semantic shift by losing its original meaning and became associated 
with the notion of culture (Kultur). From there on, the notion of Bildung came to describe 
the peculiar human mode of cultivating one's natural talents and capacities. However the 
understanding of Bildung made one of its most profound transformations when Wilhelm 
von Humboldt recognised and established a differentiation between the meaning of 
Bildung and culture. Humboldt saw that by the idea of Bildung 'we mean something both 
higher and more inward, namely the attitude of mind which, from the Imowledge and the 
feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavour, flows harmoniously into sensibility 
and character' (TM 11 / WM 8). Thus, in reacquainting us to the humanistic tradition, 
Gadamer takes Humboldt’s significant insight -  that is, characterising Bildung not so much 
as an idea intimately connected to the notion of culture -  as his starting point. He explains: 
Bildung has no goals outside itself. . . . the concept of Bildung transcends that of the 
mere cultivation of given talents, from which concept it is derived. The cultivation 
of a talent is the development of something that is already given, so that the 
practice and cultivation of it is a mere means to an end (12/9).^
Gadamer ftirther develops the understanding of Bildung by following Hegel who first 
scrutinised thoroughly what Bildung is. From Hegel's standpoint, man suffers alienation
 ^Compare witli Joel Weiiisheimer who explains, "'Bildung is distinct from cultivation in tliat it is more tlie acquisition of 
potencies than tlie development of latencies’. Wemslieinier GH. op. cit., 69,
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from the immediate and the natural, existing in a state of exile. This separation is the result 
of man’s rational and intellectual nature; however, at the same time it is only the rational 
and intellectual side of man which provides the possibility for a reunion with his proper 
state of being. Bildung, according to Hegel, is the mode by which man can overcome his 
alienated being. The formal nature of Bildung is characterised by the virtue of openness 
and involves a movement away:
from the immediacy of desire, of personal need and private interest and the 
unreasonable demand of universal. . . .  It consists in learning to allow what is 
different from oneself and to find universal viewpoints from which one can grasp 
the thing, 'the objective thing in its freedom’, without selfish interest. (14 /10-11). 
However we must keep in mind that that attitude of openness is also a prerequisite of 
Bildung itself. The gebildet man, i.e. the ‘cultivated individual’, is characterised by his 
selflessness, that is, his ability to abstract himself away from his own immediate 
particularity, to gaze towards something other and universal. He is not like the workhorse, 
which simply possesses a tunnel vision due to its blinders. Through Bildung the individual 
liberates himself from his blinders, and to this extent the vision of the gebildet individual 
holds a greater radius of sight, enabling him to look far beyond the provincial confines of 
his 'se lf , of his own community and culture. Bildung is thus the mode of self-formation 
tlirough the movement from alienation to the rediscovery of home. 'To seek one’s own in 
the alien, to become at home in it’, Gadamer, following Hegel, writes, ‘is the basic 
movement of spirit, whose being is only return to itself from what is other’ (15/11). Here 
we can recognise at once the likeness between the circular movement of Bildung and the 
hermeneutic circle of whole and part. Joel Weinsheimer similarly notes, ‘In the stmcture 
of excursion and reunion defining Bildung we see at once the circular structure of 
hermeneutic understanding . . . In the subsequent chapters I will elaborate further this 
parallel between Bildung and understanding; however, for the present section it is enough 
to point out that the concept of Bildung ties closely to the phenomenon of understanding.
On this point Gadamer concurs with Hegel’s conception of Bildung. But how does 
one arrive at Bildung'} If  Bildung promotes openness and openness is itself a necessary 
condition for the acquisition of Bildung, then the question remains: from where does the 
initial receptivity spring forth? Gadamer’s account of Bildung does not appear to
Joel Weinsheimer. Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 
p. 72.
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pronounce directly the origins of Bildung', however, we may conjecture that Gadamer 
indirectly supplies Bildung with an ontological foundation when he writes, ‘every single 
individual that raises himself out of his natural being to the spiritual finds in the language, 
customs and institutions of his people a pre-given body of material which, as in learning to 
speak, he has to make his own’ (TM  15 /  W M  11). From the very moment of our existence, 
we are, as it were, always immersed in the process of Bildung}^ Thus our ‘being’ is not 
defined as a fixed substance or essence, but rather alters and develops through Bildimg.
Eventually, Gadamer departs from Hegel by disconnecting Bildung from Hegel’s 
philosophy of absolute spirit. Whereas Hegel envisions the spirit ultimately completing 
the movement from alienation to finding a home, Gadamer, on the other hand, does not see 
an ‘end point where the movement of alienation and return can cease in the total self- 
appropriation’.^  ^ He does not deny the idea of perfect Bildung that is always open for 
greater growth and progression. His dissension from Hegel lies in the fact that Hegel 
assumes one can arrive at perfect Bildung in the absolute sense. For Gadamer such is not 
the case. Although the movement of the spirit toward homecoming becomes nearer and 
nearer, there is never a complete arrival; rather it is perpetual act with indefinite progress 
and what is gained in each and every instance of movement is never lost but is ever 
‘preserved’. Hence "Bildung\ claims Gadamer, ‘is a genuine historical idea, and because 
of this historical character of “preseivation” is important for understanding in the human 
sciences’ (TM  12 /  W M  9). To be sure it is through Bildung''s, openness and the continuous 
movement and subsequent preservation of knowledge acquired through Bildung that ‘the 
human sciences presuppose that the scientific consciousness is already formed and for that 
very reason possesses the right, unlearnable and inimitable tact that bears the judgment and 
the mode of knowledge of the human sciences’ (1 5 /1 2 ) .
To elucidate how the presupposed historical consciousness operates in the human 
sciences, Gadamer appeals to Helmholtz’s concept of ‘tact’ and explains its correlation to 
Bildung. For Helmholtz, tact represents an alternative to scientific tabula rasa, and exists 
as a form of social sense and practical know-how. To possess tact implies that we possess 
‘a particular sensitivity and sensitiveness to situations, and [know] how to behave in them, 
for which we cannot find any knowledge from general principles. Hence an essential part
"  The established ontological foundation for Bildung is the same basic structure for understanding as Gadamer conceives 
it. Tins will become more apparent in the progress of tliis Uresis, especially when we begin to consider Heidegger’s 
accoiuit of being-in-the-world and tire pheiromeiron of imderstandiirg.
Weinsheimer GH. op. cit., 71.
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of tact is inexpiicitness and inexpressibility’ (16 / 13). In other words, tact reflects the 
capacity to distinguish what is appropriate from what is inappropriate. Being tactful 
requires that one knows what is proper to say and leaves unsaid what is improper. The 
recognition of inappropriateness ‘helps one to preserve distance, it avoids the offensive, the 
intrusive, the violation of the intimate sphere of the person’ (17 / ibid.). Like Bildimg, tact 
involves a sense of openness to the universal, i.e. receptiveness for ‘otherness’. However, 
we must keep in mind that the universal here does not represent a determined concept or a 
pre-given set of norms or rules. Tact does not involve a mechanistic application to a 
particular situation, for there is no ‘user’s manual’; rather it resembles an intuitive sense 
which fLmctions accordingly to each new and particular social circumstance. It renders a 
kind of immediate knowledge which cannot be derived from or reduced to a method, for 
there are no general principles involved that could determine the explanations for its 
conclusions. Moreover, tact is not limited to social customs and manners, but is also 
effective in the Geisteswissenschqften. According to Helmholtz, Gadamer writes, ‘tact 
which functions in the human sciences is not simply a feeling and unconscious, but is at 
the same time a mode of knowing and a mode of being’ (ibid / 14). Thus tact presupposes 
both aesthetic and historical Bildung. To have tact functioning in the human sciences 
implies that one possesses a sense of the aesthetic or the historical. However since, as 
Gadamer points out, both aesthetic and historical sense involve more than an intuitive or 
artistic feelings, and are not innate to one’s natural constitution; consequently, we speak in 
terms of aesthetic or historical consciousness -  rather than of sense -  which must be 
formed through Bildung. Nevertheless this consciousness, explains Gadamer, functions 
with the similar characteristic notion of immediacy commonly ascribed to the senses, i.e., 
it is able to determine differences and constitute evaluations for each particular instance 
although it is unable to offer its reasons. Thus, in relation to the human sciences tact is 
understood in terms of historical or aesthetic consciousness. Any individual who possesses 
aesthetic consciousness is able to discriminate ‘between beautiful and ugly, good or bad 
qualities, and whoever has a sense of the historical [that is, historical consciousness] knows 
what is possible for an age and what not, and has a sense of the difference of the past in 
relation to the present’ (17 / ibid).
In retrospect, Bildung prepares the sensitivity and receptiveness to what is ‘other’ -  
known otherwise as tact. It is a cultivated mindset which involves an openness to different 
and more universal points of view, and to this extent Bildung, following Hegel, allows one
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to lose oneself insofar as one is capable of distancing oneself from one’s self-centredness 
to gain viewpoints which extends far beyond the ordinary horizon. The ‘cultivated’ 
{gebildet) consciousness moves within Bildung'^ openness, keeping himself receptive to 
other potential perspectives. His standpoints are by no means determined; they do not 
represent fixed attitudes but manifest themselves as a way of knowing, i.e. being ever open 
to possibilities. Bildung therefore reflects how one comes into being. It does not reveal 
itself as a set procedure or an attitude which one can simply reduce and codify into a 
concept of method. Through it one discovers the capacity for recognising forms of 
knowledge which are not founded on fixed rules or laws. It directs or shows to one ‘ways 
of coping’, that is, an understanding and an awareness of life and of self, by preserving 
what is learned and building through what it has gained. Thus Gadamer concludes, ‘What 
make the human sciences into sciences can be understood more easily from the tradition of 
the concept of Bildung thdixi from the concept of method in modern science’ (18 /1 5 ) .
§ 3.2 Sensus communis
In the closing analysis o f Bildung, Gadamer explains, via tact, that Bildung is a 
‘universal sense’. This conclusion eventually leads to the second element of the 
humanistic tradition, namely the concept of sensus communis, common sense. 
Surprisingly, neither of the two major scholastic contributions concerning Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, i.e. Joel Weinsheimer’s Gadamer's Hermeneutic?,-. A Reading o f Truth and 
Method and Georgia Warnke’s Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason, seem 
recognise the seminal aspect concerning the idea of sensus communis. Whereas 
Weinsheimer’s reading provides a brief commentary on Gadamer’s elucidation and 
understanding of common sense, Warnke simply foregoes the topic altogether. What is 
more, even the most recent studies supporting Gadamer’s philosophical project fail to 
highlight the weight of the second of the four guiding humanistic concepts. This obvious 
neglect however seems contradicting and misleading, given the fundamental importance 
that Gadamer gives to sensus communis. As he contends:
In the course of my research it has become apparent to me how little and limited the critical treatment given to sensus 
communis is. I have foimd tliat most critics eitlier skip over or provide only a superficial coimnentary or two to what is 
obviously a detennhhng aspect of Gadamer’s pliilosophical endeavour. ThankMly, I am not alone in singling out tire 
importance of sensus communis and have had tire fortuire of readiirg Donald Phillip Verene’s essay ‘Gadamer and Vico 
on Sensus communis'’ in Tlte Philosophy o f Han.s-Georg Gadamer, op. cit., 137-153. Although I airr iirclined to disagree 
witlr much of Vereire’s narrow readiirg and argrmrent concerning Gadamer’s concept of reflection, his perspective on 
Vico’s sensus communis Iras, nonetheless, helped irre to understand Gadamer’s position regardmg conurron sense more
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There is something immediately obvious about grounding literary and historical 
studies and the methods of the human sciences in this idea of the sensus communis.
For their object, the moral and historical existence of man, as they take shape in his 
activities, is itself largely determined by the sensus communis' (TM 22-3 / WM 20). 
Therefore in the following section we shall undertake a more intensive and comprehensive 
approach to investigate how Gadamer defines sensus communis, and how he relates this 
concept to the human sciences.
Interestingly enough, Gadamer’s account of common sense closely follows 
Giovanni Battista (Giambattista) Vico’s (1668-1744) conception of the sensus communis 
found in De nostri temporis studionim ratione {On the Study Methods o f Our Time), first 
published in 1709. Gadamer states that there are two key elements which dictate Vico’s 
understanding of sensus communis. The first of these, he points out, concerns the 
humanistic ideal of eloquentia, rhetoric, which he says has always possessed a twofold 
interpretation. “Talking well” (eu legein)’, Gadamer states, ‘is not merely a rhetorical 
ideal. It also means saying the right thing, i.e. the truth, and is not just the art of speaking -  
of saying whatsoever well’ (19 / 16).’"^ It goes without saying that one does not generally 
enter into a discourse without a sense of conviction, certitude. For a conversation to occur, 
whether there is general agreement or discord, one or both parties must claim something to 
be presumably right, to be probably true; furthermore, it demands an engagement and a 
willingness to understand and adjust to the possibilities of what is stated and what is asked. 
Without such attentiveness for the possible or the probable, conversation would be 
otherwise purely nonsensical. We should note the importance here regarding the sense of 
the ‘probable’ in that it is virtually an axiom of rhetoric. For Vico the development of the 
sensus communis is ‘not nourished on the true, but on the probable’, states Gadamer (21 / 
18). The implication is that through rhetoric and the presuppositions of discourse, which 
assume a probable truth claim, we can determine a general sense of that which is ‘obvious’ 
{verisimile), i.e. a common sense o f what is tme and what is right discovered from or 
against the probable truth and the probable right. In connection to historical studies the 
notion of probability is essential. Gadamer adduces D ’Alembert who states;
clearly. See also Dieter Teicliert’s Erfahmng, Etinnenmg Erketminis. (Stuttgart; J. B. Metzlersche 
Verlagsbuchliandkmg, 1991), pp. 3-7.
Indeed Gadamer’s reading of Vico’s definition of rhetoric is precise when we compare it with the Institutiones 
Oratofiae, in which Vico connects rhetoric with Pliilosophy and explains ‘Philosophy . . . infonns the mind of man with 
trutli, and tlie spiiit witli virtues, and also teaches one to tliink, to do, and to speak that which is true and honest ’. The 
italics given arc my own. The Art o f Rhetoric, (trans. Giorgio A. Pinton and Arthur W. Sliippee. Amsterdam, 1996), p. 3.
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Probability operates principally in the case of historical facts, and in general for all 
past, present and future events, which we attribute to a kind of chance because we 
do not unravel the causes. That part of this knowledge whose object is the present 
and the past, although it may be founded on testimony alone, often produces in us a 
conviction that is as strong as that which gives birth to axioms (23 / 20).
Arguably, Gadamer is in full agreement here, for he understands well that historical studies 
and the human sciences in general are not determined by absolutes but by the probable. 
For example, although we may know particular facts regarding the history of the Cold 
War, our knowledge of its precise beginnings, the exact causes of the event and its total 
effects can never be determined simply by facts. Given factual information, a historian, 
first, must be able to ‘interpret’ them and then situate those facts in a particular way so that 
the information becomes understandable. Historical studies do not merely attempt to list 
facts chronologically (though this is one part in the study of history); the primary intention 
of the historian is to connect the events that have occurred interpretively and meaningfully 
into a comprehensive whole. Moreover, one has to take into account that oftentimes, if not 
always, there is a lack of factual evidences to account for a ‘historical happening(s)’, and 
so the historian must fill in the gaps that arise according to his knowledge. Add to this, 
historical studies almost always involve two or more competing perspectives and 
misinterpretations. Every interpretation thus implies a probability. For historical 
understanding, or for that matter scientific understanding, to be genuine, they must begin 
with a sense of openness to the probable.
The second element of prominence in terms of sensus communis involves the 
Aristotelian distinction between the practical ideal of (ppôvqcnç (phronésis) and the 
theoretical ideal of aotpia (sophia). As opposed to purely theoretical and abstract 
knowledge, sophia, phronSsis represents a kind of practical knowledge/wisdom that is 
applicable to concrete situations. According to Aristotle, it is the governing knowledge 
that guides daily living, in that it implies a capacity to grasp, to know the particular 
‘circumstances’ in which one is situated, determining ‘instinctively’ the principle actions 
that one is to carry out in moments of decision. Subsequently, it denotes an ‘intellectual 
virtue’ since ‘[t]he grasp and moral control of the concrete situation requires this 
subsumption of what is given under the universal; i.e. the goal that one is pursuing so that 
the right thing may result. Hence it assumes a direction of the will, i.e. moral being 
{hexisy (21-22 /19). This means, in addition to the notion of capacity (dunamis), phronësis
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also presupposes a moral attitude and knowledge of conduct, which constantly develops. 
To this extent the Greek concept of phronësis constitutes an important element in the 
Roman idea of sensus communis}^ For Vico the ethical connotation and practical capacity 
o f phronësis, to differentiate what is proper from what is improper, are attributes apropos 
to sensus communis in that they signify a general understanding for the right and the good, 
and in turn demonstrate a movement towards a ‘moral being’. T h i s  combination of 
practical and moral ‘sensibility’, as Vico conceives it, is a form of knowledge which 
cannot be derived from general principles of cognition in that it lies outside the rational 
concept of knowledge; it is rather an ‘inner’ sense acquired through tradition and social 
intercourse -  i.e., knowledge learned not in the abstract sense but by living in the concrete 
community which dictates its structures and aims. Concurrently, sensus communis is also 
that which forms and establishes communities. For these reasons it is a ‘communal sense’. 
As understood, the Roman idea of sensus communis is contrary to the Greek concept of 
common sense {koine dunamisŸ^ which Aristotle speaks of in his De Anima. Gadamer 
points out that Aristotle’s notion of sensus communis infers a general intellectual faculty 
(belonging to all men) that combines the total realm of perception which constitute 
judgment (TM 22 / WM 19.). This suggests that common sense is the immanent point of 
unity and convergence of all the outer senses through which we apprehend the physical 
world. In opposition to this Greek view, Vico, Gadamer explains, rather opts for and holds 
fast to the Roman version of common sense which; ‘when faced with Greek cultivation, 
held firmly to the value and significance of their own traditions of public and social life’ 
(ibid.). As indicated above, sensus communis, as a Roman idea, is a form of concrete, 
pragmatic knowledge and a sense of moral being acquired through tradition and 
participation in the living community. To possess it means that one owns the sensibility to 
grasp the multitude of circumstances that pervade life, i.e., one is able to determine what 
one should or ought to do and what one should not do in all the divers concrete situations
Compare \vitli Gimter Figal. ‘P liro n es i^ s  Understmidiiig; Situating Pliilosophical Hemieneutics’ in The Specter o f  
Relativism: Truth, Dialogue, and Phronçsis in Philosophical Hermeneutics, (ed. Lawerence K. Sclunidt. Evanston; 
Nortliwestem Univei-sity Press, 1995), pp. 236-247., which provides an extensive and ÜioughtM insight into Gadamer’s 
understanding of phronësis. See also James Risser’s latest critical work, Hemieneutics and the Voice o f  the Other: Re­
reading Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 2., in which he contends, ‘With tlie publication of Reason and in the 
Age o f  Science (1974), a compilation of essays resulting, in part, from Gadamer’s confrontation witli Habermas and the 
problem of social reason [common sense], one could argue tliat the Greek notion of (ppôvrjmç is really the key to tlie 
entire project’.
Here we can see a shnüaiity between phronësis and tlie above mentioned tact. Both concepts imply sensitiveness to 
situations, having the sense to know how to beliave.
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of life, and choose what is proper, the common good and the common right. For Vico it is 
this sense of self-consciousness and sense for community which gives the human will its 
direction and ‘not the abstract generality of reason, but the concrete generality that 
represents the community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole human race. Hence 
the development of this sense of community is of prime importance of living’ (21 / 18).
What is more, the Roman idea of common sense, like Bildung, represents a genuine 
historical idea. The social constitution of its essence, for instance, clearly suggests that it is 
historical, for man is a historical being (Dilthey). A second element, which constitutes its 
historical character, is the sense of preservation it carries. In addition to participation in 
society, sensus communis, we recall, is acquired through tradition. Part of its basic 
foundation is the tradition on which it stands and the tradition which it ‘preseives’, and in 
this sense it is a historically ‘gebildet sense’. A further comparison with Bildung reveals 
that there is in sensus communis, as in Bildung, a sense of openness which furthers its 
development. However there is a subtle contrast between openness in Bildung and 
openness in sensus communis. Whereas the former is defined by a receptiveness to what is 
other or a willingness to change, the latter in contrast indicates a sense of ‘leaving the door 
open’ for possible or even probable changes inasmuch as it is constituted on the historical 
and social circumstances of the community. What this means is that common sense is 
conditioned by time and place, and as such it is always relative to a particular community, 
changing and adapting to new situations. In Gadamerian sense, it is certitude, which is 
susceptible to adjustments, i.e., it is not absolute. There is a critical implication of 
relativism involved here concerning ‘practical knowledge’. Yet nonetheless, Gadamer 
contends that truth is intrinsic to common sense and as a result bases sensus communis as a 
foundation for the human sciences. Gadamer’s understanding of truth seems obviously to 
go sharply against the Cartesian notion of certainty. This apparent contradiction, we will 
examine more thoroughly herein after; however, at this point it appears sufficient to say 
that sensus communis is a form of moral and social knowledge, governed by the probable 
and not by some reasoned proof, a universal rule. For a society to form and sustain itself 
or for an individual to grasp his society, whether it is local or national or the human 
community in general, there must exist, as it were, a form of sensible knowledge which the 
R om ani understood as sensus communis.
The Greek concept of koine aisthesis (conunon sense in lenns of connnon feelmgs, i.e. sensory perceptions), we should 
point out, is also anlitlietical to Vico’s imderstanding of sensus commmiis. For Vico neitlier koine dunamis nor koine
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Given the importance of the Renaissance scholar’s interpretation of common sense, 
it would appear that Vico and the Italian rhetorical tradition in general enjoyed a 
substantial impact on the eighteenth century. However this, of course, was not the case, as 
Gadamer explains, ‘[o]ne can discern hardly any influence of Vico on the eighteenth 
century’ (TM 24 / WM 21). Instead the dominant influence on Western thought came 
from Vico’s British counterpart, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), whose 
philosophical works also refer to the Roman idea of sensus communis. In order to 
demonstrate the significance of wit and humour, Shaftesbury ‘explicitly cites the Roman 
classics and their humanist interpreters’ (ibid.), claiming that sensus communis is a form of 
‘public spirit’ consisting of an intellectual and social virtue which emanates more often 
from matters of passion than from reason. Most importantly, it is a spirit that one acquires 
through sympathy and fellowship with members of one’s own community. 
Comparatively, the practice of wit and the understanding of humour, to be effective, 
demands a similar form of intellectual and civic solidarity, a sense of common ground or 
collective spirit, which Shaftesbury argues comes by way of social interaction and 
sympathetic partnership between persons within a given community. Jokes or parodies, for 
example, are rarely universal, in that they are contextual, often reflecting a particular 
society. Generally speaking, one has to stand within the basic framework of a society, i.e. 
its religious, social and political culture, to grasp a given joke. The comprehension of 
political jokes, for instance, is always closely bound to the political context in which they 
occur. This becomes clear when we consider how political jokes were understood in the 
former divided state of Germany. Although both East and West Germans shared a 
common language, citizens of West Germany often could not share the same humour in 
political satires or parodies as their eastern counterparts when the jokes contained specific 
tenns or ideas unique to the East. No doubt each community possessed its own set of 
common political assumptions, conventions and purposes, and for this reason one must 
possess a contextual understanding if political jokes or jokes in general are to be effective, 
i.e. humorous or witty. To this extent we can see why it is important to have a sense of 
community, a bond of sympathy, to understand humour and to exercise wit. Obviously, 
the cornerstone of Shaftesbury’ social philosophy is founded on the Roman idea of sensus 
communis, for it denotes a common source of thought and will that brings together
aisthesis is peitinent to tlie Roman conception of sensus communis.
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individuals, and represents a form of knowledge that keeps individuals from the dark of 
things, to understand a joke, for instance. Shaftesbury’s profound thoughts, we said 
earlier, had a broad impression on the eighteenth century. In Great Britain his work was 
succeeded by the Scottish empiricists Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747) and David Hume 
(1711-1776), both of whom, in constituting a doctrine of moral sense, came to set the 
communal feelings of sympathy, i.e. common sense, as the structural foundation of their 
moral philosophy. Both empiricists argued that the operation of sympathy was the guiding 
force of all human affairs. Likewise in France, the tradition of le bon sens, good sense, can 
also be traced back to Vico and Shaftesbury’s idea of social virtue. As the French still 
understand it today. Le bon sens, explains Gadamer, is knowledge that governs our 
relations to others and forges communal bonds; it represents the employment of sound 
judgment and a way of acting that is proper to a given society.
However, despite the obvious importance of the moral and socio-political elements 
contained in the concept of sensus communis, in Germany the followers of Shaftesbury and 
the Scottish empiricists, even during the German enlightenment, failed to take up the 
particular social dimensions that constitute the significance of the Roman idea. Following 
the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition instead, ^{s^ensus communis was understood as a 
purely theoretical faculty, theoretical judgment, on a level with moral consciousness 
(conscience) and taste’ (TM 26 / WM 24). But this, of course, was contrary to the other 
leading countries of the Enlightenment, such as Great Britain and France where the moral 
and social characteristics of sensus communis were being preserved as a civic quality. 
However, as Gadamer explains, Germany was not completely disconnected from the 
Roman notion of inner sensibility. He states that while the German philosophical 
community on the whole turned to the Greeks for their notion of common sense, a Swabian 
vicar by the name of Friedrich-Christoph Oetinger (1702-1782) appealed to Shaftesbury’s 
sensus communis, with all its wealth of moral and social implications, to challenge the 
delimitation of truth and knowledge by Cartesian rationalism. In his critical writing, 
înquisitio in sensum communem et rationem, written in 1753, Oetinger argues that the 
methods of mathematics and reason alone cannot exhaust the sphere of knowledge since 
they are, in his view, limited to a particular domain of human understanding. Although he 
acknowledges that establishing and advancing theories through deductive reasoning is one
Shaftesbury. "Sensus communis'. Aii Essay on tlie Freedom of Wit and Hiunor’, treatise 2 of Characteristics of men. 
Manners, Opinions, Times, (ed. Jolm M. Robertson, hidianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1964), p. 72.
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way of ascertaining and guaranteeing universal truths, he also maintains that the mere 
exactness of calculation and the logical consequence of deduction is not necessarily the 
only way of discovering and knowing the certitudes that govern human life. Oetinger’s 
rejection of rational scientific method, as being the only sources of knowledge, is one clear 
evidence why Gadamer invokes this obscure and little known Pietist. To be sure the 
concept of knowledge and truth is far richer and more substantial for the Swabian 
theologian than how it is understood under Cartesian rationalism, in that it extends beyond 
the mere clarity of concepts and consists of ‘certain anticipations and predilections’ (27 / 
25). According to Oetinger, the source of ‘common truths that are useful to all men at all 
times and places, “sensible” truths, as opposed to rational truths’(28 /  26) comes fi om the 
sensus communis. He represents with his appeal to sensus communis not so much an 
epistemological position but rather a wealth of substantial tmths, which are determined by 
content. He, like Shaftesbury, saw common sense as a form of practical wisdom of life, 
which derives more from the pureness of ‘heart’ than from the reasoning head. According 
to Gadamer, Oetinger saw a common divine light in all life, which, he argued, forges the 
living community. In man this spiritual essence operates in the fonn of ‘instinct’ and 
‘inner stimulation’, i.e. primordial tendencies {radicatae tendentiae), that possess 
‘dictatorial, divine, irresistible force’, to guide man towards the greatest truth and human 
happiness, a unity with God. Instincts and inner stimulation however should not be 
understood simply as confusae repraesentationes (Leibniz) nor as cursoiy effects, which 
overcome the ratio from time to time, for they are, according to Oetinger, permanent 
fixtures of our being -  i.e., they are always present but only come to life when they are 
needed -  and represent traces of the divine ‘residua simulacra imaginis Divinae in anima’ 
in the human soul. Although it may be somewhat speculative, it nevertheless appears as if 
Shaftesbury’s notion of ‘natural affections’ is involved here in Oetinger’s philosophy of 
life. The natural (instinctive) human sentiments seem to be the basis not only of 
Shaftesbury’s philosophical thoughts but also of Oetinger’s theological convictions. 
However, contrary to this view, Gadamer points out that Oetinger, in fact, accepts and 
appropriates the Aristotelian notion of common dunamis to his understanding of common 
sense. But if sensus communis is simply: ‘viva et penetrans perceptio objectorum toti 
humanitati obviorum, ex immediate tactu et intuitu eorum, quae sunt simplicissima. . .’, (27 
/  25)'® then this seems to contradict Shaftesbury’s account of common sensibility, which
My translation, ‘the vivid and penetrating perception of objects obvious to all human beings, from their immediate
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requires self-awareness and a sympathetic bond between individual o f a given community. 
Unfortunately, Gadamer is neither very clear nor ever thorough in explicating the 
relationship between Oetinger and Shaftesbury. He mainly explains that the two are alike 
in their rejection of the one-sidedness of rational method and their shared understanding of 
common sense as a form of moral and practical knowledge as shown in Solomon’s 
proverbs. This however does not seem to adequately demonstrate how Oetinger is able to 
bring his ideas into harmony with those of Shaftesbury, as Gadamer maintains?
Clearly, it would be difficult to argue, according to Gadamer’s account, that 
Oetinger takes Shaftesbury’s notion of common sense word for word, in that we can see an 
obvious discrepancy in Gadamer’s condensed analysis of the theologian’s enterprise. But 
given the blurred connection between the two philosophic minds, there is nevertheless a 
sufficient motive to support why Gadamer incorporates this relativeXmknown figure within 
the context of his elucidation of sensus communis. Oetinger’s insistence on the practicality 
of common sense seems to be the precise theme on which we should focus our attention. 
When we take into account Gadamer’s own insistence on calling his philosophy, ‘practical 
philosophy’, and his inexhaustible emphasis on the Aristotelian concept of phronësis, an 
openness to Oetinger’s ‘practical sensibility’ is not inconceivable.^® Furthermore, there are 
instances of hermeneutical significance which emanate from Oetinger’s work. Gadamer 
quotes: ‘the ideas that can be found in scripture and in the works of God are the more 
fruitful and purified the more that each can be seen in the whole and all can be seen in 
each’ (TM 28-9 / WM 26). This is of course an example of the hermeneutic circle of whole 
and part where understanding warrants the comprehension of the parts in terras of the 
whole and vice versa. This seems impressive in light of the fact that he pre-dates 
Schleiermacher who is largely regarded as the forefather of hermeneutics. And what is 
more, in the advent of growing German idealism, the pietistic thinker was insightful 
enough to defend the concept of truth and knowledge that comes from our common 
(‘inner’) sense, against both empirical science and transcendental philosophy, by 
employing the idea of sensus communis. The common divine spirit which manifests itself 
as instinct and the practical application of that inner sense within the context of vita (life), 
according to Oetinger, is a gift (belonging to all) from the heavens, which springs forth, in
contact and intuition [my italics], wliicli are simple’
“ ‘Practical pliilosophy" is much more tliaii a mere methodological model for tlie “hermeneutical" disciplines. It also 
offers sometlimg like a sachliclie Gmndlage -  substantive foundation -  for tliem.’ ‘Reflection on My Philosophical 
Journey’, op. cit., 31.
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necessary moments, from the depths of the human soul. Although Oetinger’s interests 
were more with the spiritualistic facets of sensus communis than with the political or the 
social, nevertheless, we can still see that he keeps the relationship between common sense 
and society intact and further defines it, albeit implicitly, as a sense which comes from 
‘Being’. But as Gadamer states;
the supplanting of pietistic tendencies in the later eighteenth century caused the 
hermeneutic function of sensus communis to decline to a mere corrective; that 
which contradicts the consensus of feelings, judgments and conclusions, i.e. the 
sensus communis cannot be correct (29 / 27).
To be sure the German Enlightenment, with its intense intellectualising, overshadowed and 
removed all of the moral, political and social elements contained in sensus communis, 
reducing it to a mere judgment of taste (Kant). If we recall, in chapter one we discovered 
that Kant established a universal validity for judgments of taste by providing an a priori 
principle of ‘subjective’ finality. Judgments of taste, he explained, were universal since 
the free harmonious inter-play between the faculties of imagination and understanding, 
which provokes an inner feeling of pleasure, is common to all man. It is in this sense that 
Kant labelled taste as a common sense and reduced sensus communis to mere judgment of 
taste, stripped of its moral and political significance.
§ 3. 3 Judgment And Taste; The Loss of Their Epistemological Significance
With respect to judgment (UrieiF) and taste (Geschmack), the final two humanistic 
concepts, what concerns Gadamer most is how the philosophy of German enlightenment 
altered these two concepts so that their epistemological significance as an ‘intellectual 
virtue’ become lost. Furthermore, the elucidation of both concepts anticipates Gadamer’s 
next major section which examines in-depth both Kantian and post-Kantian aesthetics. As 
we have discussed in the previous chapter, with Kant both judgment and taste reached their 
climactic transformation. By re-conceptualising of judgment and taste, Kant not only 
removed all of the values that originated with each concept, but also artificially narrowed 
the idea of sensus communis to the judgment of taste and confined taste to the aesthetics.
Because Gadamer is primarily concerned with revealing the correlation between 
sensus communis and judgment and their ‘disconnection’ as a result of Kantian 
transcendental doctrine of judgment, he therefore begins first with the concept of judgment 
before elucidating the concept of taste. However I, on the other hand, will proceed from
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the opposite direction, that is, I will examine first taste and afterwards move on to 
judgment. There are two principal reasons for this reversal. First, the objective here is to 
trace the development and relationship between judgment and taste and not sensus 
communis and judgment, and thus in doing so it seems only proper that we start with the 
idea of taste which historically precedes the idea of judgment and ‘contains the beginnings 
of the intellectual differentiation we make in judging things’ (TM 33 / WM 32). Secondly, 
Gadamer’s account of judgment and taste, although insightful, offers an all too limited 
interpretation and explication of concepts that possess a richness o f histoiy. With 
judgment, he adds little in regards to how we are to understand it as a humanistic concept. 
He merely states that ‘the introduction of the word “judgment” in the eighteenth centuiy 
was intended to convey the idea of judicium, which was considered to be a basic 
intellectual virtue (29-30 / 27). And insofar as illuminating taste, Gadamer seems fairly 
content with his reading of Karl Borinski’s analysis of Gracian’s notion of taste, which 
more or less denies every kind of aesthetic character and the idea of Weltklugheit, focusing 
primarily on the moralistic quality instead. Consequently, he fails to cover some of the 
vital details needed for properly grasping the semantic transformations of both concepts. 
By investigating first taste and then judgment, I hope to fill in those historical gaps to 
present a clearer picture of the shifts leading to Kant, but additionally to clarify Gadamer’s 
own position regarding both concepts.^'
The introduction of the expression ‘good taste’ first began in Spain during the 
middle of the seventeenth century and gained prominence when the writer, moralist and a 
leading literary theorist of the Spanish baroque Balthasar Gracian (1601-58) gave full 
articulation to its meaning. Following the tradition of Machiavelli and Castiglione, 
Gracian sought to explore the qualities that determine an ‘ideal gentleman’. His writings, 
such as El héroe (‘The Hero’, 1637), El Politico (‘The Politician’, 1640) and El discreto 
(‘The Man of Discretion’, 1646) all reflect and elaborate his inquiry and at the same time 
reveal the development of the notion of ‘taste’ (gusto). According to Gracian, taste is a 
mode of knowing, a refined capacity functioning alongside the ingenium, which enables 
one to rise above the sphere of private interests and predilections to make judgments that
Much of the present examining of judgment and taste will adduce and rely on the autliority of Alfred Baeumler, who’s 
work Das IrrationalMtsprohlem in der Âsihetik und Logik des 18. Jahrimnderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilsliraft 
(Darmstadt, 1967), provides an extensive liistorical accoimt of botli concepts. Altliough Gadamer does not cite Baeumler 
or even botliers to mention his name, he was nonetheless very much aware of Baeumler’s critical writings concerning tlie 
semantic developments of judgment and taste. One other reterence wliich has been a valued service to tlie present study 
is Emilio Hidalgo-Sema’s contribution to Gracian studies. Das Ingeniose Denken Bei Baltasar Gracian.
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are right and good. It is, in short, a form of intellectual differentiation, a capacity of the 
mind that comes from nature, which has to be accomplished and perfected. However, this 
(inner sense) ability cannot be taught through demonstration but only acquired though its 
repeated conscious practices, i.e. cultivation {ciiltura). What is more, to possess taste is to 
have fraktisch  Menschenkenninis' (practical knowledge concerning the nature of human 
being) and nidichim commune (common judgment). Consequently, taste is a social 
phenomenon, and as such it is the rudimentary fabric of culture. Good taste, we can say, is 
a sensitivity to what is common to all; it denotes a certain capacity of ‘knowing’ what to do 
(or not to do) and how to act (or not to act) in every social situation. For instance, the 
language one uses with a teacher or employer is often different in manner and tone from 
the language which one uses with a friend or a family member. This is because a certain 
degree of familiarity warrants a particular way o f speaking (and behaving). Taste is that 
which instinctively and immediately advises us to adjust, to properly measure and distance 
ourselves according to the social circumstance and employ the necessary language or 
behaviour, so that we are not left stupefied or to feel out of place in a particular situation. 
But this does not mean that it always corresponds with society, for taste does not blindly 
observe commmml fashion. In fact, taste can often reject what is popular, in that what is 
popular does not always indicate ‘tastefulness’. Thus, generally speaking, we can say that 
a man of taste is a man of discretion, a perfect cosmopolitan, an esteemed and educated 
character who possesses the f e  ne sais quoi\ knowing, for instance, how to deal with 
every subject matter and behaving accordingly to every concrete situation. Guided by his 
taste, he is neither hesitant nor uneasy or hindered by societal pressures when making 
decisions. In fact, ‘he is able to make distinctions and choices consciously and from a 
superior position’ (TM  34 /  W M  32).
Gracian’s profound insights into taste was revolutionary, in a manner of speaking, 
for it evoked a new idea of social cultivation {Bildung) which became a widespread spirit, 
influencing not only Spain but also countries, such as Italy, France, England and Germany. 
Gadamer notes, ‘this [new] ideal of social Bildung seems to emerge everywhere in the 
wake of absolutism and its suppression of the hereditary aristocracy’ (ibid.). Indeed, by the 
end of the seventeenth century, Gracian’s ideal of Bildung began to replace the old notion 
of refinement based on the class structure of the feudal system. Birth and rank were no 
longer considered to be the qualities that determine a cultivated individual or society; 
instead, it was the capacity to recognise and learn the proper value of thing and actions, by
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appropriately distancing oneself from the narrowness of one’s prejudices and self-interest, 
which came to signify a gebildet individual and a society of cultured individuals. To put 
this into better perspective, Gracian, in a sense, democratises the idea of culture and
cultured. He in effect dispenses the antiquated idea that wealth or pedigree denotes culture
^  \or the cultured, and in place puts forward the notion that any individual who can educated v 
himself and acquire the necessary understanding of good judgment can indeed become an 
accomplished man o f culture. For this reason, it is not hard to see why Gracian’s thoughts 
were considered revolutionary when we view it in the context of seventeen-centuiy social 
order. But in France, where Gracian enjoyed the greatest influence, the very ethical and 
political nature of the new Bildung was expanded to include the aesthetics. Taste, together 
with the aesthetic of the Classics, formed a new way of evaluating art. This came to be 
known as the aesthetics of ‘'délicatesse'' and of the ‘'je ne sais quoi', which replaced the 
aesthetics of ‘vérité'' and ‘raison'. The sense of knowing and distinguishing well and 
reasonably what is good from bad and proper from improper, thus, became the governing 
standard for judging art. The aesthetics of ‘délicatesse' however never reached an actual 
theoiy of aesthetics, though it marked an important first step. The first aesthetic theories 
actually began in Italy, where Gracian’s notion of taste encountered another significant 
modification. Muratori’s treatise Delle reflessioni sopra il Biion Gusto nelle Scienze e 
nelle Arti was perhaps one of the earliest, if not the first, theoiy on aesthetics using the 
notion of taste. Muratori’s theory essentially relates good taste to poetry since every poet 
has to distinguish the basic principles and the beauty within his poetry, which he wants to 
create. But Muratori does not completely limit the notion of taste to poetry but applies it in 
connection to the distinction of the beauty and the good in the sphere of sciences, arts and 
practical action of man. Although he himself never mentions Gracian in his work, the 
preface of Delle reflessioni sopra il Buon Gusto nelle Scienze e nelle Arti supplies an 
introductory segment by Bernardo Trevisano who notes that the notion of good taste has its 
origins in Spain. But more importantly, Trevisano also explains that taste is a feeling 
which functions under authority of reason. Consequently, taste no longer has a direct link 
with ingenium. Trevisano in effect places the notion of judgment, intelligence and wit, 
what Gracian had understood as belonging to the tribunal of taste, under the rule of reason.
In Germany the introduction of the notion of taste came late and via the French 
aesthetic concept of bon goût (good taste). Christian Thomasius (1625-1728), a lawyer 
and philosopher from Leipzig, was one of the first Germans to write a treatise over taste.
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but erroneously he understood taste as a French phenomenon rather than a Spanish one. 
Thomasius used the metaphorical notion of hon goiit, taken from L 'Homme de Cour -  the 
French translation of Orciculo manual -  but only in a moralistic way. For him, bon gout 
stood directly in connection to the doctrine of prudencia (intelligence), and reflected a 
capacity to distinguish imperfectabilities; in the senses, in the effects, in inclinations, in 
understanding and the will. It was an intelligence which moved one to distinguish and 
choose what is right from wrong. The practical meaning of taste, i.e. the fine art of living, 
which Gracian had intended, was too alien for Thomasius. In fact, the concept of taste in 
Germany never quite developed as it did in the romance-language cultures -  that is, in 
Germany it more or less developed from the sphere of thought than from the life o f a 
cultivated society. This was partly in response to and under the influence of the analytic 
philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff.
Both Leibniz and Wolff, in formulating their theoiy of knowledge and of 
understanding, divided cognitive Icnowledge into two parts: ‘perfect knowledge’, i.e. the 
‘superior upper part’ and ‘imperfect knowledge’, i.e. the ‘inferior lower part’. Whereas the 
former consists of clear and distinct ideas brought to light tlnough reason, the latter was 
thought to yields only arbitrary and confused ideas, deriving from imagination and sense. 
But given the contrariety, reason and sense nonetheless possess continuity, according to 
Wolff. Both he and Leibniz argued that the obscured or confused ideas, though imperfect, 
could become perfectly clear and distinct ideas if we correctly apply our intellect. In 
theory, this meant that it was only a degree of perfection, which separated rational 
Icnowledge from sensate knowledge. Further, qualitatively speaking, Icnowledge deriving 
from sense was understood as a division of cognitive knowledge, although an inferior one.
Taste, in line with both Leibnizian and Wolffian philosophy, was perceived as a 
lower cognitive faculty that was able to generate knowledge and understanding through 
sensate judgment. However around 1730, the concept of judgment (Urted) began to 
replace the concept of taste. According to Alfred Baeumler, Joh. Ulrich Konig a well read 
scholar of French aesthetics and Johann Christoph Gottsched both began to use the concept 
of taste {Geschmack) and concept of judgment {Urteil) interchangeably. There are several 
different streams of development which could explain why taste was used interchangeably 
with judgment and finally replaced by judgment. Let us examine two probable causes of 
this phenomenon.
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Konig, explains Baeumler, differentiates the concept of taste into two distinct ideas; 
‘particular good taste’ and ‘universal good taste’. The latter, Konig argues, is based on 
reason. Universal good taste, he contends, teaches through sensation to respect highly 
what reason would have approved infallibly, given that there was enough time for 
reflection. Taste is a ‘finished sensation’ or ‘finished examination’ in contrast to the act of 
judging as a thoughtful, deliberate and reflective examination. Someone who possesses 
universal taste ‘senses’ in the way a reasonable man would think, that is, although he is not 
a scholar, he judges ‘after-the-fact’ like a scholar. The sensation of the beautiful, we can 
say in our contemporary language, is not rational but ‘rationable’. Thus Konig speaks in 
tenns of ‘inner sensation of understanding’ {jnmrUche Empfindimg des Verstandes) or 
‘taste of understanding’ {Geschmack des Verstandes), which he calls a word ‘from a new 
concept’. The concept of universal good taste is eventually interchanged with judgment in 
order to designate the x?Axon{able) aspect of taste.
An other reason for the interchange between taste and judgment can be found in 
Gottsched, whose preoccupation centred around ‘germanising’ taste due to its connection 
with the English concept o f sentiment. Taste in respect to moral and aesthetic judgments 
was closely related to the notion of sentiment. According to the English moral 
philosophers, sentiment is not based on reason nor does it obey reason. However, for 
Gottsched, reason is the sole basis of judgment. This opposing contrast between taste- 
sentiment relationship and taste-judgment seems to have influenced Gottsched to replace 
altogether the concept of judgment for taste, adding his own touch to the notion of 
judgment by elevating it to the higher cognitive faculty.
With Gottsched the term judgment, similar to the concept of sensus communis 
which Vico had conceptualised, was understood to reflect an internal sensibility, a kind of 
inner knowledge, which enables one to subsume a particular representation correctly and to 
practice what one knows. Kant himself acknowledges in his First Critique that ‘the power 
of judgment is a peculiar talent that cannot be taught at all but can only be practised. This 
is also the reason why the power of judgment is the specific [feature] of so-called mother- 
wit, for whose lack no school can compensate’.^  ^ However, because the philosophical 
community of the German Enlightenment did not consider judgment as a faculty which 
could subsume a particular under a universal, Gottsched’s elevating of judgment to the 
higher faculties of knowledge was therefore short-lived, and judgment was again relegated
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to the lower cognitive faculty, rendering imperfect knowledge, as Leibniz and Wolff had 
first determined. But if it could be proved that judgment is able to subsume a particular 
under a universal, then this would mean that judgment is a concept or rule rather than a 
sense, and that its functions would depend on and follow yet a higher principle to guide its 
own application; however, such is not the case. The workings of judgment are parallel to 
the faculty o f sense rather than to the faculty of reason, for it relies entirely on concrete 
experience. As we have already seen, in the Third Critique Kant takes the concept of 
judgment one step fijrther than his predecessors by making a distinction between cognitive 
(determinate) judgments and aesthetic (reflective) judgments. Through this differentiation, 
he established the autonomy for aesthetics; however, concurrently he removed all of the 
moral or social implications that characterised taste. The significance of taste as an avenue 
of knowledge and a mode of being was utterly replaced with the notion of reflective 
judgment, which offers only a subjective universality without any cognitive value.
For Gadamer, however, the concept of judgment possesses a similar 
meaningfulness as the pre-enlightenment understanding of taste that Gracian had 
developed. ‘Whosoever has sound judgment’ Gadamer writes, ‘is not thereby enabled to 
judge particulars under universal viewpoints, but he knows what is important, i.e. he sees 
things from right and sound points of view’ (TM 31 / WM 29). Clearly in Gadamer’s view 
judgment is not so much a faculty as a moral sense inherent in all men that must be 
cultivated. It is in this sense that judgment -  that which guides taste -  is sensus communis: 
Everyone has enough ‘sense of the common’ (gemeimn Sinn), i.e. judgment that it 
can be expected to show a ‘sense of community’ (Gemeinsinn), genuine moral and 
civic solidarity, but that means judgment of right and wrong and civic concern for 
the common ‘good’ (31/29).
Judgment, as a humanistic concept, epitomises a special way of knowing and of being. It 
cannot be taught, as Kant had rightly pointed out, but only acquired through concrete 
application, but once secured, all the ‘knowledge of the world’ cannot replace the 
‘wisdom’ of sound judgment, which functions almost like intuition; that is, judgment 
articulates itself quickly and almost without notice. In this sense, it possesses superiority 
over rational thinldng, in that it asserts itself even prior to fhj^  act of thinking, offering 
immediate practical knowledge. This knowledge is not simply self-generating and self- 
validating, but it is sensus communis', common knowledge tftfrf is developed. One may
Kant. Critique ofPttre Reason \33a/\12h. 206.
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argue, however, that with each individual and community, there are different ideas of 
culture, common sense, judgment and taste, and thus point to arguments of relativism. But 
it seems quite obvious that beyond the discrepancies of exact definition or understanding 
of what common sense, judgment or taste might be, every individual and community 
clearly possesses some ideal of culture, some version of common sense, judgment and 
taste, which ftmctions in a socially cohesive manner. However individual or slightly 
varying the meaning of these humanistic concepts may be -  due to geographical and 
historical boundaries mostly -  the concepts themselves are no less universal, for they are 
exercised in every human c o m m u n i t y . H e n c e ,  combined together, the humanistic 
concepts represent a tradition by which every society cultivates itself in coming to be what 
it ‘could be’, i.e. in the Heideggerian sense the humanistic concepts represent the 
potentiality-for-being. These ideas are the immediate sources of our practical knowledge, 
our pragmatic know-how. Through them, we learn to interpret and understand others and 
ourselves in such a way which eludes all methodical thinking. What is more, they are the 
foundation on which we establish our human communities, and through community we 
(re)formulate and develop these ideas. This process is dialectical, ever continuous and 
progressing.
§ 3.4 Tradition and Language
Certainly, Gadamer is not concerned with showing merely the history of humanistic 
concepts. Through the four concepts, he illuminates the ‘tradition’ in which we stand and 
through which we exist. By this 1 mean that he unconceals and brings to consciousness 
that which remains, for the most part, invisible to us, ‘Tradition’, as Richard Palmer 
explains, ‘is so transparent a medium that it is invisible to us -  as invisible as water to a 
fish’.^ '' This means, tradition is like the air we breathe. It surrounds us and encompasses 
the whole of our being. We are immersed in it so much so that we more often fail to 
recognise that we are in this tradition -  but as much as we are within this tradition, so too is 
tradition immersed in us. But let us take the notion of tradition one step further. Tradition 
is not simply the ‘medium’ in which we move and participate in the lifeworld or in the 
literal sense something simply handed down, but we are the very tradition which we 
inherit, i.e. ‘being is tradition’. From Gadamer’s viewpoint we do not fall into error if we
We may expect as the geographical boundaiies continues to recede due to modem teclmology that even the content of 
the concepts become more imiversal.
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follow tradition, as Decartes had presumed. Rather by understanding tradition, we come 
into being. This is why the humanistic concepts are so important for Gadamer. They 
represent modes of being and knowing, which bear significance on the present as well as 
on the future. What we are in the present and what we strive to become in the future are 
conditioned by what we have inherited from the past. Our understanding for the present 
and the future is always conditioned by and is the product of the sum of prejudgements or 
prejudices which we inherit bom  the past. In Gadamer’s view then all interpretation and 
understanding involve preconceptions which we cannot escape. As historical beings, 
prejudices are embedded into our very being through tradition; consequently, how we see 
the world and how we approach it is always through an ‘effective historical consciousness’ 
{wirkimgsgeschichtliches Bewufitsein). As Joel Weinsheimer points out, ‘This phrase 
refers to the fact that not only is consciousness {Bewitfitsein) affected by history but that it 
is also conscious of that fact. It is self-conscious’.^  ^ But we should be careful not to 
assume that by being conscious or aware of our historicity that we can separate from 
history and achieve objectivity. We can no more step out from our history than we can 
step out fi'om our shadow. Rather we always move within history. It is the guiding force 
of our lives. This is what is meant by ‘being is tradition’.
But now let us ask what the mode of being of tradition is? How do we 
communicate tradition? According to Gadamer, ‘Being that can be understood is 
language’ (432 / 450). As mentioned above, ‘language’ for Gadamer ‘is the universal 
medium in which understanding itself is realised’. It is the ‘house of being’, the necessary 
prerequisite for all hermeneutical understanding. This seems to affirm then that the being 
of tradition is language. But how are we to understand language itself? Gadamer states 
that we should not confuse language ‘as grammar or as lexicon’ but rather see it as that 
which constitutes the hermeneutical event ‘. . . in the coming into language of that which 
has been said in the tradition: an event that is at once assimilation and inteipretation’ (TM 
421 / WM 439). According to Gadamer, language is not merely a means to an end, made 
available to the consciousness, but it is an autonomous way of being that mediates an 
ontologically ascertained truth in which Dasein participates. And since language possesses 
self-sovereignty, it obeys its own ‘laws‘. Its mastery, control and regulation do not 
succumb to the power of the schematising capacity of the human consciousness. From this
"^‘Palmer. Hermeneutics, op. cit., 177.
”  Weinsheimer GH. op. cit., 182.
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perspective, we can clearly see that Gadamer resolutely challenges rational thinking, which 
presumes that it imparts self-given and unambiguous, definite concepts. He explains, Tt is 
not just that the use and development of language is a process which has no single knowing 
and choosing consciousness standing over against it . (Thus it is literally more coirect to 
say that language speaks us, rather than we speak it . . .  ’ (TM 420-421 / WM 439). Jean 
Grondin also insightfully observes that truth escapes the dominion of the subject and takes 
refuge in the logoi; that is in language in which being reflects itself.
According to Gadamer, in language we become home in a world, which is carried 
and mediated by tradition. To this extend, language is always closely bound to a world, 
that is, the ‘world is linguistic in nature’ (401 / 419). The autonomy of language therefore 
must not be understood in the sense that language has a life independent from the world 
which comes into being through language. Analogous to the world, which is only world in 
so far as it comes into language, language has its real being only in the fact that the world 
is re-presented within it (ibid.). Every language therefore represents a particular view of 
the world.
For Gadamer, it is in the interdependent relation between the view of language 
(Sprachansicht) and the view of the world {Wekansicht) that real importance for the 
problem of hermeneutics lies. In communicating with other times, i.e. ‘epochs’, cultures 
and people , we bring our own view of language and subsequently also our view of the 
world to this dialogue. This means that we are formed by the particular language we 
acquire and that we have consequently also a particular (prejudiced or presupposed) view 
of the world. This particular view of the world and of language is not to be misunderstood 
as a limitation or short-coming in the acquisition of a foreign subject matter, for instance, a 
foreign language, but that it is the necessary prerequisite in ‘the exercise o f this capacity of 
understanding [which] always means that [that] what is said has a claim over one, and this 
is impossible if one’s own “view of the world and of language” is not also involved’ (401 / 
418).
According to Gadamer:
Language is the record of finitude, not because the stmcture of human language is 
multifarious, but because every language is constantly being formed and developed, 
the more it expresses its experience of the world. It is finite not because it is not at
icanQxaaàm. Henneneutische Wahrheit? Zttm WahrheitsbegriffHans-GeorgGadamers (2'"* revised ed. 1994 , Beltz 
Atlieiiaiun Verlag, Weinlieiin), p. 187.
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once all other language, but simply because it is language. We have considered 
important turning-points in European thought concerning language, and from these 
we have learned that the event of language corresponds to the finitude of man in a 
far more radical sense than is brought out in Christian thinking about the word. It 
is the centre of language, whence our whole experience of the world, and especially 
hermeneutical experience, unfolds . . . .  It is the centre of language alone that, 
related to the totality of beings, mediates the finite, historical nature of man to 
himself and to the world. The word is not simply, as held in mediaeval thought, the 
perfection of the species. If the existent is represented in the thinking mind, this is 
not the reflection of a pre-given order of being, the true nature of which is apparent 
to an infinite spirit (that of the creator). But nor is the word an instrument that can 
construct, like the language of mathematics, an objective universe of beings that 
can be manipulated by numbers. (415 / 433)
It is through language, then, that the ‘fusion of horizons’ occurs, meaning that the horizon 
of the past and horizon of present coalesce to mediate the phenomenon of understanding. 
In other words, the linguisticality of understanding is the concretion of the ‘effective 
historical consciousness’, which is embodied in the fusion of horizons. In communicating, 
language hands down to us something which it already understands. It brings together two 
different world and forms understanding. Without language, we would have no world, no 
basis for communicating, no understanding. Thus even prior to the very act of vocalisation 
through language, language already understands.
In the next chapter, we shall look at how the experience of art also involves the 
hermeneutical experience of language. For Gadamer, language does not necessarily refer 
to ‘spoken language’. In fact, in the experience of art, no vocal proclamations occur, yet 
nonetheless Gadamer demonstrate, by using the analogy of game-playing, that a dialogue 
or conversation takes place between the work of art and its beholder. This of course 
implies that language is involved in art, for every conversation requires language.
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§ 4 Discovering the Truthfulness of Art
In examining the guiding humanistic concepts Gadamer has clearly shown that 
there are knowledge-claims beyond the sphere of the natural sciences, and that one does 
not necessarily need to refer to method to uncover, prove and acquire truth. By exposing 
and substantiating the knowledge-claims that exist beyond the sovereignty of ‘reason’ and 
method, Gadamer in effect ‘pre-demonstrates’ the legitimacy of truth-experiences in the 
Geisteswissenschaften. As we have seen, tmth uncovered through Bildung, sensus 
communis, judgement and taste is different from the kind of tmth discovered through 
methodical rationality. The knowledge-claims that the humanistic concepts reveal are by 
no means ‘absolute certainties’. They are only certain in the sense that they belong to the 
lifeworld {Lebenswelf), Being such, these knowledge-claims are opened to corrections and 
modifications as they continuously unconceal themselves in the movement towards the 
whole.'
With respect to the human sciences, their claim to tmth is no different from that of 
the guiding humanistic concepts, for the ‘tmth event’ of the Geisteswissenschaften also 
belongs to the lifeworld. The human sciences do not disclose corresponding or relational 
absolutes. Rather they unconceal the ‘whatness’ and the ‘howness’ of being. Philosophy, 
music, literature, art and all the like disciplines participate in the inexhaustible quest of 
unconcealing the very being of life to which we are so close and yet ironically too distant 
to fully realise its extraordinariness. When we watch a Shakespearean play, for example 
Hamlet, it is the something of ‘being’, which it captures, that demands our attention and 
provokes our minds to thought. When we as audience listen to (and so often whisper along 
with) Hamlet during his famous soliloquy, ‘To be, or not to be’, we feel as if we 
understand Hamlet. But what we understand is not so much the meaning of being a prince 
or being Danish but the immeasurable depth of human affection. We participate with 
Hamlet in asking ourselves the very same question that he imposes on himself: ‘what is the 
meaning of b e i n g ? T h e  play Hamlet in essence awakens and disturbs our consciousness 
to ‘[t]he heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks / That flesh is heir to ’.’ In this way it 
adds to our understanding of life. In our ‘forgetfulness of being’, plays such as Hamlet
' I should like to remind tire reader here that the ‘whole’, wliich 1 am speaking of, refers specifically to what Hegel 
behoved as tire absolute. Wliereas Hegel saw tire arrival at tire whole of trutlr or absolute Irullr for the human sciences, 
Gadamer irever sees tire triumphairt eird. The rrrovemeirt towards the truth as a whole exists as long as beiirg exists. For 
Gadamer it is not so much tire anival at tire whole of trutlr as the coirtmuous irrovemenl towards that whole wliich 
represents the greatest value to humanity.
 ^William Shakespeare. Hamlet (III. I. 55).
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offer us a glimpse of that which often goes unnoticed in our strenuous routine of daily 
living. It shares with us a deeper sense of being by disclosing the intensities of human 
qualities, such as joy and suffering. But how are we to assure ourselves that what we 
experience is not something merely given by the 'play' of our mental faculties? What is it 
that creates pleasure and gives understanding in the aesthetic experience? To disclose how 
we understand and experience truth in the human sciences, Gadamer first turns to the 
experience of art. Through art, he tries to show the phenomenological nature of tmth and 
how we are to enter into a ‘philosophical conversation' {Philosophishes Gesprcich) and 
‘listen’ to what the work of art and the human sciences in general has to ‘say’. The 
concept of listening is important for Gadamer, in that listening requires a sense of 
seriousness, attentiveness and thoughtfulness as opposed to merely hearing something 
without thought.
If we recall, according to Kant, to assert that ‘x is beautiful’ underlies an 
harmonious ‘free play’ between the faculties of imagination and understanding, which 
creates a ‘disinterested’ sense of pleasure in the individual making the aesthetic assertion. 
We should bear in mind in addition that there is nothing in the object which can cause 
aesthetic pleasure; the object, in Kant’s view, merely initiates the play between the 
faculties. This means that aesthetic sensations are purely subjective and that the judgement 
of taste is universal only in the sense that everyone also owns the very same capacity to 
experience the similar interplay, and can therefore offer precisely the same judgement, 
which is without any cognitive significance. But if there is nothing to be ascribed to the 
object being viewed in the aesthetic experience, as Kant presumes, what is it then that 
provokes the initial interplay between imagination and understanding? Could we not 
simply look at anything, art or non-art, and make it to an object of aesthetic pleasure? 
Kant’s subjectivisation of the aesthetic experience moreover seems to neglect completely 
the ‘category’ of the work of art {Kategorie des Kimstwerkes).
First we must understand that it was never Kant’s intention to propose an aesthetic 
theory of art. As we have seen in chapter one, his primarily concern was to mediate an a 
priori principle to bridge the gulf between the concept of universal causality, which 
determines the natural, i.e. ‘phenomenal’, world and the concept of freedom in some 
supersensible, ‘noumenal’ world; this noumenal world, at least as an idea, is said to be 
constitutive for man’s interpretive actions and moral relationships. According to Kant, the
 ^Ibid., m. I. 61-2.
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faculty of judgment is the bridge that closes the gap between the mental faculties of pure 
knowledge and desire. Therefore, it is not surprising that Kant essentially focuses in the 
Critique o f Judgement on the beauty of nature rather than on beauty of art. It is a 
consequence of his whole methodical approach that Kant does not consider the ‘work- 
character’ of art. However this does not imply that Kant’s 'Jhird Critique did not have a 
major impact on aesthetic theory. In fact, it is, as we know, the root of modern aesthetics 
proper. It is in the Critique o f Judgement that Kant established the subjective universality 
of aesthetic judgement. The problem for art and the human sciences altogether is that in 
doing so Kant also superficially narrows the concept of knowledge wholly to the 
possibility of ‘pure natural sciences’, ultimately placing the aesthetic experience and the 
human sciences’ truth-claim on the ‘quicksands’ of relativism.
To counter the apparent relativistic nature of aesthetic judgement, Gadamer 
attempts to demonstrate the manifestation of truth in works of art. He defends the truth- 
claims of art against Kant and his successors, such as Schiller, by asserting that the 
legitimacy of truth-claims in art is not to be found in the perceiver’s own faculties that 
cause pure aesthetic pleasure, but in the artwork itself which reveals something of ‘Being’. 
The disclosure of ‘being’ (truth), however is not simply ‘there’ given by the object. We 
cannot experience the truth of art as a subject perusing an object. The disclosure of being, 
according to Gadamer is ‘in-between’. That is to say, it is not the subject (the perceiver) 
nor the object (the artwork itself) that reveals truth, but the ‘metaphorical conversation’ 
which emerges between the subject and the object, wherein all notions of subject-object 
schema are dissolved. By entering into a dialogue with the artwork, its being and the 
‘Being’ it captures transpire phenomenologically and a ‘fusion of horizons’ occurs. The 
process of dialogue is best concretised in the notion of play {Spiel). Discovering truth in 
art, Gadamer admits in his autobiographical essay, is no easy task:
The experience of art constitutes a kind o f evidence which is both too strong and at 
the same time not strong enough. It is too strong in the sense that probably no one 
would venture to extend their faith in scientific progress to the heights of art and 
try, for instance, to see in Shakespeare an advance over Sophocles, or in 
Michelangelo an advance beyond Phidias. On the other hand, th% ^idence o f art is
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also too weak in the sense that the artwork withholds the very truth that it embodies
and prevents it from becoming conceptually precise/
In revealing the ontological foundations of art, Gadamer attempts to show how we might 
disclose the truth that the work of art withholds from us. But in order to do so, he ai'gues, 
we must first break ourselves away from the prejudice o f ‘aesthetic consciousness’, which 
began with Johann Cliristoph Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805). Schiller’s interpretation 
of Kant, Gadamer explains, was the pivotal turning-point, which ‘turned the radical 
subjectivisation, through which Kant had justified transcendentally the judgement of taste 
and its claim to universality, from a methodical condition to one of content’ (TM  73; W M  
77).
As an artist Schiller was deeply concerned with the purpose and status of the 
aesthetic in human experience and its relation to our freedom as morally autonomous 
beings. He construed in Kant’s epistemological discriminations between the phenomenal 
and the noumenal realms - the realm of nature and the realm of freedom - experiential 
conflicts in the individual, in which the possibility of exercising freedom is put to question. 
Kant, as mentioned above, discovered a need to bridge the experiences we encounter in the 
phenomenal world with the experiences we face in the noumenal world. Out of this need, 
he published his Kritik der Urteilsh’aft in 1790, in which he reconciled the distance 
between the phenomenal and the noumenal world through the aesthetic. But for Schiller, 
Kant’s analysis of the beautiful as that which pleases universally and necessarily without a 
concept, without an interest and embodies purposiveness without a purpose, functioning as 
a medium between cognitive judgements and moral judgements, did not satisfy the tension 
between the sensuous and the moral. Moreover, Schiller was convinced that aesthetic 
judgements, although independent from logical judgements, have a direct relationship with 
ethics. In his bid to overcome the Kantian perception of the beautiful, the first major 
challenge for Schiller was to discover a way of defining the beautiful, which Kant claimed 
was impossible. Schiller decided to compose a philosophical treatise, to be called Kallias 
Über die Schonheit, to show that an objective definition of the beautiful was possible. 
Although Kallias was eventually abandoned, while developing the idea for his 
philosophical dialogue, Schiller, beginning in 1793, kept a close correspondence with his 
friend Christian Gottfried Korner over his philosophical project and formulated his famed 
idea that beauty is ''Freiheit in der Erscheinung’ (Freedom in semblance). In essence this
‘Reflections on My Pliilosophical Journey’, op. cit., 6.
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means that the object of beauty strikes the beholder as being autonomous or removed from 
the compulsion that ordinarily governs objects in the natural world. That object 
consequently serves as a representation of freedom, in the sense of moral self- 
determination, though it shows freedom only in semblance, since all objects in the 
phenomenal world are subject to the laws of nature. This radical understanding of beauty 
had far-reaching consequences on Schiller’s entire aesthetic theory.
In his later Àsthetische Briefe [Aesthetic Letters] -  Über die asthetische Erziehimg 
des Menschen [Letters on the Aesthetic Education o f Man] -  Schiller idealistically 
advocates the idea o f aesthetic cultivation, that is an education through art and for art. 
What he envisioned was an ‘Aesthetic State’, a society of aesthetically conditioned 
consciousness that could inhabit the ideal realm of art, i.e. the realm o f ‘semblance’. 
According to Schiller, the world of art is a separate actuality divorced and isolated from the 
life world. Possessing its own independent principles of construction and internal
coherence provided by the imagination, the world of semblance provides man with inner 
‘psychological’ freedom. This means that the power of imagination to form images is self- 
reliant and need not refer to external nature. From Schiller’s standpoint, art does not 
complement nature and vice versa, as it did for Kant and his predecessors. Instead, it is 
perceived as something that is to be contrasted with practical reality. The work of art 
which traditionally fulfilled the role of completing ‘its supplementing and fulfilling activity 
within the areas given and left free by nature’ (TM  76; W M 78), is not longer a part of 
lifeworld. To this extent. Les beaux arts are no longer considered as ‘a perfecting of 
reality’. Art is basically divorced from its temporality, its historicity, possessing its own 
autonomous ‘free’ world. The cause of ‘[t]he shift of the ontological definition of the 
aesthetic to the sphere of aesthetic appearance’, Gadamer explains, ‘has its theoretical basis 
in the fact that the domination of the scientific epistemological model leads to the 
discrediting possibilities of knowing that lies outside this new model (75 / 79-80). But to 
enter the ‘enchanted’ world of art, one needs to acquire an ‘aesthetic consciousness’ and 
view art as the ‘art of beautiful appearance’. Basic to Schiller’s aesthetic theory, as we 
have discussed above, is the concept of ‘freedom’ (Freiheit) and ‘semblance’ (Schein). 
Schiller contends;
[IJndifference to reality and interest in semblance may be regarded as a genuine 
enlargement of humanity and a decisive step towards culture. . . [Tjhis affords
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evidence of outward freedom; for as long as necessity dictates, and need drives,
imagination remains tied to reality with poweidul bonds.
Instead of placing art ‘its original context of life, and the religious or secular function 
which gave it its significance’ (76 / 81), Schiller proposes an “ ‘ideal kingdom” which is to 
be defended against all limitation, even against the moralistic guardianship of state and 
society’ (74 / 78). He confers to art its own life and presence, and what is left is a pure work 
of art. In other word, the aesthetic consciousness demands that the work of art abstract 
from its original context from which it emerged and from all contextual conditions under 
which the beholder encounters the work of art. Thus what we call a work of art and what 
we experience aesthetically consist in a performance of a double abstraction, which 
Gadamer calls ‘aesthetic differentiation’. By displacing art from its original lifeworld 
context, Schiller creates the necessary ‘distance’ for objectively viewing art in its purest 
form, i.e. art as art itself. Through aesthetic differentiation, art becomes atemporal, 
suspended from time. To this extent, aesthetic consciousness has the character of 
simultaneity since it claims to embrace everything of quality. That is, ‘[t]he immediacy 
with which the purified artwork is present to purified aesthetic consciousness implies the 
co-presence of all times in the mind of the beholder.’'^  As a consequence of this 
qualitatively all-embracing aesthetic cultivation, i.e. aesthetic differentiation, which tries 
‘to make the artwork immediately available to the beholder as pure consciousness to pure 
consciousness, it renders the two worlds inaccessible to each other, for the purity and 
immediacy of the aesthetic are achieved by abstracting from the media which permit 
accessibility between worlds.’’ That is to say, Schiller’s notion of aesthetic cultivation is 
utterly indifferent to content and leaves art without a specific content, since it abstracts 
precisely from all media, even including the content which permit us to take a moral, 
religious or philosophical stand. In this sense, we again arrive at a subjective relativism 
since ‘the aesthetic consciousness is the experiencing centre from which everything 
considered to be art is measured’ (TM 76 / WM 80-81). Moreover the abstraction of art from 
its world, it seems, is quite artificial and contrived. Schiller’s notion of aesthetic 
consciousness completely disregards the fact that we are temporal beings and that the 
function of art is rooted within the context of life. When we encounter a work of art, we
 ^See The Development o f German Aesthetic Theory From Kant to Schiller (New York; Edwin Mellen Press, 1994. 
(Letter XXVI. 4), p. 305.
Joel Weinsiieimer GH. op. cit., 93.
’ Ibid.
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cannot and do not abstract ourselves from time. Heidegger had poignantly proved our 
inescapability from temporality m Being and Time. We cannot, as it were, step away from 
our historicity for a few moments to enjoy pleasure deriving from the artistic form of the 
artwork, which also itself is disconnected from reality. Rather, in the experience o f a work 
of art we do not leave our world, our home so much as we come home. In this respect, the 
experience of art is ontological. In Heideggerian terms, the experience of ait represents a 
coming into being of what we could be; for the artwork is not a mere pleasure object, but a 
presentation, transfused into an image, of a truth of being as event. Hence, the work of art 
is fully continuous with our reality to the extent that it opens up our own world to broaden 
our self-understanding. That is, it renders knowledge about our being, so that we learn to 
see the world and our being ‘in a new light’ -  as if anew. Art illuminates our ordinary 
perception and understanding of life, bringing into view the extraordinary character of life. 
If indeed the artwork is discontinuous from the lifeworld in which it was born, as Schiller 
maintains, then art could not illuminate our being and expand our self-understanding. 
When we separate art and our aesthetically formed consciousness from reality, we are in 
effect divorcing ourselves from ourselves and entering into a meaningless ctd-de-sac^ 
called the ideal realm of art. In order to do justice to art, aesthetics must go beyond itself 
and abandon the “purity” of the aesthetic’ writes Gadamer (83 / 88). What this means is 
that we must overcome all perception of ait as objects that stand outside of time. 
Moreover, we should not pretend to disconnect ourselves from our time to view ait as an 
object of sensuous form that renders subjective pleasure. Gadamer asserts;
The pantheon of art is not a timeless presence which offers itself to pure aesthetic 
consciousness but the assembled achievements of the human mind as it has realised 
itself historically. Aesthetic experience also is a mode of self-understanding. But 
all self-understanding takes place in relation to something else that is understood 
and includes the unity and sameness of this other. Inasmuch as we encounter the 
work of art in the world and a world in the individual work of art, this does not 
remain a strange universe into which we are magically transported for a time. 
Rather, we learn to understand ourselves in it, and that means that we preserve the 
discontinuity of the experience in the continuity of our existence. Therefore it is 
necessary to adopt an attitude to the beautiful and to art that does not lay claim to 
immediacy, but corresponds to the historical reality o f man (86 / 92).
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In Gadamer's view, we need to overcome the primacy of self-consciousness and place art 
back into his true historical context, but to do so he states that we must first return to the 
phenomenological character of aesthetic experience. Art, he contends, unconceals and 
brings to light something of ‘Being’, which the artist has captured. So then, how are we to 
witness the unfolding of truth that art possesses? For this, Gadamer introduces the concept 
of ‘play’ (Spiel) and draws an analogy between playing games and the experience of art. In 
his view the phenomenon of play is an essential fimction of human life. Human culture, he 
maintains, is unthinkable and impossible without this element.®
§ 4.1 The Dialogical Process of Play
‘Play’ (or ‘Game’), Gadamer explains, is the mode of being of the work of art and 
not simply a subjective attitude or a state of consciousness, which produces self-created 
pleasure, as Kant and Schiller had understood -  that is, play, in connection to aesthetics, 
neither refers to the mental activity (i.e. the ‘free play’ between the faculties of imagination 
and understanding) of a creator or viewer of art nor to the freedom of human subjectivity. 
Play itself, Gadamer tells us, is not serious, for it is merely a spectacle, a form of 
entertainment. There is however a seriousness to be found in play when it is being played. 
In the moment of playing, a sense of seriousness emerges from the play and provides ‘life’ 
to the game. This seriousness of game creates a certain new reality with its own overriding 
norms and guiding principles, which is independent of the consciousness of the player, that 
the player, upon entering this new autonomous space -  whether a football pitch or a sports 
arena -  must observe. In doing so, he concedes his own concerns and submits to the 
‘authority’ of the game. As a result the player, participating in playing, is transformed and 
is no longer himself. His actions are not governed by his own will but by the will o f the 
game; consequently, his actions are not the subject of the game but rather the responses to 
the tasks the game imposes. The true subject., then, is the ‘happening’ or movement of the 
game itself. Thus we say; in playing, there ‘is’ play (game);
The attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in the fact that 
the game tends to master the players. Even when it is a case of games in which one 
seeks to accomplish tasks that one has set oneself, there is a risk whether or not it
 ^See also The Rele\’ance o f  the Beautiful op. cit. Gadamei' m ote tliis essay some fourteen years after Truth and Method. 
It represents an expansion of his initial concept of play. Tire leading question in this essay focuses on how we can expect 
help from classical aesthetics in view of tire experimeirtal practice of art today. Gadamer tries to fnrd an airswer to Üris 
questiorr by eirrployiirg tire coircepts of play, symbol and festival as tire airtlrropoiogical basis of oirr experience of art.
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will ‘work’, ‘succeed’, and ‘succeed again’, which is the attraction of the game.
The real subject of the game (this is shown in precisely those experiences in which
there is only a single player is not the player, but instead the game itself. (95-96 /
102)
But despite the dominance and normative authority that game possesses over the player; 
the player is no less essential. In fact, play depends on and requires the players. If it were 
not so, can we really say that there is football (- game) without football players? Is golf, 
for instance, what is summarised in a book of rules, or reflected in a set of strategies? 
What is poker or snooker without poker players and snooker players playing? Here, it 
becomes evident that a game’s concrete existence only comes into being when it is played 
out. Without the player(s) the possibility of play does not exist. Thus we can say that the 
player completes the play in the same sense the play completes the player, i.e., the play 
gives identity to the player. For this reason Gadamer calls games ‘self-representations’. 
With this in mind, now let us return for a moment to the assertion that game is the 
‘happening’ or movement of itself. This claim seems to suggest two things: first, that play 
is capable o f changing. To be sure, play in its disclosure can shift randomly according to 
different kinds of situations and unpredictable circumstances. For example, although the 
rules and reality of a given game does not change at all, different players or strategies and 
even environmental conditions under which play unfolds itself all to some extent determine 
how the game will appear in its movement. Although a football match-p/q); in Berlin is a 
different ‘match-play’ from a football match-p/op in London, except for the variation in its 
unfolding, play ‘happens’ in both places.
The second aspect of claiming game as the happening or movement of itself seems to 
suggest that play is not a tangible object. For example, a chessboard and chess pieces do 
not make up the game o f chess. Rather, as we have seen, it is the happening of the play 
itself, the movement which guides the players who have committed and engaged 
themselves in the act of ‘serious’ playing in the ‘reality/world of game’, that is ‘Play’. 
This seems to make clear that there is no subject-object schema in play. The player as 
subject is no longer the subject, and the play as object is no longer a true object. What is 
left is the disclosure of play as a ‘happening’ where the subject and object coalesce therein: 
‘Hence the mode of being of play is not such that there must be a subject [or an object] 
who takes up a playing attitude in order that the game may be played’ (93 / 99). Rather, 
‘the primacy of play over the consciousness o f the player is fundamentally acknowledged.
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[. . . ] if one starts from the medial sense of the word spielen’ ( 94 / 100). Thus we are 
quite familiar with phrases like something is ‘playing’ somewhere or at some time, or 
something is going on (dafi sich etwas abspielt) or that something is at play {dafi etwas im 
Spiele ist).
To illustrate the phenomenon of play, let us take tennis as an example. When two 
tennis players step onto a court, they, in a sense, leave their life-realm for the ‘concrete 
world of play’, and as play commences, the seriousness of playing takes over the players -  
and not the players over the play, as subject standing over against an object. The 
seriousness can be seen in the fact that both players ardently run in and around the 
boundaries of the court, chasing after a small yellow ball in order to prevail and fulfil the 
purpose of the game. Additionally, in playing, both players adhere to or at least try to stick 
to the rules, purposes and protocols of the game. Their actions in effect are governed by 
the movement of the game. A tennis player, for example, knows when and from where he 
is to serve a ball. He also Icnows when the ball is ‘in’ (to continue play) and when it is 
‘out’ (to end play). These are rules to which he commits from the very beginning of play 
to its very end. What is more, he understands the penalties for breaking a mle of play, and 
attempts to avoid violating all given rules. This compliance -  almost blind obedience -  to 
rule(s) is part of the seriousness that keeps the play moving until the game’s conclusion. 
To completely disregard or defy the of rule(s) of play implies that there is no seriousness 
and thus no genuine play. The obvious implication of all this is ‘[t]he players are not the 
subjects of play; instead play merely reaches presentation through the players’ (92 / 98). 
Yet tennis, to be tennis (- game), requires players. Without participants to play, there 
cannot be a happening of tennis, i.e. no phenomenon of play. ‘The peculiarity of games is 
thus that, on the one hand, they have authority over their participants, determining their 
goals and aspirations for the duration of the game, while on the other they exist in a 
concrete sense only through the participation of their players.’^  This phenomenon 
demonstrates that even though the participants of a game do not invent the game, the game 
does not exist until it is actually played. Gadamer illustrates quite nicely the implicit 
relation between ‘autonomy’ and ‘dependency’ by employing the image of festival 
celebrations:
Roy J. Howard. Three Faces ofHermerreutics. (Berkeley; University of California press, 1982), p. 143.
Chapter III 100
The Ontological and Hermeneutic Significance of Art
A festival exists only in being celebrated. This is not to say that it is of a subjective 
character and has its being only in the subjectivity of those celebrating. Rather the festival 
is celebrated because it is there. ’ (TM 110 / WM 118).
In its disclosure as play, tennis or any other game cannot be viewed in terms of a 
subject-object dichotomy. There is no ‘F and ‘it’. In the event of playing, the ‘I’ or ‘me’, 
i.e. the subject aspect, and the ‘it’, as the object, collapses and the only subject left is the 
movement, which is itself the play. What is more, this movement can never be repeated 
exactly in the same manner twice. As long as there is playing, play exists but with each 
new event of play, the unfolding of itself is different.
What occurs in the experience o f playing games, Gadamer suggests, is analogous to what 
occurs in the experience o f art. When one encounters a creation of art, e.g., examining a 
painting by Picasso or reading a poem by Rilke, a play begins, but not as ‘free play’ of 
imagination and understanding. Play which occurs in the experience of art is not an event 
thriving in the consciousness of the participating viewer; but rather as in game-playing, it 
is a ‘happening’, an event of disclosure and hiddenness. The experience of an artwork, like 
game-playing, creates a totally new environment into which the viewer of the artwork 
enters. There the viewer loses himself in the experience -  without the forgetfulness of 
being -  letting the play guide him; consequently, art has normative priority over the 
viewer.’” A person looking at a van Gogh does not say to himself, ‘I think I’ll look at the 
right corner of the painting and then move to the left before heading down to the bottom- 
left of the work’. He simply engages himself with the artwork, and through that 
engagement, allows the play of art to unfold itself -  that is to say, let art reveal itself. The 
viewer has no control of the happening of art, but simply participates by being engaged. 
We should not forget that to experience a work of art, in similar respect to game-playing, 
also requires a sense of seriousness. A person who is kicking a basketball cannot claim 
that he is seriously playing basketball. He is merely kicking an object; consequently, there 
is no play. Likewise, an onlooker who offers a mere glance to an artwork cannot claim 
that he experienced art; at best, he enjoyed briefly the pleasure of sense perception from 
the form of an object called a work of art. Thus, seriousness -  that is an open willingness 
for engagement -  constitutes an important element in the experience of art.
The separate reality of art however does not mean that tlie reahn of art is totally closed and discontinuous with tlie 
reality of the lifeworld. hi fact, as we mentioned above, the work of art is simply the transfonnation of the lifeworld 
reality, i.e. the truth of bemg, into an expressive image. The artist does not create that which does not belong to the
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Although the work of art has a normative priority over the viewer, the necessity of 
a viewer is fundamental for the existence of an artwork. Works of ait are representations, 
which only have concrete existence in being viewed. But even with a viewer to see the 
work of art, the experience of art itself cannot occur without a sense of willingness for 
engagement -  a metaphorical dialogue, if you will. In the experience of art we participate 
in a philosophical conversation, according to Gadamer. The beholder brings to this 
experience what he knows, what he has experienced, i.e. his history, but so too does the 
work of art. The artistic creation, Gadamer contends, also possesses its own authentic 
being. In fact, a work of art represents the ‘experience of being’ which the artist has 
transfused into an expressive image. As a creation of man, it therefore possesses history 
and yet at the same time because it is a creation (Gebilde) ‘the manifestation in question 
has in a strange way transcended the process in which it originated, or has relegated that 
process to the periphery. It is set forth in its own appearance as a self-sufficient creation’." 
In the aesthetic experience a fiision o f horizons occurs between the artwork and its 
beholder. The history o f the art and the histoiy of the viewer coalesce, creating the 
dialectic process through which the truth of being unconceals. The aesthetic moment, we 
must keep in mind, is a highly dynamic and flowing movement during which truth reveals 
and conceals itself simultaneously. Hence, we speak in terms of listening to what the work 
of art has to ‘say’, what it has to reveal. This to and fro movement of questioning and 
answering is the dialogical structure of understanding in the human sciences. It is an 
endless process in perpetual motion since tmth is unconcealment and hiddenness.
Because of the dual nature of tmth, when one experiences art (listening to a 
symphony, reading a poem, examining a painting etc. . .), that experience is always 
different. Although the work of art itself as an object remains essentially the same, i.e. 
self-identical, its content however constantly changes with each new encounter by the 
viewer. It is ‘[a]n entity that exists only by always being something different.’ . . . 
[‘Seiendes, das nur ist, indem es stets ein Anderes ist . . .’] (TM 110 / WM 117). Just as the 
content of games is concretised in the particular action and attitude of their players, the 
content and the meaning of works of art are concretised by the action and attitude of their 
audience. Gadamer tries to elucidate this position by means of the example of the 
performance of a play:
human experience. Art is tlie embodiment of experience, llia t is, the artist has captured the tnitli of being tliat he liimself 
has experienced. The coherence between tlie two realities is thus ontological.
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Their [the players or here actor’s and actress’] mode of participation in the game is 
no longer determined by the fact that they are completely absorbed in it, but by 
their playing their role in relation and regard to the whole of the play, in which not 
they, but the audience is to become absorbed. When a play activity becomes a play 
in the theatre a total switch takes place. It puts the spectator in the place of the 
player. He - and not the player - is the person for and in whom the play takes place.
. . .  In that the play is presented for him [the spectator], it becomes apparent that it 
bears within itself a meaning that must be understood and that can therefore be 
detached from the behaviour of the player. Basically the difference between the 
player and the spectator is removed here. The requirement that the play itself be 
intended in its meaningfulness is the same for both.’(99 / 105)
If the meaning of works of art only exist in relation to the audience and their particular 
circumstances in which they encounter the work of art (text, symphony, sculpture, painting 
etc.), the meaning of works of art is in some sense created and completed by the beholder. 
Thus the beholder who experiences works of art is essentially necessary for the possibility 
of art to possess significant meaningfulness. Here it seems that we run into the question of 
relativism again. If the meaning of an artwork depends on the beholder, the meaning of it 
then could vary infinitely, according to each viewer. But the beholder, Gadamer claims, is 
not completely free to chose capriciously the meaning of a work of art. The beholder is 
permitted a fair degree of freedom, but this does not imply that he or she is free simply to 
interpret or dream up what one wishes. For an interpretation to be an interpretation of a 
particular work of art and not for something other, it must be in some sense logically 
constrained by the given work of art itself. The particular artwork, in other words, 
exercises a degree of determination over the beholder’s response to it, otherwise criticism 
would seem to fall into utter anarchy. Just as games are dominating over their players, the 
work of art or the representation or performance of it also has a dominating force over its 
audience. In other words, just as the player of a game is flexible in playing the game 
within the framework of given rules and conventions, as flexible is the audience in 
interpreting works of art, i.e. giving meaning to it. Flayers can not change the rules of the 
game otherwise they would not play the same game. Of course this leaves the question 
open, what constitutes the meaning of a work of art, for example the meaning of a text? 
The meaning of a work of art is certainly not determined by the intention of its original
Gadamer. o ïAï V in The Relevance o f  the Beautiful, op. cit., 126.
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creator, the author of a novel or the composer of a symphony. The author simply provides 
the framework in which the work of art is to be interpreted. The meaning of a particular 
work of art is not to be reduced to the intention of the artist, since this would disregard and 
neglect the autonomous character of the work of art. As we stated earlier, in Gadamer’s 
view art is an attempt to represent truth. ‘Reducing its meaning to an expression of its 
author’s creativity reflects both, a failure to recognise its autonomy and, more importantly 
an unjustifiable restriction on the knowledge it contains.”  ^ The meaning or the truth of a 
given text, such as the Bible, continues to disclose itself in conversation. Through the 
fusion of the self-hood of the artwork and self-hood of the beholder, the meaningfulness of 
the art comes to light. But this does not imply that one person knows all or absolute truth:
One never obtains a final answer that one now “knows.” Nor does one take from it 
relevant information, and that takes care of that! One cannot fully harvest the information 
that resides in an artwork so that it is, so to speak, consumed, as is the case with 
communications that merely advise us o f something. Apprehending a poetic work, 
whether it comes to us through the real ear or only through a reader listening with an inner 
ear, presents itself basically as a circular movement in which answers strike back as 
questions and provoke new answers. . . . An art work is never exhausted. It never becomes 
empty. . . . No work of art addresses us always in the same way.’^
The tmth of art and all of the human sciences is in a sense a great ‘living puzzle’ which we, 
as a human community, must piece together. Because it is living, it is always changing, 
evolving as it continues to disclose and hide itself. The living character of truth is what 
makes our understanding of it a challenge, for it evades all interpretations and fortifies 
itself relentlessly against all endeavours to confine it into the identity of a concept.
§ 4.2 Understanding Antliority
To aid our understanding of art, Gadamer also speaks of listening to authority. The 
concept of authority, Gadamer explains, does not promote the idea of superiority of power, 
which demands blind obedience. To listen to authority instead signifies that one owns the 
humility and the willingness to concede superior insight to the other voices that resound 
tradition and the past. In Gadamer’s view, listening to authority means the suspension of 
disbelief. It is optimism or open faith to the idea that ‘other’ has not only something
" Georgia Wamke. op. cit., 55.
"  ‘Reflections on My Pliilosophical Joimiey’, op. cit., 44
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different to say but also a better insight from which one can learn. Gadamer essentially 
adopts the Socratic docta ignoraniia\ the sustained awareness of not-knowing {das Wissen 
des Nicht-wissens). For Gadamer human wisdom involves a conscious acceptance of one’s 
own fmitude and ignorance, i.e., the modesty to recognise that one does not know 
everything and thus is willing to open to what is ‘other’ and learn from others and what the 
past has to teach. Gadamer himself admits;
I myself remember how I disputed with an experienced scholar about an academic 
matter, which I claimed to know with certainty. He abruptly instructed me in my 
error on this issue and when I asked him, in a very embittered tone, “How do you 
know that?” his answer was: “When you are as old as I, you’ll know it too.” That 
was a coiTect answer. . . .Most of the time we cannot say why this or that 
philosophical or historical conjecture of a beginner is “impossible.” It is a question 
of tact that is acquired through unrelenting interaction with the subject matter, but it 
cannot be taught and demonstrated.
In the same way, when we engage a work of art, we must trust ourselves to the authority of 
the work of art. That is, we must be open to the idea that the artwork has something true to 
offer. The suspension of disbelief however does not suggest that we should be so foolish 
to keep our eyes entirely shut and accept openly everything that is given; rather in total 
contrast it proposes that we always keep both eyes opened, so that we are aware of what 
the artwork has to reveal while at the same time being suspicious of what it offers. 
Suspicion, here, is not a negative notion in any sense, for what it implies is caution and 
consideration balanced together with openness. One must, according to Gadamer, have the 
wisdom to question, reflect and evaluate all knowledge.
To summarise, the experience of art ‘manifests’ itself through dialogue between the 
beholder and the work of art. Through the interchange of question and answer, the 
‘manifestness’ of art unfolds itself -  that is, art discloses itself in its selfsameness. Once 
the play o f art ‘manifests’ itself, its movement is independent of the viewer and the artwork 
itself. The experience of art moreover moves in a direction which viewer cannot foresee. 
The dialogue, which occurs in the experience of art, is what enables us to generate new 
thoughts. In the spontaneous act of utterance, new understandings modify, develop and 
deepen our previous understandings of the subject matter and so of ourselves. We come to
‘Truth in tlie Human Sciences’, op. cit., 28. See also ‘Reflections on My Philosophical Journey’, op. cit., 33.
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know the self in a different light. Conversation is the primordial convention by which we 
are transformed.
The constitution of aesthetic meaning is thus the amalgamation of the experiences 
of the beholder with the truth-content of the work of art itself. As such, the truth of a work 
of art is always relevant to the lives it speaks to. ‘[N]o text and no book speaks if it does 
not speak the language that reaches the other person’ (TM 358 / WM 375). The task of the 
viewer then is to find the appropriate language of interpretation in order to listen to the 
work of art speak. In order to understand the meaning of a work of art, the audience has to 
apply the truth content the work of art imposes on them from the perspective of their own 
concerns and problems -  this is the only approach available since we cannot detach 
ourselves from ourselves. Gadamer concludes:
Interpretation is probably, in a certain sense, re-creation, but this re-creation does 
not follow the process of the creative act, but the lines o f the created work which 
has to be brought to representation in accord with the meaning the interpreter finds 
in it. (107/114)
According to Gadamer, works of art are representational in as much as they bring truth to 
light and reveal the essence of their subject matter to an audience. The essence is the 
essence of its audience and therefore it cannot be eternally the same but is rather relative to 
the different audiences. The truth-claim the work of art imposes on their audience cannot 
be specified outside the particular situation or circumstances in which the work of art is 
perceived. Therefore the work of art has no determined meaning in the sense E. D. Hirsch 
would impose, i.e. the intention of the author. Gadamer explains:
A claim [Anspmch'\ is something lasting. Its justification (or pretended 
justification) is the first thing. Because a claim continues, it can be affirmed at any 
time. A claim exists against someone and must therefore be asserted against him; 
but the concept of a claim also contains the idea that it is not itself a fixed demand, 
the fulfilment of which is agreed by both sides, but is, rather, the ground for such.
A claim is the legal foundation for an unspecified demand’ (112 /120).
Having examined thus far the nature of aesthetic experience by analogy of play, in the next 
section we shall investigate Gadamer’s understanding of mimesis or imitation and how this 
concept is used to defend further the experience of truth in art.
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§ 4.3 Gadamer’s Revival of the Theory of Mimesis
In the Republic, Plato condemns art, for it does not represent the ideal or the eternal 
forms but imitates only a secondary reality T  He therefore sees art as an imitation of an 
imitation, consequently, standing three times removed from reality and the truth. Plato 
asserts; ‘The art of representation is therefore a long way removed from truth, and it is able 
to reproduce everything because it has little grasp of anything, and that little is of a mere 
phenomenal appearance."” Gadamer, however, contends that this critique of art given by 
Plato is extremely ironic and dialectical, and he further explains that we need to reconsider 
our understanding o f mimesis taught to us by the Classicism of the eighteenth century, 
which evidently accepted blindly Plato’s assertions concerning art given in the Republic. 
In Gadamer’s view, mimesis is simply the imitation or copy (Abbild) of something 
original, offering no cognitive knowledge of any kind. The notion of mimesis, as he sees 
it, embodies the meaning of ‘representation’ (Darstelhmg) and recognition in 
representation. He states:
. . .  in the representation of art, recognition is operative, which has the character of 
genuine knowledge of essence, and since Plato considers all knowledge of being to 
be recognition, this is the ground of Aristotle’s remark that poetry is more 
philosophical than histoiy. Thus imitation, as representation, has a clear cognitive 
function. (TM 103 / WM 110).
This position is not too surprising, given that in his earlier elucidation of play, he asserts 
that art is ‘representational’ and that the experience of art or the aesthetic play is a form of 
self-representation. In claiming that art is representational, Gadamer, we recall, does not 
imply that the work of art necessarily constitutes a depiction o f an actual event. He insists 
that modern paintings, for example Impressionism and Cubism, still remain mimetic 
although they avoid conventional representation of objects. Even when the representation 
does not perceptually mimic the natural world, we can nevertheless see in modern 
paintings a representation of the lifeworld. Gadamer explains:
We start from the position that the mode of being of the work of art is 
representation [Darstellung] and ask ourselves how the meaning of representation 
can be verified by what we call a picture [Bilcf]. Representation cannot here mean 
copying. We shall have to define the mode of being of the picture more exactly by
" S e e  Plato. The Republic FartX. §1. (Trans. Desmond Lee. 2"'’ ed. London: Penguin, 1987). 
" lb id .,X . §1 598 b.
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distinguishing the way in which the representation is related to something that is
original, from the relation o f the copy to the original. (TM  122 / WM 131)
In distinguishing mimesis as copy {Abbild) of reality from mimesis as representation or the 
‘appearance of what is there’ (1 2 1 /  131), Gadamer demonstrates that the concept of 
imitation neither needs to refer solely to the notion of reality ‘in itself nor that art exactly 
re-produces. He argues that although art represents an essence of the lifeworld, this aspect 
is not one that is apparent outside the work of art, i.e. the representation, itself In his view 
the work of art is not merely a reproduction of reality that can be identified independently 
from the work of art and used to assess the adequacy of its re-presentation. ‘The world 
which appears in the play of representation’, he argues, ‘does not stand like a copy next to 
the real world, but is the latter in the heightened truth of its being’ (121 / 130). In other 
words, artistic representations do not provide an exact mirror of reality. What the artwork 
illuminates, as an expressive representation, is the particularly heightened experiences or 
events of life, while concurrently minimising the importance o f other aspects of reality. 
Functioning as such, artistic representations disclose (as well as conceal) ‘reality’. And 
reality, as Gadamer explains, is what is ‘untransformed’. What is more, he claims that art 
is the raising up {Aufhebtmg) of that reality into its truth. Truth, as we have already 
examined, is an aspect of human experience or of being that has been given an emphasis 
and illuminated for all to witness. Gadamer’s account of artistic trutli is closely affiliated to 
tlie Heideggerian concept of trutli as alêtheia (unconcealment). As mentioned previously, witli 
his literal translation of tlie Greek word alétheia, Heidegger triggered a profound 
reconsideration concerning the understanding of truth. If we recall, for Heidegger the 
meaning of truth cannot be fully exhausted by simply acknowledging it as the agreement or 
coherence of something to something, i.e. Adequatio intellectus ad rem -  a definition that 
is commonly accepted as truth. To recognise something correctly or truthfully, Heidegger 
explains that ‘the fact must show itself to be fact if knowledge and the proposition that 
forms and expresses knowledge are to be able to conform to the fact; otherwise the fact 
cannot become binding on the proposition’." Truth in a sense is always identified with the 
degree of correctness. But in order to understand and to verify the correctness of a 
proposition, one really has to go back to something that is already evident. The starting
"  Martin Heidegger: Der Ursptwig des Ktmstwerkes. (Stuttgart: Pliilipp Reclaim Jun., 1995), p. 49. ‘Damit jedocli das 
Erkemien imd der die Erkeimtuis ausformende imd aussageude Satz sich der Sache anmessen kaiui, damit dem zu vor die 
Sache selbst ftk deu Satz verbindlich werdeu kami, muB doch die Sache selbst sich als seiche zeigeu.’ lire  English
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point, Heidegger contends, is the unconcealment of the being {des Seienden). 
Unconcealment, as it were, situates us in a condition of being that in representation, we 
always remain installed and in attendance upon an unconcealment. Thus he claims:
That which is can only be, as a being, if it stands within and stands out within what 
is lighted in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guaranties to us humans a 
passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we 
ourselves are. Thanks to this clearing, beings are unconcealed in certain changing 
degrees.’®
If artistic representations disclose the truth of reality, then, that truth is something which 
cannot be obvious or immediately intelligible. Truth is something which has to be 
revealed. The work of art, i.e. artistic representation, in essence provides a medium to 
show the truth by extricating its subject matter from that which it considers as nonessential 
while simultaneously revealing the most significant. Therefore artistic representation 
cannot be a mere copy or a repetition of the events o f the ‘real’ world. That is, the work of 
art does not capture the world like it ‘really’ is or as it is. It is something different and yet 
still remains connected to the original in a quintessential sense. ‘Hence representation 
remains limited in an essential sense to the original {Ur~Bild\ that is represented in it’ (TM 
124/WM 133).
Moreover, in representation there is also the ‘transformatio’ of human play into 
structure {Venmndhmg ins Gebilde), i.e. into the truth of which the perfection of art 
consists. Gadamer uses the term ‘transformation’ deliberately instead of the term change 
since ‘change’ categorically implicates that the thing which is changing remains to a 
certain degree qualitatively the same. By employing the concept of transformation, 
however, Gadamer emphasises that the play becomes something completely new; it 
becomes Gebilde (a structure, i.e. a creation). With the transformation into Gebilde^'^ the 
play attains ‘the character o f a work, o f an ergon and not only of energeia’ (TM 99 / WM 
106). Therefore it has an independent and superior mode of being {Seinsweise), extricated 
from the contingency o f the reality. Moreover, play transformed into Gebilde possesses an
trmislation is found in ‘The Origin of tlie Work of Art’, Pliilosophy o f  Art and Beauty, (Edited by Albert Hofstadter and 
Richard Kulins. T ie University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 678.
‘Das Seiende kaim als Seiendes nur sem, wemi es in das Gelichtete dieser Lichtung liinein-und hinaussteht. Nur diese 
Liclitung schenkt imd verbürgt uns Menschen einen Durchgang zmu Seienden, das Mr selbst iiicht sind, mid den Zugang 
zu dem Seienden, das wir selbst shid.’ ibid., p. 51.; (trans.) pp. 679-80.
"  From here on I will elect to use the German word Ge~bilde since this already implies tliat tlie work of art must be 
something which is gebildet, i.e. foraied. The Gebilde is the result of the process oTBild-img. Furthermore the German
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absolute autonomy over the performer, the audience and the creator, i.e. the artist himself. 
This autonomous mode of being {Seinsweise) of the play as Gebilde is, as Gadamer puts it, 
‘always realisation, sheer fulfilment, energia which has its telos within itself.’(101 /108). In 
so far as it is Gebilde, it has its standard within itself and does not measure itself with 
anything external to it. In play the Gebilde unfolds itself as it is in its selfsameness, i.e. it 
brings into the open what is usually concealed and withdrawn. Hence, Gadamer concludes 
that a comparison o f the work of art as Gebilde with reality as a strict standard of pictorial 
resemblance is not possible. The Gebilde is above all such comparison because it utters a 
‘superior’ truth., i.e. the tmth of being and not the coherence or correspondence of facts. 
The Gebilde is in itself a unified and self-contained whole. Through the Gebilde, a closed 
circle of meaning {Sinnkreis) is represented which one could not discover in ‘daily’ reality 
since reality is always seen in anticipation of the future, in which there lie undecided 
possibilities. Therefore reality does not allow the possibility to grasp completely the 
coherence of meaning {Sinnziisammenhang) since the future is always undetermined. In 
this regard, the Gebilde (work of art) seems to elevate beyond reality, in that it reveals 
knowledge and truth that is, under ‘real’ circumstances, unrecognisable. Through the work 
of art, we ‘re-cognise’ and comprehend its truth because the represented subject matter in 
the work of art, transformed into the Gebilde, is freed from its contingency. The 
consequences and ramifications of the events represented are entirely contained within the 
boundaries of the Gebilde. Therefore the meaning of the subject matter takes on a certain 
stmcture and closure. ‘We therefore see what the work of art has taught us to see, but this 
means that we cannot verify the representation by comparing it to an original because we 
already see the original in its l i g h t . I n  Gadamer’s view the ‘represented’ is not simply 
‘there’ in the world but is actual!sed through the artistic representation, i.e. ‘it has in this 
way come to exist more frilly (TM 103 / WM 109). This argument underlies a premise that 
we have to acknowledge the element of Imowledge {Erkenntnissim) which is implicated in 
the concept of mimesis. Gadamer defines the nature of "Erkemdnissimf of mimesis as 
‘re-cognition’ (Wiedererkenmmg).^^ He states;
word pemrits associations witii other foniis of tlie word like Bild, Bildung, gebildet, wliich are not possible in tlie English 
translation.
Wanike. op. cit., 59.
■’ Gadanier connects tliis cognitive function of art to Plato’s accoimt of anamnesis (remembrance). He argues tliat this 
Platonic idealism is already suggested in the phenomenon of recognition. ‘The “known” enters into its true being and 
manifests itself as what it is only when it is recognised.’ (TM 103 / WM 109) By considering all knowledge of being to 
be recognition, Plato provides tlie gromid of Aristotle’s remark that poetry is more philosoplhcal tlian liistory. (Aristotle, 
Poetics 9, 1451 b 6)
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[T]he essence of imitation consists precisely in the recognition of the represented in 
the representation. A representation intends to be so true and convincing that we do 
not advert to the fact that what is so represented is not ‘real’. Recognition as 
cognition of the true occurs through an act of identification in which we do not 
differentiate between the representation and the represented. . . . Recognising 
something means rather that I now cognise something as something that I have 
already seen. The enigma here lies entirely in the ‘as’. I am not thinking of the 
miracle of memory, but of the miracle of knowledge that it implies. When I 
recognise someone or something, what I see is freed from the contingency of this or 
that moment of time. It is part of the process of recognition that we see things in 
terms of what is permanent and essential in them, unencumbered by the contingent 
circumstances in which they were seen before and are seen again.
According to Gadamer, the phenomenon of mimesis is uniquely a primordial event, for its 
essences consist namely in ‘recognition’. The concept of recognition implies that there is 
interpretation and understanding of something. What this means is that the mimetic, as 
representation {Darstelhmg), is itself the recognition of something as something as well as 
the object which should or ought to be recognised, i.e. understood, as something in itself. 
In art there is, we can say, a ‘double recognition’. The first is the recognition and 
interpretation of being which the artist has experienced and captured, and the second event 
of recognition occurs in the viewer who sees or recognises in the representation the being 
which the art embodies. The mimetic and the aesthetic experiences, as we can see, are 
clearly forms of knowledge.
The work of art essentially teaches us to see or recognise and re-cognise the subject 
or content represented in terms of the tmth it discloses. In picking out and emphasising 
certain features or aspects of life, artistic representations teach their audience more about 
the tmth of being which previously was not apparent or understood. In fact, what the work 
of art does is to open up continuously other perspectives of an already familiar subject to 
the audience, albeit in a heightened form. When one engages an artwork, one sees 
something which is on one hand familiar and still on the other new and unknown. The 
meaning of recognition stands somehow, on Gadamer’s view, between familiarity and 
newness. ‘The joy of recognition’, Gadamer states, ‘is rather that more becomes known 
than is already known. In recognition what we know emerges, as if through an
The Rele\’ance o f  the Beautiful and other Essays, op. dt., 99.
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illumination, from all the chance and variable circumstances that condition it and is
grasped in its essence’ (TM  102 / W M  109). The work of art is not only representational but
has also an educational and pedagogical function. The work of art represents its subject
matter in such a way that the understanding of the audience is enhanced and refreshed with
each new encounter. It always provokes a confrontation or rather a conversation with the
audience, with their lives, since the audience experiences work of art as ‘authoritative’ and
views its own world from a new perspective provided by the particular representation.
It [recognition] does not simply reveal the universal, the permanent form, stripped
of all our contingent encounters with it. For it is also part of the process that we
recognise ourselves as well. All recognition represents the experience of growing
familiarity, and all our experiences of the world are ultimately ways in which we
develop familiarity with that world. . . .  All art of whatever kind is a form of
recognition that serves to deepen our knowledge of ourselves and thus our
familiarity with the world as well.^^
Here, Gadamer already reverses the mimetic relation between the representation and what
is presented (i.e. the original, Ur-Bild)- He does not view the mimetic relationship as a
single-sided issue, i.e. he does not recognise that representations, like the copies, point to
something that is really existing outside itself. Gadamer emphasises the mutual
dependency between the world and the world of art and he states; ‘Without the mimesis of
the work the world is not there as it is there in the work, and without reproduction the work 
is not there. Hence, in representation, the presence of what is represented is completed’
(TM  121-22 / WM 131). A copy only wants to be seen ‘as i f  it were something which it
resembles, the original {Ur~Bild), but a copy is just a repetition (Wiedergabe) of something
and not something as something in itself. Furthermore, it does not have the function to
provoke reflection, comparison and distinction. Its flinction exhausts itself simply in
pointing to the original that it resembles. Its self-hood lies only in identification with
something which itself is not, and it raises itself only in the sense that in its fonction it
fulfils itself in its self-repeal {Selbstaufhebtmg). A picture on the contrary is not defined by
its self-repeal. A picture does not function as a means to an end. The self-hood or
meaning of a picture is self-contained, insofar as it is important how the representation is
represented. This means that we are not simply led away from the picture to what is
represented in the picture. The representation rather remains essentially connected to what
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is represented and belongs to it. Gadamer illustrates this ‘connection’ with the example of 
a miiTor image. The picture in the mirror -  we usually call image -  depends on the 
presence of what stands in front of the mirror and therefore the mirrored picture exists only 
insofar as something is reflected. What is represented in the mirror and the object of that 
representation is inseparable. One cannot differentiate between the representation and 
what is represented. It is therefore the picture of the represented and not the picture of the 
mirror that is reflected. One can say in the end that the crucial difference between 
representation and copy lies in their different function. While a copy simply points to 
something with which it identifies, fulfilling its purpose in the act of self-repealing, a 
picture or representation meanwhile remains ontologically inseparable from the 
represented and therefore its intention lies in the original unity and ‘non-differentiation’ 




Since the age of Enlightenment, the ‘existential’ question of the humanities and 
social sciences has been the question of truth; that is to say, can the human sciences claim 
truth? If we follow the traditional line of thinking and claim that the criterion of truth is the 
absolute ‘correspondence’ or ‘coherence’ of some given thing to some given other, then the 
human sciences must concede that they do not possess tmth. One explanation is obviously 
due to the reason that there is no such thing as a ‘given’ in the human sciences and so no 
archimedian point or standard position from which to evaluate the subject of the human 
sciences or a fixed end-point to which an evaluation can arrive. If we examine the language 
of the human sciences, we can see that nearly every concept bears multiple meanings. A 
simple example is the concept of happiness. We know, or rather we have a sense of what it 
means to be happy or to have happiness but to define it as it is in its selfsameness, is an 
unreal!sable task. Whatever definition we give to it is merely an artificial explication which 
attempts to describe, as close as possible, its tme essence. Concepts which belong to the 
human sciences are expressive more so than explanatory, and they always open to further 
elucidation and interpretation. As such what is ‘given’ in the language of the human 
sciences, in a manner of speaking, is then simply the continuous development of concepts 
which constantly grow in their meaningfulness. This, of course, makes all attempts to 
condense them into a univocal absolute impossible. This consequently means that there is 
no way of generating ‘absolute agreements’ in the human sciences. The only disciplines 
which can generate or uncover the corresponding certainties of ‘given’ things are the 
modern or natural sciences. This is strictly due to the language and method which they 
utilise. As we mentioned previously in this thesis, the modern sciences employ a unique 
system of ‘sign language’ that enables them to transform concepts into a specific sign, i.e. 
words are ‘given’ an exact designation, which when processed or tested by the method of 
induction or deduction, the ‘agreement’ of something given to some other given can be 
determined. The static and ‘closed’ nature of scientific concepts, together with scientific 
method, is what allows the modem sciences to discover the pre-existent absolutes or the 
cosmic order of the natural world.
Hence, if we determine that tmth is the absolute ‘agreement’ of something to 
another, then it becomes solely discoverable through the method of modern sciences. And 
tliis naturally leaves the human sciences, as they say, ‘in the cold’ or more precisely in 
relativism. However, as we have discovered, for Gadamer the concept of tmth is not
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merely the perfect and unchanging agreement of something to something or the experience 
of truth something which can be delimited to the natural sciences. In his view, there are 
experiences of truth which transcend the sphere of the control of scientific method.' But to 
discover such truth(s), he argues one has to reconceptualise the meaning of truth. 
According to him, prior to all understandings of truth as correspondence or coherence, truth 
is unconcealment or disclosure. This recognition of truth as unconcealment is of course the 
adoption of Martin Heidegger’s ontological and phenomenological definition of truth as 
alêtheia, given in Being and Time? Alêtheia, as I elucidated in Chapter I, is what the ancient 
Greeks understood as unliiddenness, i.e., the self-presentation of being or the uncovering- 
of-self as it is in itself It is the hermeneutical understanding of truth, which is 
phenomenological and less correspondence.
Heidegger’s revival of alêtheia, as it were, emancipated the human sciences from its 
artificial comparison with the modern sciences and offered Gadamer a new way of 
conceiving the human sciences. The relationship between ‘tm th’ and ‘method’, which was 
advocated by the Romantic tradition of Schleiermacher and sustained by the 
"geisteswissenschaftliche'’ hermeneutics of Dilthey, is rejected by Gadamer in favour of the 
ontological and phenomenological understanding of truth as revealed by ‘hermeneutics of 
facticity’. This is first demonstrated through the exposition of the guiding humanistic 
concepts.
If we recall, the concepts Bildung, sensus communis, judgement and taste all 
represent not only a mode of knowing but also of being. These concepts, we discovered, 
represent a tradition though which we acquire ‘practical’ and ‘common’ Icnowledge 
concerning the idea of a moral-political being. According to Gadamer, concepts such as 
Bildung help us to reach out and discover the ‘otherness’ while simultaneously modifying 
and cultivating one’s moral and social being. However, the knowledge and understanding 
one gains by way of the humanistic concepts cannot be learned either by instmction or 
through any scientific system, but only acquired through concrete practice. In other words, 
knowledge of this kind transcends the boundaries of method. For instance, lonowing what is 
good judgment cannot be grasped through scientific method, in that, first of all, an absolute
' TM xii /  WM xxviii
’ If we recall, Heidegger establishes tlie priority of the trutli of ‘Dasein’ over tlie concept of trutli as certainty hi Sein 
nnd Zeit. Refer to Chapter I, § 2. 4 .
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judgment does not exist. Judgment is not a rule that can be processed through method. It 
rather has the character of sense or intuition, which one has to develop through its practical 
use. Seeing things from right and sound points of view, i.e. judging, requires practice and 
letting every instance or use of judgment shows itself as being either right or wrong, good 
or bad. It is only through continuous experience that one comes to discover the meaning of 
‘sound judgement’. Experience in this sense is the unconcealing of judgement. Every 
experience of judgment discloses a sense of understanding.
In the same way, the Geisteswissenschaften also render knowledge and 
understanding which cannot be logically uncovered, but only disclosed through concrete 
practice, that is, through the concrete practice of conversation. In every aesthetic 
experience, e.g. listening to Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, watching Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest or looking at a water lily painting by Monet, Gadamer contends that there is a play 
which occurs between the object and its audience. But this aesthetic play, he explains is not 
subjective, neither as in the Kantian notion of ‘free play’ of imagination and understanding 
nor as according to Schiller’s notion ‘play impulse’ (Spieltrieb), but a dialectical and 
dynamic event, wherein a ‘fiision of horizons’ transpires. In his view, evei-y ‘serious’ 
encounter with a work of art leads to a genuine conversation -  albeit a metaphorical 
dialogue -  between the work of art and its beholder, effectively provoldng questions, which 
when answered opens to further questioning -  akin to Socratic dialectic. The movement of 
this conversation, Gadamer believes, is autonomous, and yet its existence depends on the 
viewer. As the conversation unfolds so too does the experience of art, i.e. the event in 
which the self-presentation of being discloses itself. In simpler terms, the truth of art or the 
expression of being unconceals itself. But this is not to suggest that the whole truth, i.e. 
complete unconcealment, unfolds in the experience of art. As it were, we never ‘see the 
whole picture’. The reason for this is that hermeneutical truth is manifest and concurrently 
obscure; it is both unconcealment and hiddenness. The unconcealment of being is an 
endless process; a ‘bad infinite’ as Gadamer calls it. Coupled with the fact that we are finite 
beings, the character of hermeneutical tmth as disclosure and hiddenness unfortunately 
permits us to discover only a limited ‘profile’ of truth. ‘All human speaking’, Gadamer 
explains, ‘is finite in such a way that there is within it an infinity of meaning to be elaborated 
and interpreted. That is why the hermeneutical phenomenon also can be illuminated only in 
the light of this fundamental finitude of being, which is wholly linguistic in character’ (TM
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416 /  W M  434). Thus, with each new encounter with a work of art, whether it is the same 
work or something new, a new or different conversation evolves, and we discover 
something wholly new (and yet at the same time it is something very familiar). This 
however does not imply nor guarantee that one necessarily will change ones position with 
each new experience. In fact one may maintain the same position with every encounter, but 
that position will always be differently developed than the one with which one began.
Gadamer’s elucidation of the experience of ait serves as a paradigm for all the 
hermeneutic disciplines. It shows that we must overcome and transcend the false aesthetic 
consciousness, originating with Kant, which distorts hermeneutic truth. Rather than 
abstracting art from the lifeworld, and separating it from ourselves, we must instead become 
in a sense ‘one’ with the art through dialogue, through language. In every encounter with 
music, history, literature or philosophy, we communicate and engage in a conversation, 
asking questions while concurrently being open to questions ourselves. What is more, such 
experiences require one to listen attentively to language which the music or novel speaks. 
But every experience is a different experience; consequently, we always add to our 
understanding not necessarily something qualitatively better but something different, 
something more, i.e., a new perspective. But is this so different from the natural sciences? 
Have they discovered or rather uncovered absolutely everything? The answer is obviously 
no. The natural sciences are far from unconcealing all there is to know. Hence, they too 
only possess a limited profile of truth. Of course, the discoveries of certainties are possible 
in the natural sciences. Theorems, for instance, are unchanging. But every theorem is the 
product of an existing theorem and has therefore some relation to another theorem, creating 
a giant web or a tree of theorems, which remains incomplete. This seems to parallel the 
meaningfulness of concepts -  concepts that belong to the human sciences of course. If we 
recall the concept of happiness, this term also possesses a wealth of meaningfulness that 
creates a web of meanings, which, like the web of theorems, remains incomplete. As new 
theorems are discovered, the web of theorems enlarges; likewise, as new ideas of happiness 
unconceal themselves, the concept also further expands.
Thus, the question of natural sciences, like the question of human sciences, is a 
question of discovery. Both the natural sciences and the human sciences seek to 
understand: the former search for understanding of the outer world while the latter pursues 
understanding for the inner world, the being of human beings. In both instances, the
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hermeneutic experience of knowing leads to further knowing. The commonness in both 
fields of study is that all phenomena of understanding eventually lead to self-understanding.
In concluding, the first major section of Truth and Method we can summarise as 
Gadamer’s attempt to demonstrate a concept of truth which is not restricted or limited to 
the narrow concept of scientific truth or to the truth of matter of facts (Taisachenwahrheit). 
He does this first by introducing the humanistic concepts, which demonstrate knowledge 
that can neither be denied nor minimised as Tesser’ knowledge or subjective knowledge. 
This is followed by the experience of art. Gadamer essentially determines the ontology of 
the work of art through the model of ‘play’. This model serves as the elaboration of a non- 
subjectivistic concept of art, which does not reduce the value of the artwork through an 
overvaluing of the perceiver’s respond. In connection with the concept of play, Gadamer 
also show how the concept of mimesis has been misunderstood, and sets out to demonstrate 
the fundamental differences between copy and representation and recognition in 
representation. In this regard I have tried to clarify Gadamer’s intention to overcome the 
Kantian notion of aesthetic experience (Eiiebnisasthedk) and consequently how we should 
reconsider the meaning of aesthetic autonomy, i.e. the autonomy of art.
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